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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis investigates how socialization in three selected institutions, 
namely the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF) and the UN Security Council (UNSC) has led to pro-norm 
behaviour on the part of Vietnamese officials. This behavioural change was 
evidenced by their support for the creation of an ASEAN Human Rights Body, the 
adoption of Preventive Diplomacy Papers in the ARF and internalization of the 
Responsibility to Protect as an emerging norm at the Security Council. Empirical 
findings in the thesis show that socialization occurred across three case-studies, 
eliciting pro-norm behaviour on the part of state officials, though to varying 
degrees. These findings confirm the plausibility of socialization as a source of 
cooperative behaviour among state agents within social environments. In addition, 
they provide insights into the slow but increasingly active and substantive 
cooperation in political and security areas where Vietnam has historically been 
reluctant. The thesis concludes with a suggestion that socialization could be an 
extremely useful framework for investigating how far Vietnam might go beyond 
verbal support for new norms, given the country has recently embarked on a new 
phase of integration. Vietnam now attaches great importance to the 
implementation of international commitments that it has made, and considers this 
a guiding principle for the country‘s new integration strategy. Socialization 
processes could yield insights about the likely extent of norm internalization and 
compliance in this new period.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Background and research questions 
Vietnam today is an increasingly active and important actor on the world 
stage. A major part of this new activism has been greater participation in regional 
and global institutions.
1
 While Vietnam‘s increased involvement in international 
institutions is not a wholly new phenomenon,
2
 the extent to which it has been 
affected by participation in these groups remains understudied. This thesis 
explores Vietnam‘s involvement in three important political and security 
institutions it joined in the post-Cold War period. In particular, it investigates if 
and how socialization inside these groups has changed Vietnam‘s behaviour to 
become more cooperative - a shift manifested in norm-taking - on some key 
political and security issues, where historically it has been reluctant to deepen 
cooperation.   
 
The thesis is framed around the following questions: what did Vietnamese 
officials learn from participation in discussions and deliberations at these regional 
                                               
1 Phạm Gia Khiêm, ―Ngoại giao Việt Nam năm 2010: Vững bước trên con đường hội nhập và phát 
triển‖ [Foreign affairs of Vietnam in 2010: Steady advance on the path of integration and 
development], Tạp chí Cộng sản 819 (2011):14-20; Phan Doãn Nam, ―Ngoại giao Việt Nam trong 
25 năm Đổi mới: 1986-2010‖ [Vietnam‘s diplomacy after 25 years of renovation, 1986-2010], Tạp 
chí Cộng sản 814 (2010): 42-6. 
2 Beginning with the normalization of relations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
World Bank (WB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 1993 and especially its accession to 
ASEAN in 1995, in the 1990s Vietnam also joined other institutions such as the ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the Asia-Europe Meeting 
(ASEM). The first decade of the 21st century has witnessed the country‘s further integration into 
the world community, gaining membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2006 and 
becoming a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 2008-
2009. Vietnam is currently participating in the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations (TPP), a free 
trade area that composes of twelve members. This is in marked contrast with the limited 
involvement in institutional life in the period 1977-1991 when Vietnam only participated in the 
United Nations, some of its functional agencies, and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). 
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and international institutions? Did socialization lead them to change their minds 
on issues and associated norms that they considered sensitive and with risks for 
the country‘s security and development, and if so, how? Did a change in their 
attitude lead to change in their preferences?  
 
Up to now most scholarly works on Vietnam‘s participation in 
international institutions have focused on the costs and benefits of participation. 
Much less attention has been paid to if and how Vietnam has changed in the 
process.
3 
Of the work that is available,
 Vietnam‘s membership in the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) is the case that scholars claim has brought about the most 
extensive changes. In addition to technical changes such as legal and institutional 
reforms,
4
 Vietnam‘s integration into the WTO has arguably made an important 
contribution to ―changing its old thinking, shaping and consolidating a new 
thinking on all fields.‖5 In particular, Vietnam now sees itself as an equal player in 
regional and global playing fields and admits that in that position it cannot act 
however it likes.
6
 Rather, it has to behave in conformity with common norms and 
rules if it is to maximize national interests.
7
 
                                               
3 The study of Vietnam‘s membership in ASEAN is a case in point. Many authors have explored 
the strategic, political, security and economic benefits as well as threats and challenges to Vietnam 
that has come about by participation in ASEAN. See for example, Carlyle A. Thayer, ―Vietnamese 
Foreign Policy: Multilateralism and the Threat of Peaceful Evolution,‖ in Vietnamese Foreign 
Policy in Transition, eds. Carlyle A. Thayer and Ramses Amer (Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 1999), 1-24; Ralf Amer, ―The Indochinese Enlargement of ASEAN: Security 
Expectation and Outcomes,‖ Australian Journal of International Affairs 59, no 1 (2005): 71-88;  
Jorn Dorsch, ―Vietnam's ASEAN Membership Revisited: Golden Opportunity or Golden Cage?‖ 
Contemporary Southeast Asia 28, no. 2 (2006): 234-58; Carlyle A. Thayer, ―Vietnam‘s Regional 
Integration: Domestic and External Challenges to State Sovereignty,‖ in Vietnam’s New Order: 
International Perspectives on the State and Reform in Vietnam, eds. Stephanie Balme and Mark 
Sidel (New York: Palgrave Macmilan, 2007), 31-50; David W.P. Elliott, Changing Worlds: 
Vietnam's Transition from Cold War to Globalization (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 
150-52.  
4 See Nguyễn Quang Thuấn, Năm năm Việt Nam gia nhập WTO [Vietnam‘s participation in the 
WTO in the first five years] (Ho Chi Minh City: Nhà xuất bản Khoa học Xã hội, 2013). 
5 Đặng Đình Quý, ―Nhìn lại năm năm sau gia nhập WTO: Một số tác động về đối ngoại và bài học 
đối với Việt Nam‖ [Vietnam‘s participation in the WTO after five years: Implications and lessons 
for the country‘s external relations], Nghiên cứu Quốc tế 88 (2012): 8.  
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid.  
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While legal and institutional reforms are technical and conventional in the 
sense that they are obligations of any WTO member, Vietnam‘s recognition of the 
importance of norm-guided behaviour as part of its involvement in the WTO 
reflects a more fundamental change. On the one hand, Vietnam came to accept 
norms and rules and admitted that acting consistently with such norms and rules 
constitutes good behaviour. Put differently, what Vietnamese officials learned 
from participating in the WTO was that as a member Vietnam needed to act as 
norms and rules prescribe. On the other hand, such a change in perception 
occurred after Vietnamese officials directly engaged and dealt with other 
members in the WTO on a wide range of issues. Therefore, the recognition of and 
compliance with norms and rules is a perception change that came as a result of 
endogenous interactions inside the WTO.  
 
Change in terms of norm acceptance on the part of Vietnam as a result of 
participation in the WTO thus raises an important issue: whether the same 
phenomenon also occurs in institutions other than the WTO and in issues other 
than economic and trade cooperation? This study seeks to identify and explain 
change in the form of norm-taking with a view to enriching the existing literature 
on how much Vietnam has changed as a result of participation in international 
institutions. 
Explaining norm - taking  
There are two possible explanations for an actor‘s approval of 
international norms.
8
 The first is a material approach which follows the logic of 
consequences and stresses that material side-payments and coercion motivate an 
                                               
8 On logics of social actions, see for example, Thomas Risse, "Constructivism and International 
Institutions: Toward Conversation across Paradigms," in Political Science: State of the Discipline, 
eds. Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2003), 600-4; 
Kjell Goldmann, "Appropriateness and Consequences: The Logic of Neo-Institutionalism," 
Governance 18, no. 1 (2005): 35-52. 
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actor‘s decisions. In the materialist account, if an actor comes to accept certain 
norms inside international institutions, it does so in order to gain material rewards 
offered by the group or to avoid costs that might result from opposing them. 
Material incentives dominate neo-liberal explanations of international regime 
creation: states accept norms associated with the creation of regimes in order to 
pursue their given interests. In contrast, a second account advanced by 
constructivists follows the logic of arguing and of appropriateness. In this 
constructivist perspective, an actor adopts particular norms because they, through 
engaging and arguing with norm advocates, become convinced that such norms 
are correct or appropriate.  
 
Constructivist accounts of norm adoption are fully captured in 
socialization theory developed by Alastair Iain Johnston.
9
 The theory assumes that 
even in the absence of exogenous material threats or promises, cooperation can be 
achieved through socialization. As Johnston observes, various definitions of 
socialization exist across the social sciences in general and political science in 
particular. Since these definitions share common themes, socialization can 
generally be understood as a process of social interaction through which novices 
or newcomers - be they individuals or states - learn to adopt, internalize and take 
for granted particular ways of thinking or acting, values, norms, attitudes or 
behaviour that are accepted, practised or upheld by the groups that they belong 
to.
10
 Specifically, socialization in the International Relations literature - from a 
constructivist perspective - refers to the process that new states, or those with 
limited participation in international life, come to adopt international norms.
11
 
 
According to Johnston, the degree to which socialization works - how 
likely it is that an actor will come to adopt and internalize norms - depends on the 
                                               
9 Alastair Iain Johnston, "Treating International Institutions as Social Environments," International 
Studies Quarterly 45, no. 4 (2001): 487-515. 
10 Ibid., 494-6. 
11 Ibid. 
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characteristics of the actor and the working environment of particular institutions. 
Of the former, Johnston argues that socialization effects will be most likely to 
happen if actors are newcomers whose noviceness is defined in terms of their 
(normally low) level of participation in institutional life. From this perspective, if 
actors are newcomers to an institution it will be much more likely for them to 
accept the norms embedded in that institution.  
 
On the latter, Johnston suggests that institutional design matters in creating 
environments that are more conducive to socialization processes. This is because 
it is through these processes that a novice would engage in arguing, reasoning, 
interpreting or judging arguments conveyed by others upon a particular issue and 
associated norm. Johnston identifies three socialization processes, namely 
mimicking, social influence and persuasion. A more detailed analysis of what 
these processes are and how they work will be provided in chapter two. Here only 
a brief description of these mechanisms is provided: (i) mimicking is the act of 
copying behaviour of others in a group. This process happens when a novice actor 
enters an uncertain environment and in such a novel environment, that actor 
chooses to act like others in the group in order to survive; (ii) social influence is 
an indirect socialization process that arguably leads an actor to support the 
position advocated by the group through the distribution of social rewards or 
punishments; (iii) persuasion is a process that arguably leads to change in an 
actor‘s behaviour and preferences, thus creating common knowledge or a 
homogenization of interests. As such, persuasion is the key socialization 
mechanism. Johnston suggests that in order for these socialization processes to 
work, the most effective environments are those that are informal, weakly 
institutionalized and run on the basis of consensus.
12
  
 
                                               
12 Ibid., 511. 
6 
 
As a research program, socialization is at a nascent stage. There have been 
comparatively few works testing socialization theory in East Asia.
13
 As Johnston 
himself has pointed out, the study of institutions in Asia-Pacific should be a good 
focus for socialization research since a systematic study of institutions and 
socialization in this region has been ―underdeveloped.‖14 Exploring Vietnam‘s 
involvement in international institutions since the end of the Cold War is one way 
to extend the empirical research on socialization. Although Vietnam has been seen 
by some as a potential target for socialization by the more established ASEAN 
members, it has not been used as a case to test socialization theory.
15
  
The case of Vietnam 
There are at least four reasons why socialization could be a useful 
explanatory framework in the case of Vietnam. First, the country is, to some 
degree, a novice and thus a target for socialization in the international institutions 
it has joined in the post-Cold War era. Although what constitutes a ―novice‖ is not 
clearly defined, empirical research on the cases of China
16
 and ex-communist 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe
17
 implies that the concept has both 
quantitative and qualitative aspects. The quantitative aspect of noviceness is a 
state‘s overall level of participation in international institutions, while the 
qualitative aspect stresses differences in the way of thinking and acting between 
the targeted state and the communities that the state wishes to join.  
                                               
13 Alastair Iain Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980-2000 (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2008); Alice D. Ba. "Who's Socializing Whom? Complex 
Engagement in Sino-ASEAN Relations," The Pacific Review 19, no. 2 (2006): 157-79. 
14 Alastair Iain Johnston, ―Conclusions and Extensions: Toward Mid-Range Theorizing and 
Beyond Europe,‖ in International Institutions and Socialization in Europe, ed. Jeffrey T. Checkel 
(Cambridge University Press, 2007), 1037. 
15 See for example, Amitav Acharya, "Asian Regional Institutions and the Possibilities for 
Socializing the Behaviour of States" (Working Paper, Asian Development Bank, 2011); See Seng 
Tan, "Herding Cats: The Role of Persuasion in Political Change and Continuity in the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)," International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 13, no. 2 
(2013): 233-65. 
16 Johnston, Social States. 
17 Jeffrey T. Checkel, ed., International Institutions and Socialization in Europe (Cambridge 
University Press, 2007). 
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Vietnam‘s noviceness in a qualitative sense should be understood in the 
sense that the country is a new member acting in new institutional environments 
which cover novel issues and have different styles of communication and 
interactions, different language and norms. These institutions often include a 
diverse range of participants, including former rivals. ASEAN, the ASEAN 
Regional Forum and many other institutions are examples where Vietnam now 
sits along with states it formerly considered enemies. Taking into consideration 
both quantitative and qualitative aspects of noviceness, Vietnam is arguably a 
novice participant in post-Cold War international institutional life. It was clearly 
in new and challenging surroundings during the 1990s when it joined ASEAN, 
ARF, and APEC. Vietnam was also on unfamiliar ground when it joined the WTO 
and the United Nations Security Council in the first decade of the 21
st
 century. 
That said, there is no doubt that it has become more experienced as time has 
passed and as its overall participation rate has increased.  
 
Second, Vietnam‘s perception of international integration has elements in 
common with Johnston‘s idea of socialization. For instance, in a recent review by 
a senior Vietnamese official, one of the prominent features of the first phase of the 
country‘s international integration was described as its participation in multilateral 
institutions that are associated with norm-taking.
18
 However, the review does not 
elaborate on which norms Vietnam has adopted as a result of participation in 
multilateral institutions, or how and why.  
                                               
18 Đặng Đình Quý, ―Bàn thêm về khái niệm và nội hàm hội nhập quốc tế của Việt Nam trong giai 
đoạn mới‖ [On concepts and contents of Vietnam‘s international integration in the new period], 
Nghiên cứu Quốc tế 91 (2012): 26. In addition to norm-taking, the most recent Politburo 
Resolution on international integration released in April 2013 also stated that Vietnam should 
seriously implement its international commitments, be active in setting international rules and 
norms and effectively take advantage of such rules and norms. Integration in the Vietnamese 
perspective can therefore be described as a process of active acceptance and application of and 
participation in setting international rules and norms in a manner that would best serve its national 
interests. See ―The Politburo Resolution no. 22-NQ/TW on International Integration,‖ April 10, 
2013, http://www.mofahcm.gov.vn/mofa/bng_vietnam/nr080212094156/ns130709211917. 
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Third, there is a need to take into consideration both social and material 
factors in examining the process through which Vietnam has come to adopt 
international norms. Given that the country has experienced nearly two decades of 
involvement in institutional life, the level of interactions - engaging with others - 
has increased accordingly. As a result, there is a possibility that in a certain 
context and depending upon a particular issue, decisions to adopt norms can be 
made because of peer pressure or pressure resulting from membership. This is 
where socialization theory, which accounts for norm-taking in the absence of 
material influences, can step in to make empirical research more insightful. 
 
Finally, socialization theory is also relevant in the case of Vietnam 
because it suggests testing the effects of socialization on an actor‘s behaviour in 
security issues.
19
 In fact, Vietnam has long been reluctant to expand and 
substantiate cooperation in political and security issues. The country‘s integration 
process started with economic cooperation and gradually expanded to other 
areas.
20
 There were two main reasons for this: first, the domestic socio-economic 
crisis in the 1980s cried out for economic reform and integration; second, it was 
the Vietnamese leadership who had been heavily influenced by Marxism that 
determined that integration should start in economic field.
21
 It was not until the 
Xth National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) in 2006 – 
                                               
19 Johnston, ―Treating International Institutions as Social Environments,‖ 509. 
20 On Vietnam‘s perception of integration, especially economic integration, see Nguyễn Vũ Tùng, 
ed., Chính sách Đối ngoại Việt Nam: 1975-2006 [Vietnamese foreign policy, 1975-2006] (Hanoi: 
Học viện Quan hệ Quốc tế, 2007), 220-63; Phạm Bình Minh, ―Chủ động và tích cực hội nhập quốc 
tế theo tinh thần nghị quyết Đại hội Đảng toàn quốc lần thứ XI‖ [Proactive international 
integration in line with the Resolution of the XIth National Congress of the Communist Party of 
Vietnam], Nghiên cứu Quốc tế  91 (2012): 5-18.  
21 Despite the collapse of the socialist bloc in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe, Vietnamese 
leaders were persistent in taking the country toward socialism based on Marx‘s predictions on the 
transition toward socialism. See Elliott, Changing Worlds, 119-21; Documents adopted at the 
VIIth National Congress of the CPV in 1991, especially the section on economic reforms, 
incorporated various elements that were similar to those in Lenin‘s New Economic Policy (NEP). 
See ―Documents of the VIIth National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam,‖  
the Communist Party of Vietnam, 1991, 
http://dangcongsan.vn/cpv/Modules/News/ListObjectNews.aspx?co_id=30145.  
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twenty years after Doi Moi (Renovation)
22
 was launched - that expanding 
cooperation in other areas beyond economic integration was raised. Documents of 
the Xth Congress call for Vietnam to: ―proactively and actively engage in 
international economic integration while expanding international cooperation in 
other fields.‖23 More recently, even prior to the XIth National Congress of the 
CPV in 2011, there was still opinion among some quarters that there should be no 
integration in political and security areas.
24
 Therefore, it is important to trace the 
development of Vietnam‘s thinking on cooperation in the previously closed areas. 
The Xth National Congress of the CPV in 2006 was significant in the sense that it 
marked a turning point and reflected a change in the perception of the Vietnamese 
leadership on the need to expand cooperation in other areas beyond economic and 
trade. This raises the question of why and how the Vietnamese leadership changed 
their minds to become more cooperative in areas where historically they have 
been reluctant. Socialization can help provide insights into important aspects of 
Vietnam‘s integration strategy.  
Methodology 
Having made the case that there are good reasons to study Vietnam‘s 
norm-taking inside international institutions, this next section discusses how 
specifically to examine the process through the lens of socialization. It starts with 
decisions about case selection with a view to testing socialization. The second part 
sets out the main hypothesis and the third section identifies the main research 
methods used, the sources required by using those methods and the structure of 
the thesis chapters that follow. 
                                               
22 Doi Moi (Renovation) is a comprehensive reform process officially launched at the VIth 
National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam in 1986. This grand strategy started with 
economic reform, aiming to help the country get out of the domestic socio-economic crisis and the 
external blockage and embargoes that Vietnam was subjected to throughout the 1980s.  
23 ―Documents of the Xth National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam,‖ the Communist 
Party of Vietnam, accessed February 20, 2013, http://chinhphu.vn/portal/page/portal/ English 
24 Interview by author in Hanoi, March 25, 2013. 
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Case selection 
Which institutions should we look at if Vietnam is a good example to 
examine in the framework of socialization? Based on their importance in 
Vietnamese foreign policy and the suggestions of the socialization theory, the 
thesis looks at Vietnam‘s membership in the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) as three main case studies. In relation to Vietnamese 
foreign policy, ASEAN, the ARF and the UNSC are among the most important 
institutions the country has joined since the end of the Cold War and they reflect 
Vietnam‘s involvement in institutional life at the sub-regional, regional and global 
levels. The importance of these three institutions is confirmed in the most recent 
Documents of the XIth National Congress of the CPV adopted in 2011.
25
 One 
might also add Vietnam‘s membership in the WTO as another milestone in the 
country‘s foreign policy. However, the case of WTO membership is not chosen as 
a case study here since the organization deals with what are arguably less-
sensitive issues of economics and trade. And as was noted above, since the 
highest priority in Vietnam‘s integration process is given to economic 
cooperation, this means the WTO is not a hard case for testing socialization: 
complying with the WTO‘s norms and rules is a means to reap the direct benefits 
afforded by membership. It might also be argued that the country‘s participation 
in security institutions such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) could be cases worth studying. 
However, participation in these two institutions arguably came with very low 
costs for Vietnam.
26
  
 
                                               
25 Vietnam has made specific commitments on the fulfilment of obligations and showed 
determination to take on a new role as a proactive and responsible member, especially in ASEAN, 
regional security forums like the ARF, and the United Nations. The Documents of the XIth 
National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam can be accessed at http://chinhphu.vn. 
26 Vietnam signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 1996 and ratified this Treaty in 
2006.  
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In relation to socialization theory, ASEAN, the ARF, and the UNSC cover 
some of the key political and security issues which Vietnam has historically found 
challenging, thus providing an acid test for Vietnamese cooperation. For example, 
Vietnam‘s membership in ASEAN might impose policy constraints when it comes 
to reconciling hard-won sovereignty and regionalism.
27
 Similarly, one can argue 
that by participating in the UNSC, Vietnam only puts itself in a more difficult 
situation, because interactions with major powers, particularly the United States 
and China, could impose greater pressure.  
 
In addition, these institutions vary in the extent to which they are 
institutionalized and they therefore allow us to consider institutional features as a 
factor that makes them conducive (or not) to socialization. Johnston suggests that 
the most effective environments for socializing actors are informal, weakly 
institutionalized and consensus-based institutions. On this basis, both ASEAN and 
the ARF would be the ideal cases to look for outcomes of socialization, since their 
institutional designs closely match Johnston‘s criteria. In contrast, the UNSC is 
strongly institutionalized. However, given this study is one of theory testing, the 
UNSC is chosen as a ‗least-likely‘ case to test the effects of socialization in order 
to see if the theory is confirmed or not. 
Hypothesis  
As Johnston assumes, socialization leads an actor to support and 
internalize prevailing norms in institutions it joins. The thesis therefore starts with 
the hypothesis that socialization, particularly persuasion as a key socialization 
process, has occurred in the three selected institutions, leading Vietnam to support 
and internalize particular norms embedded in those institutions. In order to test 
this hypothesis, the following section will specify, in each of the institutions, the 
                                               
27 Thayer, ―Vietnam‘s Regional Integration: Domestic and External Challenges to State 
Sovereignty,‖ 31-50. 
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issue and associated norm that Vietnamese officials might have been persuaded 
by others to support.  
ASEAN 
ASEAN is a sub-regional institution in Southeast Asia. It was formed in 
1967 with five founding members, including Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand. Enlargement occurred with the accession of Brunei in 
1984 and then of a group of four states in the second half of the 1990s. Vietnam 
joined ASEAN in 1995.
28
  Over nearly two decades of participation, Vietnam has 
become more committed to the group: it makes an active contribution to the 
building of ASEAN into a Community and constructing a collective identity. One 
of Vietnam‘s most notable endeavours in deepening regional cooperation is its 
recent support for the creation of an ASEAN Human Rights Body (HRB), 
developing for the first time a shared perspective with other ASEAN members on 
one of the most controversial issues on the organization‘s agenda. The proposal 
was initiated in 1993 but it was not until 2007 when the ASEAN Charter was 
drafted that consensus was reached among ASEAN members to make it real. 
Vietnam‘s decision to support the creation of the HRB was significant because 
discussing human rights issues intra-regionally has long been considered a taboo 
in its foreign policy. 
 
The drafting of the ASEAN Charter revealed sharp debates on whether a 
HRB should be established. The Task Force in charge of drafting the ASEAN 
Charter was split and their deliberations turned into a negotiation between two 
groups: participants from older ASEAN members who supported the initiative and 
those from newer members, namely Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam 
                                               
28 Laos and Myanmar entered ASEAN in 1997 and Cambodia in 1999. 
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(CLMV) who were reluctant.
29
 However, the latter group finally agreed to the 
creation of the HRB. For the first time, Vietnam broke the taboo, agreeing to take 
on regional responsibility in this sensitive area. There are two possibilities for 
Vietnam‘s support of the HRB. Socialization theory would suggest that through 
discussions the Vietnamese representative found that arguments conveyed by 
representatives from older ASEAN members were persuasive and came to 
acknowledge that creating a HRB was a worthy common interest. Conversely, 
materialist theories would expect to see side-payments or coercion in order for 
Vietnam to go along with the initiative.  
ARF 
The ARF is a regional security forum formed in 1994 with a view to 
alleviating uncertainty caused by fundamental changes in the Asia-Pacific security 
environment after the end of Cold War.
30
 Vietnam was one of the first group of 
states to join the ARF in that year. A Concept Paper adopted in 1995 set out a 
three-stage process for the ARF‘s development: Stage I is on the promotion of 
confidence-building measures (CBMs); Stage II is on the development of 
preventive diplomacy mechanisms; and Stage III is on the development of conflict 
resolution mechanisms.
31
 Unlike ASEAN, the ARF as a process has not 
                                               
29 Tommy Koh, "The Negotiating Process," in The Making of the ASEAN Charter, eds. Tommy 
Koh, Rosario G. Manalo and Walter Woon (Singapore; Hackensack, NJ : World Scientific Pub. 
Co., 2009), 47-68. 
30 Khong Yuen Foong and Helen E.S.  Nesadurai, "Hanging Together, Institutional Design, and 
Cooperation in Southeast Asia: AFTA and the ARF," in Crafting Cooperation: Regional 
International Institutions in Comparative Perspective, eds. Amitav Acharya and Alastair Iain 
Johnston (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 58. On the formation and 
evolution of the ARF, see also Ralf Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in 
ASEAN and ARF (New York: Routledge Cruzon, 2003), 10-39; Alice D. Ba, (Re)Negotiating East 
and Southeast Asia: Region, Regionalism, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 
(Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2009), 159-92; Rodolfo C. Severino, The ASEAN 
Regional Forum (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), 1-22; Noel M. Morada, 
―The ASEAN Regional Forum: Origins and Evolution,‖ in Cooperative Security in the Asia-
Pacific: The ASEAN Regional Forum, eds. Jurgen Haacke and Noel M. Morada (London & New 
York: Routledge, 2010), 13-35. 
31 ―The ASEAN Regional Forum: A Concept Paper,‖ The ASEAN Regional Forum, August 1, 
1995, http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/files/library. 
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experienced upheavals over the past decades. The institution has moved smoothly 
with Stage I and confidence-building measures, which are low-cost measures to 
adopt. Disagreement among members only began regarding the institution‘s 
embarkment on the second stage of preventive diplomacy (PD). Tracing the 
development of the ARF, deliberations on preventive diplomacy were most 
intense in the period 1997-2001. There were two broad groups of states in the 
ARF‘s PD deliberations. Vietnam was part of a reluctant group that also included 
China, Russia, India and almost all ASEAN members.
 
Meanwhile, a group of 
activist members including Japan, the United States, Australia and Singapore 
pressed for the acceptance of PD. Deliberations between these two opposing 
groups eventually saw the reluctant side agree to the adoption of three documents 
in 2001, namely the Paper on Concepts and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy 
(PD paper), the Terms of Reference for the ARF Experts/Eminent Persons 
Register and the Paper on the Enhanced Role of the ARF Chair (hereinafter PD 
papers collectively).
32
 This seems a case where prima facie the argument could be 
made that Vietnam, as a reluctant member, was finally persuaded to go along with 
the adoption of PD papers, paving the way for the Forum to embark on the second 
stage of its development. 
UNSC 
Vietnam served a two-year term as a non-permanent member of the UNSC 
in 2008-2009. Unlike ASEAN and the ARF where Vietnam has participated for 
nearly two decades, the UNSC was a totally new environment. While many 
diverse international norms are debated at the UNSC, in 2008-2009 Vietnam 
found itself closely engaged with the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) as a new 
emerging norm. The evolution of RtoP from an idea to a norm also met with 
strong opposition, especially from developing countries. Vietnam was no 
                                               
32 ―Chairman‘s Statement of the Eighth Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum,‖ ASEAN 
Regional Forum, July 25, 2001, http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/library/arf-chairmans-
statements-and-reports.html. 
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exception. Prior to the 2005 World Summit, Vietnam opposed RtoP. However, 
this position gradually changed: In 2005-2007, the country was described by one 
R2P advocate as a ―fence-sitter‖ but by 2008-2009 had become ―RtoP-
engaged.‖33  
 
Vietnam‘s support for RtoP was reaffirmed in various statements, stressing 
the primary role of states in protecting their people and the role of the 
international community, first and foremost the United Nations, in helping the 
countries concerned. If the Responsibility to Protect is just another expression of 
the old and controversial concept ―humanitarian intervention‖, why and how did 
Vietnam come to adopt this norm while it still strongly upholds the non-
intervention principle and opposes humanitarian intervention, especially military 
intervention? The possibility again is that through deliberations at the UNSC, 
Vietnamese officials came to a new understanding of RtoP, recognizing that it 
was not the same as humanitarian intervention and becoming convinced that it 
was appropriate and even needed in the world today. 
 
In short, the thesis tests the hypothesis that persuasion has occurred in 
three selected institutions and that Vietnam came to support the group‘s position 
on the issues debated and associated norms. Did persuasion work in changing 
Vietnamese officials‘ attitude from opposing to supporting the creation of 
ASEAN HRB? Did it lead them to agree with the adoption of the Preventive 
Diplomacy Documents? Was persuasion the most plausible explanation for 
Vietnam‘s endorsement of RtoP? These questions will be answered in separate 
chapters in an effort to provide a full account of the events surrounding Vietnam‘s 
norm-taking behaviour. 
                                               
33 Alex J. Bellamy and Sara E. Davies, ―The Responsibility to Protect in the Asia-Pacific Region,‖ 
Security Dialogue 40, no. 6 (2009): 547-74. 
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Methods and sources  
 Methods 
 Given the research design is one of theory-testing and its goal is to identify 
and assess evidence on the causal processes that might lead to changes in 
Vietnam‘s attitude and preferences on the above issues, the primary method used 
is process tracing.
34
 George and Bennett define process-tracing as a method that 
―attempts to identify the intervening causal process - the causal chain and causal 
mechanism - between an independent variable (or) variables and the outcome of 
the dependent variable.‖35 This method focuses on generating and assessing the 
evidence of the operation of hypothesized causal mechanisms within the confines 
of a case(s) under examination.
36
 The collected evidence thus allows analysts to 
judge whether the hypothesized explanation is adequate or not. More specifically, 
for case studies that may have a number of potential causes, tracing the processes 
that may have led to the expected outcome can help narrow the list of these 
possible causes by eliminating at least one or several rival explanations. For those 
cases with one main explanation, process tracing can help identify alternative 
causes that have led to the same outcomes.
 37
  
 
In the case of Vietnam, tracing the process of participation by state 
representatives, primarily diplomats, in the discussions and deliberations in 
ASEAN, the ARF and the UNSC will help collect evidence of the operation of 
                                               
34 On process tracing as a qualitative research method, see Alexander L. George and Andrew 
Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press, 2004), 205-32; Pascal Vennesson, ―Case Studies and Process Tracing: Theories and 
Practices,‖ in Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences: a Pluralist Perspective, eds. 
Donatella Della Porta and Michael Keating (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 223-
39; Andrew Bennett, ―Process Tracing: A Bayesian Perspective,‖ in The Oxford Handbook of 
Political Methodology, eds. Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Henry E. Brady and David Collier, 
(Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 702-21; Jeffrey T. Checkel, ―Process 
Tracing,‖ in Qualitative Methods in International Relations: A Pluralist Guide, eds. Audie Klotz 
and Deepa Prakash (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), 114-30. 
35 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 205. 
36 Ibid., 214. 
37 Ibid., 207. 
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persuasion as the primary hypothesized causal mechanism. In other words, it 
helps provide insights into if and how these state agents were persuaded to 
support the group‘s position on issues under examination. Given their 
involvement in the shaping of the country‘s foreign policy, tracing the process of 
participation by Vietnamese representatives in deliberations also sheds light on 
how their changed attitudes were reflected in policies on the issues debated in the 
selected institutions.  
 
For the purpose of testing socialization theory, process-tracing evidence 
found in the Vietnam case not only helps test Johnston‘s assumptions about the 
causal micro-processes, but it may also reveal potential causes other than 
socialization that could have led to change in behaviour on the part of the state 
agents. In addition, close scrutiny of the Vietnamese experience provides insights 
into the conditions under which micro-socialization processes are more or less 
likely to occur, contributing to the improvement of the theory. 
Sources 
 Since process tracing is the main method of this research, the key sources 
for this thesis are semi-structured interviews and documents analysis. The core 
group of interviewees include leaders in the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MOFA) and senior officials and experts who either directly or indirectly 
were involved in the deliberations at the selected institutions. In particular, 
interviews were conducted with officials from the following MOFA Departments: 
  
 ASEAN Department: This Department is in charge of activities at both 
ASEAN and the ARF. Semi-structured interviews were carried out with 
senior officials and experts who have participated in ASEAN and ARF 
activities, particularly those directly involved in the ARF‘s deliberations 
on Preventive Diplomacy in the late 1990s and early 2000s and in the 
drafting of the ASEAN Charter in 2007.  
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 International Organizations Department: This Department is in charge of 
Vietnam‘s participation in international organizations, primarily at the 
global level such as the UN. Interviews focused on those in charge of the 
country‘s participation in UN activities in general and the UNSC in 
particular, especially officials who worked at the Mission in New York in 
the term 2008-2009. 
 
 Foreign Policy Department: This Department is in charge of policy 
advising and planning, speech writing, coordinating with other 
departments and monitoring the implementation of Vietnamese foreign 
policy through different periods.  
 
 West Asia and Africa Department: This department is in charge of 
Vietnam‘s relations with countries in these two geographical regions. 
Since the UNSC agenda in general and in the 2008-2009 period in 
particular covered various issues in African states, there has been close 
coordination between this Department and the International Organizations 
Department as well as with the Foreign Policy Department.  
 
 Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam - MOFA’s think tank: There is a small 
group of officials from the Academy who participate in ASEAN and ARF 
activities at both Track I and II. DAV has become more involved in the 
foreign policy making process and its voice now carries more weight than 
before. 
 
 Other bodies: Officials from the Party‘s Central Committee for External 
Relations were also interviewed because this body also participates in the 
foreign policy making process. 
 
Semi-structured interviews offer a number of advantages. First, they help 
provide background information of the issues debated. Second, they help open 
―behind-the-scenes‖ environments that officials are involved in and provide a 
better understanding of the characteristics of participants such as their initial 
preferences, beliefs and attitudes of the institutions and of other actors, and level 
of autonomy from their principals during deliberations. These are crucial factors 
in measuring how conducive to socialization the working environment in each 
institution is and which socialization process - mimicking, social influence or 
persuasion - is more likely to happen in such an environment. Third, interviews 
can help confirm the accuracy of information collected from various sources so as 
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to determine which documents are more reliable. Of equal importance, interviews 
help determine how and to what extent officials‘ experience and knowledge - 
gained from participation in international institutions - have been reflected in the 
formulation of particular policies.  
 
Process tracing also requires collecting and reading archival documents. 
Those used in this study include the following: 
 Primary sources: Unpublished documents such as MOFA department 
reports, talking points on specific issues, proposals and policy 
recommendations; reviews of Vietnam‘s participation in international 
institutions, particularly in ASEAN and the ARF which are normally made 
every five years, and assessment of the country‘s two-year term at the 
UNSC; and various research projects done by MOFA departments. 
 
 Secondary sources: Published documents such as the Documents of the 
Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) released at the Party Congress held 
every five years
38
 to review all aspects of the country‘s development over 
the previous five years and charting the orientation for the following five 
years. Other published sources include books and monographs. Books and 
journal articles on Vietnamese foreign policy are widely available both in 
Vietnamese and English and the two most relevant Vietnamese journals 
for this study are Tạp chí Cộng sản (the Communist Review) and Nghiên 
cứu Quốc tế  (International Studies). The latter is a publication of the 
Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam. 
 
Primary sources are of critical importance for this study. First, confidential 
documents are the most valuable sources that provide background information, 
helping build a detailed chronology of events under examination that may not be 
fully achieved only through interviews. Second, while the general orientation and 
guidelines of Vietnamese foreign policy can be found in published documents, its 
position and that of other concerned parties on particular issues can rarely be 
understood through these sources. Such information can only be acquired through 
accessing the primary sources and conducting in-depth interviews as mentioned 
                                               
38 The most recent is the XIth National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam which was 
held on January 12-19, 2011. Its Documents can be accessed at http://www.cpv.org.vn. 
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above. In addition, published documents are not always suited to explaining 
processes of change.   
 
Although there were some difficulties in conducting personal interviews 
and accessing archival materials, for example the mobility of Vietnamese 
diplomats with whom interviews were sought and the limited access to primary 
sources as provided by MOFA‘s working procedures, the author of this thesis is 
well-placed to conduct this study. Having worked for the Diplomatic Academy of 
Vietnam (DAV) for more than ten years, I have good contacts in the MOFA. 
Many of the interviewees are my colleagues. These people introduced me to 
higher ranking officials at the MOFA for interviews and material access, 
particularly confidential documents stored at relevant MOFA departments. 
Published documents can easily be found at the DAV Library because it is set up 
for MOFA research activities with unlimited access for research fellows and 
diplomats. 
Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is composed of seven chapters, including chapter one, which 
serves as an Introduction. Chapter two provides a review of the constructivist 
approach to institutional effects and state behaviour. Constructivism goes beyond 
neo-realism and neo-liberalism in showing how powerful institutions can be in 
influencing state actions. In a constructivist perspective, institutions do not only 
have regulative but also constitutive effects on states as actors. In particular, they 
play a significant role in socializing states to accept new norms and values.  
 
Chapter three looks into the institutional design and features of ASEAN, 
the ARF, and the UNSC as the three selected institutions and the characteristics of 
the Vietnamese participants who were directly involved in deliberations and 
discussions at these institutions. The goal of this chapter is to measure the degree 
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to which the different social environments are conducive to persuasion, as the 
main hypothesis to test the effects of socialization. 
 
Chapters four, five and six constitute the main part of the thesis. Using the 
lens of socialization theory, these chapters investigate the most plausible 
explanation for Vietnam‘s changed attitude toward supporting the creation of the 
ASEAN HRB, the adoption of Preventive Diplomacy Papers, and its 
internalization of the Responsibility to Protect as an emerging norm, respectively. 
Each chapter seeks to identify the main socialization mechanism(s) that have led 
to this attitudinal change (and possibly changed preferences) in those key political 
and security issues.  
 
These three chapters follow the same format. Each begins with an 
introduction which is in essence a brief summary of the chapter. This is followed 
by a detailed chronology of events or background of the issues debated, in which 
Vietnam‘s initial position and its changed attitude toward convergence with that 
of the group is highlighted. The third section starts by reminding the reader of the 
specific hypothesis and a brief analysis of how the working environment and the 
characteristics of the Vietnamese participants are conducive to socialization. It 
then relates a socialization account in changing the behaviour of Vietnamese 
participants on the issue examined. These accounts make up the heart of the three 
chapters.  
 
Chapter seven - the conclusion - provides a brief summary of the main 
empirical findings and makes some generalizations on Vietnam‘s changed 
behaviour toward cooperation inside international institutions during the period 
covered by this study. I conclude there is some evidence that mimicking, social 
influence, and persuasion, individually or in combination, happened across the 
three case studies and exerted their social effects which led to the attitudinal 
change on the part of Vietnamese officials. Based on the available evidence, I 
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argue that socialization can provide a plausible explanation for Vietnam‘s 
decisions to support the creation of ASEAN HRB, the adoption of the Preventive 
Diplomacy Documents and internalization of the Responsibility to Protect as a 
new international norm. Empirical findings in the case of Vietnam therefore 
support constructivists‘ claims about the significance of social factors in 
explaining the development of pro-norm behaviour among states.  
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CHAPTER II  
INSTITUTIONAL EFFECTS: A CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACH 
 
This chapter provides a review of the constructivist approach to studying 
how institutions influence state behaviour, especially with regard to the process 
through which states come to accept international norms. Why constructivism? It 
is because in both theoretical and empirical works constructivists go much further 
than neo-realists and neo-liberals in claiming significant institutional effects on 
state actions. For realists, the role of institutions in world politics is insignificant 
because they are the creation of self-interested states, thus being subjected to 
change and reform by their creators.
39
 As a result, institutions exert no 
independent effects on states.
40
 With regard to norm-taking, neo-realists argue that 
it is powerful states who set norms and rules and that ―they would only agree to 
those norms and rules with which they can comply rather effortlessly.‖41  
 
Neo-liberals grant a greater role for institutions. In neo-liberal perspective, 
states create institutions to further their interests, but once formed institutions can 
constrain and shape state behaviour. Institutional effects can be grasped when one 
understands fundamental problems that institutions address. According to 
Keohane and Martin, these problems include coordination and the fear of 
cheating.
42
 Of the former, Stein argues institutions - in the form of multilateral 
                                               
39John J. Mearsheimer, ―The False Promise of International Institutions,‖ International Security 
19, no. 3 (1994-1995): 5-49; Kenneth N. Waltz, ―Structure Realism after the Cold War,‖ 
International Security 25, no. 1 (2000): 5-41. 
40 Institutions can at best work as intervening variables, but in a very restrictive circumstance. See 
Robert Jervis, ―Security Regimes,‖ in International Regimes, ed. Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1983), 173-94.  
41 Risse, ―Constructivism and International Institutions: Toward Conversation across Paradigms,‖ 
616. 
42 Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, ―The Promise of Institutionalist Theory,‖ International 
Security 20, no.1 (1995): 45. 
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norms or conventions rather than strong formal organizations - help facilitate state 
cooperation through the provision of a focal point that allows actor expectations to 
converge upon one of the possible equilibria, serving as a basis for their 
cooperation.
43
  
 
Of the latter, Keohane believes that institutions can help in three 
distinctive ways.
44
 First, institutions work as monitoring mechanisms of state 
behaviour, creating and increasing a sense of obligation among states to adhere to 
rules and agreements. Second, institutions help reduce transaction costs. 
Specifically, international regimes establish rules and principles of legitimacy so 
interactions among states that violate these principles will be costly. In this aspect, 
institutions do not only create an increased sense of obligation but also provide for 
specific retaliation to prevent attempted cheating or possible free riding 
encouraged by multilateral norms. Third, institutions help provide information in 
order to reduce uncertainty about others‘ intentions, preferences, and their 
willingness to implement commitments.  
 
In short, the significance of international regimes on state behaviour in the 
neo-liberal view lies primarily in their regulative effects, the monitoring and 
enforcement of states‘ compliance with agreements, norms and rules. The issue of 
whether institutions have any impact on the process in which states come to 
accept norms is not important to neo-liberals. This is because they assume that 
when states negotiate to create institutions, they have already agreed upon 
particular norms and rules governing their behaviour. What is more important in 
                                               
43Arthur A. Stein, "Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World,‖ International 
Organization 36, no. 2 (1982): 314. See also Duncan Snidal, "Coordination versus Prisoners' 
Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes," The American Political 
Science Review 79, no. 4 (1985): 923-42; Lisa L. Martin, "Interests, Power, and Multilateralism," 
International Organization 46, no. 4 (1992): 765-92.  
44 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), chapter 6. 
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this view is whether states would comply with such norms and rules and how 
effective institutions are in making them conform.  
 
In contrast, the issue of how and why a state comes to adopt and 
internalize international norms is the core question in constructivist studies of 
institutional institutions.  Constructivists believe that institutions have significant 
impacts on states with regard to norm-taking. The following sections will provide 
more insights into the constructivist perspective on institutional effects and norm-
taking as a key behavioural change on the part of states resulting from 
endogenous interactions in institutional environments. 
Constructivism  
According to Jeffrey Checkel, constructivism with its strong roots in 
sociology provides an alternative to the rationalist approach to the study of 
international politics.
45
 The constructivist approach emphasizes the social aspect 
of the environment in which states act. It argues that their identities and interests 
are generated by and changed as a result of such social interactions. In other 
words, actors do not exist independently from their social environment. 
Constructivism therefore contrasts sharply with realism in three ways. First, it 
sees states as social actors in the sense that their identities and interests are 
endogenous, rather than exogenous, to interactions.
46
 Second, states and structures 
are mutually constructed. Constructivists place considerable emphasis on the 
constitutive aspect of interactions that contributes to the (re)shaping of state 
identities and interests. Third, while neo-realists assume state interests and 
                                               
45 Jeffrey T. Checkel, ―The Constructivist Turn in International Relations,‖ World Politics 50, no. 
2 (1998): 14. For an updated introduction on constructivism, see also Emanuel Adler, 
"Constructivism and International Relations," in Handbook of International Relations, eds. Walter 
Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (London: SAGE, 2002); Ian Hurd, 
―Constructivism,‖ in Handbook of International Relations, eds. Christian Reus-smit and Duncan 
Snidal (Oxford University Press, 2008), 298-316. 
46 Scott Burchill et al., Theories of International Relations (Basingstoke, Hampshire [U.K.]; New 
York Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 223. 
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behaviour flow from the distribution of power, constructivists treat identity as an 
independent variable in studying the formation of interests. As Alexander Wendt 
argues, interests are a function of state identities.
47
  
 
Institutions are central to the constructivist view of international 
relations.
48
 Over the past two decades, constructivists have gone beyond asserting 
institutions ―matter‖ in world politics, to show how powerful they are in 
influencing state action. As Thomas Risse has observed, constructivist 
institutionalism ―adopts a ‗thick‘ understanding of international institutions as 
social structures deeply embedding actors such as states.‖49 In this view, 
institutions not only constrain and regulate actors‘ behaviour and strategies, but 
also constitute these actors in the sense that they define their identities and 
interests. At the core of the constructivist approach is the study of the possibility 
of state socialization - a process where actors come to adopt and internalize norms 
embedded in institutions.  
Institutions and state socialization  
Here there are two distinct approaches which we can call socialization by 
or in international institutions.
50
 In the former approach - the ―socialization by‖ 
strand - international institutions are treated as potential purposive actors with 
independent effects on states. Among the earliest work is Martha Finnemore‘s 
argument that international institutions are instrumental in teaching states new 
norms or values, with a view to changing states‘ perceptions of and defining or 
                                               
47 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012), 233. 
48 Acharya, ―Asian Regional Institutions and the Possibilities for Socializing the Behaviour of 
States.‖  
49 Risse, 605. 
50 See Jeffrey T. Checkel, "International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and 
Framework," International Organization 59, no. 4 (2005): 801-26. 
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redefining their interests.
51
 In National Interests in International Society, 
Finnemore explores the role of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the International Committee of the Red Cross 
and the World Bank in teaching states new international norms. Here I call this 
socialization process vertical socialization since the relationship between the 
institutions and states resembles the relationship between teachers and students. In 
such a relationship, Finnemore argues, institutions have both generative and 
constitutive aspects, disseminating new norms and constituting new interests and 
values for actors.
52
  
 
In contrast, the “socialization in” approach developed by Alastair Iain 
Johnston treats institutions as social environments. Through interactions and 
specifically through three socialization micro-processes, actors come to change 
their behaviour to become more cooperative, a shift manifested in norm-taking. 
According to Johnston these three distinctive processes - mimicking, social 
influence and persuasion - can lead to shifts in actors‘ preferences and behaviour, 
in what I call horizontal socialization. Having pointed out that socialization is a 
neglected source of cooperation in international relations, Johnston‘s goal is to 
find a new way of explaining cooperation by studying how state agents are 
socialized to accept new norms as a result of participation in international 
institutions and their effects, in turn, on the formation of state foreign policy.  
 
Horizontal socialization is different from vertical socialization in several 
important ways. First, actors in institutional environments - or the units of analysis 
- are state agents, including diplomats, decision makers, analysts, or policy 
specialists, rather than states. Second, rather than potential purposive actors, 
international institutions are treated as social environments in which actors 
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interact among themselves and with their environment. Institutions are believed to 
be conducive to socialization micro-processes through which individuals and 
small groups accept norms embedded in institutions they belong to. It is these 
socialized agents who will then have influence on the decision making process of 
the state they represent, contributing to shaping or redefining their state interests 
and behaviour in a more cooperative manner. Third, identifying socialization 
mechanisms that lead to change in actors‘ behaviour and potentially their 
preferences is another feature distinguishing horizontal from vertical socialization. 
As Johnston noticed, the diffusion of norms in the vertical socialization model 
seems ―virtually automatic, even, and predictable,‖ thus leaving various processes 
unexplained.
53
 These processes are significant because it is through them that 
actors ―understand, process, and act upon the lessons that are ‗taught‘ by 
international institutions.‖54 In other words, it is through these processes that one 
can observe the effects of the logic of arguing and of appropriateness that actors 
follow toward accepting norms.    
 
Johnston seeks to fill this gap by identifying three separate socialization 
mechanisms that lead actors to adopt particular norms. This is significant because 
as Martin and Simmons point out, structuring the debate around the question of 
whether institutions matter was a response to the realist agenda. As a result, little 
attention has been paid to studying the mechanisms through which institutional 
effects were expected to work.
55
 In this sense, Johnston‘s socialization theory has 
a role to play in developing research along this path. 
 
As noted, Johnston specifies three socialization micro-processes that he 
suggests lead to an actor‘s pro-norm behaviour. The first is mimicking - the act of 
copying behaviour of others in a group. Copying the behaviour of others happens 
                                               
53 Johnston, ―Treating International Institutions as Social Environment,‖ 492. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Lisa L. Martin and Beth A. Simmons, "Theories and Empirical Studies of International 
Institutions," International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 742-43. 
29 
 
when newcomers try to adapt to the uncertain environment. In international 
institutions, mimicking often involves the actor‘s borrowing of working 
procedures and routines, language or talking about the issues that are central to the 
institutions.
 56
   
 
A second mechanism is social influence - a socialization process that 
elicits an actor‘s pro-group behaviour through the distribution of a group‘s social 
rewards (i.e. status, recognition) and punishments (i.e. criticism, shaming).
57
 The 
outcome of successful social influence is an actor‘s conformity with the position 
advocated by the group, particularly with what most members in the group do or 
what they believe should be done. For those actors who care about their image 
and status, social influence can affect their behaviour in important ways: 
supporting the group‘s position would help them achieve social objectives such as 
improving their image, status and credibility or avoid a loss of status, shaming or 
humiliation. Conformity with a group‘s position as a result of social influence is 
therefore described as public conformity without private acceptance: ―I believe 
the answer is X, but others said Y, and I don‘t want to rock the boat, so I‘ll say 
Y.‖58  
 
The third mechanism is persuasion. This micro-process ―involves 
changing minds, opinions, and attitudes about causality and affect (identity) in the 
absence of overtly material or mental coercion.‖59 The outcome of successful 
persuasion is the creation of common knowledge or a homogenization of interests. 
In institutional environments, persuasion involves an actor‘s assessment of the 
persuasiveness of arguments for particular norms, values or attitudes conveyed by 
the group. Through such assessment process, actors become convinced that such 
norms, values or attitudes are correct and appropriate. Persuasion therefore differs 
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from social influence in that it entails public conformity with private acceptance: 
―I thought the answer is X, but everybody else said Y, so it really must be Y.‖60  
 
In short, socialization in its truest sense is an actor‘s internalization of new 
norms through persuasion. This micro-process arguably leads to not only the most 
durable and self-reinforcing pro-norm behaviour, but also change in an actor‘s 
preferences. In contrast, mimicking is the process with fewest social effects on an 
actor and social influence is an indirect one.     
Socialization theory and the Asia-Pacific region 
 Recently, socialization - as a concept, a process or theory - has received 
greater attention from scholars studying international relations in Asia-Pacific. As 
a concept or process, socialization has widely been used by constructivists for the 
study of regionalism in Southeast Asia.
61
 For instance, Amitav Acharya in his 
book Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia argues that through 
socialization norms exert both regulative and constitutive effects on state 
behaviour toward shared principles and practice of peaceful conduct, thus 
contributing to the development of a sense of community.
62
 Socialization in this 
sense serves as a mediated process against which norms regulate and shape state 
behaviour. 
  
 The prevalence of institutions with design features arguably conducive to 
socialization and the presence of a number of states considered as targets for 
socialization means that Asia offers real potential for testing socialization theory. 
There have been a number of attempts to explore the power of socialization in 
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making shifts in foreign policy behaviour by states after joining regional 
institutions. For example, Acharya examines the role of Asian regional institutions 
in socializing Vietnam, China and India.
63
 He argues that the key change after 
Vietnam joined ASEAN was its acceptance and internalization of the non-
intervention norm. In the case of China, the key change was its adoption of a 
multilateral approach to conflict management. And for India, the key change as a 
result of socialization was the shift from economic nationalism and protection to 
trade liberalization.  
  
 Another scholar, Tan See Seng, examines the role of peer pressure in the 
ASEAN framework in making reluctant member(s) change their attitude toward 
supporting particular positions or norms of the organization.
64
 Having pointed out 
political suasion is the key modality through which ASEAN members develop a 
shared perspective, given that ASEAN-decision making has been consensus-
based, Tan tests the effects of persuasion in three case-studies, namely Indonesia 
and the formation of ASEAN, the establishment of the ASEAN Charter, and the 
constructive engagement of Myanmar. Regarding the establishment of the human 
rights body as provided in the ASEAN Charter, for example, Tan argues that 
persuasion rather than force-based coercion led to the endorsement of the 
initiative by more reluctant ASEAN members, including Vietnam, Laos, and 
Myanmar. Evidence of persuasion was also found in two other instances, giving 
more support for the plausibility of socialization as an explanation for the 
cooperative behaviour of ASEAN members on the basis of the logic of 
appropriateness. 
  
 Meanwhile, Mathew Davies - in an effort to challenge the dominance of 
constructivism in regional studies, particularly the role of norms in shaping state 
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behaviour - argues that ASEAN‘s engagement with human rights norms, 
implicitly including the creation of a human rights body, has been strategically 
driven rather than morally driven.
65
 In Davies‘ view, constructivists have 
overstated the power of norms in shaping state behaviour: the weakness of 
constructivism, he argues, is evidenced by its failure to explain why ASEAN did 
not comply with the norms that it had promoted. Davies argues ASEAN has used 
human rights norms as a tool for political ends; that is, to increase its legitimacy in 
the eyes of external and internal actors. This leads him to conclude that a rational 
choice framework rather than constructivism can provide a more persuasive 
explanation of ASEAN‘s pro-human rights behaviour. 
 
  While Tan and Davies do not engage in a direct debate, their different 
perspectives on the same issue, namely ASEAN‘s engagement with human rights 
norms, reflect the rationalist-constructivist divide relating to the logic of action of 
norm-taking. According to Thomas Risse, socialization is the main process 
through which constructivist institutionalism interprets the logic of 
appropriateness to provide an account of how international norms acquire their 
―taken for grantedness.‖66 Put differently, through socialization actors will come 
to endorse particular norms, believing in their rightness and correctness and 
voluntarily abiding by those norms. In contrast, the logic of consequences 
emphasizes the instrumentality of actors in taking norms: actors try to realize their 
preferences through strategic behaviour and taking norms is to maximize or to 
optimize their interests and preferences.  
 
 In fact, constructivists do recognize the role of material and rational factors 
in explaining cooperation. But their emphasis on the importance of ideational and 
social elements in studying a particular phenomenon aims to provide an 
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alternative account. As Tan observes, there is increasing agreement among 
scholars that appropriateness and consequentiality are not necessarily 
incompatible.
67
 If so, conducting investigations about socialization, which 
emphasises norm-taking driven by the logic of appropriateness, is also a test to see 
if the other logic of action - the logic of consequences - plays any role. This study 
of Vietnam‘s participation in international institutions seeks to explore precisely 
this question. 
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CHAPTER III 
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND SOCIALIZATION 
This chapter provides an analysis of the institutional features of ASEAN, 
the ARF and the UNSC to measure the extent to which they are conducive to 
socialization. As Johnston suggests, persuasion is more likely to happen and it 
will be easier for a novice to be persuaded if the social environment has the 
following characteristics: (i) a small membership; (ii) the institutional franchise 
recognizes the special authoritativeness of a couple of actors; (iii) when decision 
rules are based on consensus; (iv) when mandate is deliberation; and (v) when the 
autonomy of agents is high.
68
 But how are these institutional features conducive to 
persuasion? Johnston clarifies three routes through which an actor is persuaded 
and explains why these institutional features help facilitate each one.  
 
First, the possibility that an actor changes his/her attitude depends on 
his/her relationship with the persuader, because the persuadee tends to assess new 
information based on the source of that information. If information comes from 
in-groups or those the actor likes, that information is more convincing than if it 
comes from out-groups or those he/she dislikes. Thus, it is more likely that the 
actor would change his/her mind, opinions and attitudes if information comes 
from those that he/she likes or shares traits with. Therefore, Johnston suggests that 
in an environment with a small membership, in-group identity effects on the 
persuasiveness of the counter-attitudinal messages are strongest.
69
 In addition, if 
the institution recognizes the special authoritativeness of a couple of actors that 
means for a novice their information will be more reliable than from other 
sources.
70
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Second, an actor is more likely to be convinced of the information if 
he/she engages in a high intensity process of cognition in which he/she has to 
carefully consider the possible implications for his/her interests if holding their 
initial attitude. In an institution with decision-making rules based on consensus, 
cognition effects will arguably be strongest because consensus requires 
deliberation, thus requiring the actor to actively assess the message or counter-
attitudinal information and carefully consider the implications of holding the 
initial attitude for his/her interests. It is through this active assessment process that 
the probability of attitudinal change on the part of the actor increases. 
 
Third, the possibility that an actor changes his/her attitude depends on 
his/her own characteristics, including the cognitive-processing capability, the 
strength of existing attitude, or the degree of independence in relation to his/her 
principal. If the mandate of the institution is deliberative, it not only requires 
active complex cognition on the part of the actor but also helps increase his/her 
autonomy in relation to the principal. This is because ―deliberation‖ as mandate 
means there would be no obvious distribution of benefits at stake, so an actor  
may not have to report to or to receive instructions from his/her principal. In other 
words, an actor will be given some degree of free choice in decision making. As a 
result, the possibility of actor‘s attitudinal change is higher. 
 
In contrast, environments conducive to social influence have the following 
features: (i) large membership; (ii) the franchise is equally allocated; (iii) decision 
rules are majoritarian or reasons for supporting or opposing consensus are on 
record; (iv) the mandate is negotiation; and (v) the autonomy of agents is low. 
Since social influence leads to an actor‘s conformity with the group‘s position 
through the distribution of social rewards or punishments, these institutional 
features arguably make the effects of such rewards and punishments stronger on 
the actor. For an actor who cares about his/her status and image, the role of an 
institutional structure in facilitating his/her cooperation is through the provision of 
36 
 
information about the degree to which he/she is behaving in ways consistent with 
the group‘s prior shared understanding of what constitutes an appropriate 
behaviour. For instance, if there is a wide distance between an actor‘s behaviour 
and that shared understanding of good behaviour, then the larger the number of 
observers of the actor‘s behaviour, the more powerful the shaming effect will be.71 
In other words, a large membership will help generate greater pressure on the 
actor, compelling him/her to act in a more consistent manner with the shared 
standard of behaviour. Conversely, if an actor is trying to maximize his/her status 
through supporting particular positions of the group, the presence of a large 
number of members will help increase the level of praise and recognition as social 
rewards for conformity.  
 
The institution‘s monitoring effects are also furthered if decision rules are 
majoritarian because the actor‘s behaviour is on record and consistency effects 
may be stronger.
72
 Other institutional features, including equal allocation of 
authoritativeness, negotiation as mandate and low agent autonomy arguably help 
reduce the effects of persuasion. Without a small number of highly authoritative 
actors, there would be no persuasive sources of new information; negotiations 
over the distribution of benefits would make it more difficult for the actor to be 
persuaded; and low autonomy would not give him/her much freedom to make 
decisions on his/her own.  
 
Against the above criteria, the following section will examine the 
institutional features of ASEAN, the ARF and the UNSC as the three selected 
institutions and the individual features of Vietnamese representatives as targets of 
socialization. A closer look at the institutional features of these three institutions 
reveals that they are all more conducive to persuasion than social influence.  
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The Association of Southeast Asian Nations  
As a social environment, ASEAN meets more criteria to be conducive to 
persuasion than social influence. First, the organization has a small membership. 
Formed in 1967 with five founding members, Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, it expanded with the accession of Brunei in 
1984 and then a group of four states in the second half of the 1990s: Vietnam, 
Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia. The inclusion of ten Southeast Asian countries 
under the roof of ASEAN was once considered one of the great achievements of 
the organization. Second, ASEAN‘s mandate has been deliberative. Since its 
inception, ASEAN deliberations have primarily taken the form of consultations 
and dialogues among members on intra-regional problems and concerns with the 
annual ASEAN Ministerial Meeting as the most important and regular 
interaction.
73
 Third, ASEAN‘s decision-making process has long been based on 
consensus. Though consultations and consensus in the ASEAN context always go 
hand in hand, there are some important points regarding consensus as a decision-
making rule as opposed to consultations which are covered here by mandate: (i) 
ASEAN has long avoided majority voting and prefers consensus as its decision-
making rule, given its concern that the former can lead to the imposition of views 
by the majority on the minority; (ii) decisions made on the basis of consensus 
must be acceptable to all. Consultations play the key role in ensuring that the 
views of every member will be taken into consideration and reflected in the final 
decisions. As such, consultations help facilitate the process toward achieving 
consensus; (iii) consensus is different from unanimity. In the ASEAN context 
decisions made by consensus do not always mean every member feels 
comfortable or satisfied with them. Rather, as long as their basic interests are not 
disregarded they can go along with the decision.
74
   
                                               
73 Khong and Nesadurai, "Hanging Together, Institutional Design, and Cooperation in Southeast 
Asia: AFTA and the ARF," 41. 
74 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia, 82-85. 
38 
 
ASEAN‘s mandate and decision-making rules largely remain intact 
although its institutional scope has expanded since the end of the Cold War. The 
ASEAN Charter adopted in 2007 reaffirms that ―decision-making in ASEAN shall 
be based on consultation and consensus.‖75 And with the adoption of the ASEAN 
Charter, further steps in the institutionalization of regular consultations and 
meetings have been taken at various levels.
76
 Regular consultations are not limited 
to the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting. As the supreme policy-making organ of 
ASEAN, the ASEAN Summit now convenes twice a year and its mandate is to 
―deliberate, provide policy guidance and take decisions on key issues pertaining to 
the realization of the objectives of ASEAN, important matters of interest to 
member states and all issues referred to it by the ASEAN Coordinating Council, 
the ASEAN Community Council and ASEAN Sectorial Ministerial Bodies.‖77 
Interactions among state members became more intensified when the scope of 
cooperation was expanded and regular consultations taken at different levels. 
 
It was obvious that enlargement in the 1990s to include new members with 
differences in political systems and level of economic development presented 
ASEAN with the task of socializing these new members into its organizational 
methods and procedures, among others.
78
 For instance, Amitav Acharya wondered 
if the new members could be socialized into the ASEAN Way.
79
   
 
The ―ASEAN Way‖ has widely been understood as the core feature of 
ASEAN design that comprises principles regulating the relationship among state 
members and determining the working style and decision-making rules of the 
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organization.
80
 Core principles that govern behaviour among member states 
include respect for the independence, sovereignty and equality, territorial 
integrity, national identity, non-interference in the internal affairs of another state, 
non-use of force and pacific settlement of disputes. These principles have been 
incorporated in various ASEAN documents such as the Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation in Southeast Asia adopted in 1976 and most recently in the ASEAN 
Charter. ASEAN members have long upheld these principles because they ensure 
the independence of all in deciding their domestic policies.
81
 This reflects their 
preference for consolidation of state sovereignty even when cooperation is 
expanded to cover new issues. Meanwhile, ASEAN‘s working style stresses the 
importance of informality, flexibility, consensus-building and non-confrontational 
bargaining styles as the mode of the organization‘s operation.82 With regard to 
consensus-building, Acharya points out two important aspects of the process: the 
non-hostile setting of consultation, and a commitment to find a way of moving 
forward that enjoyed broad support by taking into account the interests of all 
members.
83
  
 
For Vietnam, these ―ASEAN Way‖ principles have been of vital 
importance given its preference for protecting sovereignty in the new context of 
the post-Cold War era. ASEAN‘s working style was also of importance because 
Vietnam was a genuine novice in latter half of the 1990s and early 2000s. The 
social environment in ASEAN during this period facilitated the accommodation of 
Vietnam as well as other new members into a new environment in which: 
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 Actors‘ independence is respected. 
 Regular consultations created opportunities for greater and active 
participation of new members; 
 Voices of new members were to be heard and encouraged; 
 Preferences, concerns and differences to be raised, taken into account and 
settled through discussions; 
 Old members refrained from imposing their own norms and values; 
  Arguments and dissemination of new information were presented in non-
threatening way; and 
 Cooperation moved at a pace comfortable to its slowest members. 
 
For the first generation of Vietnamese officials involved in ASEAN 
activities, this environment helped them gain a better understanding of those they 
were communicating with; familiarized them with new working styles at a 
multilateral institution; explored new areas of cooperation in which they had to 
think about the implications for national interests such as economic cooperation in 
the framework of ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA); and meant they learned how 
to cooperate with other members to deal with problems that the institution was 
faced with as a whole, such as addressing the 1997-98 economic crisis.
84
 
Therefore, the noviceness of the Vietnamese participants in those early years in 
ASEAN can be characterized in part by a lack of capacity and efforts to address 
this, ranging from improving English skills for officials, getting used to working 
procedures, to practising hosting a number of meetings.
85
 
 
However, this first generation of Vietnamese officials in ASEAN did not 
enjoy much autonomy. The most important reason was the centralization of 
Vietnamese foreign policy-making whereby decisions were always made at the 
highest level of the Party and State.
86
 The decision to join ASEAN is one 
example: it was made by senior figures in the CPV‘s Politburo. This system does 
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not allow officials to enjoy much freedom. Within MOFA officials were routinely 
required to report to their principals on developments relating to issues and areas 
that they were in charge of. In short, Vietnam‘s participation in ASEAN in the 
early years was of an exploratory and learning nature, where officials reported to 
their principals on every aspect of cooperation and at the same time had to wait 
for instructions on how to participate. As a result, state agents had limited 
independence in deciding any matters on their own. Officials‘ limited knowledge 
and skills, especially English fluency, also inhibited their effective participation in 
ASEAN activities. In addition to this, Vietnam was unable to participate in all 
ASEAN meetings due to a lack of human and financial resources.
87
 Interactions in 
the 1990s were therefore of a very low quality. 
 
Vietnam has become less of a novice as time has gone by. As a result, the 
social environment in ASEAN has also become less conducive to socialization. 
For a member like Vietnam, the introduction in the late 1990s of new norm of 
―flexible engagement‖ posed a direct challenge to the non-interference norm that 
Vietnam had long upheld. Former Thai Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan proposed 
this idea with a view to making ASEAN more effective by allowing its members 
to comment on each other‘s policies, especially when dealing with domestic 
issues with regional implications. However, new ASEAN members strongly 
opposed the initiative and ―flexible engagement‖ was finally replaced with 
―enhanced interaction‖ - a milder term that affirms the non-intervention principle 
and assures the freedom of ASEAN members in engaging with one another.
88
 
Entering the first decade of the 21
st
 century, ASEAN was determined to work 
toward a more rules-based group with the goal of building an ASEAN 
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Community. This put newcomers in a more difficult situation of how to reconcile 
their national interests with that of the Association. 
 
Since ASEAN cooperation has been expanded to include a wider range of 
cooperation schemes and plan of actions, interactions within the ASEAN 
framework and coordination at the domestic level have increased as well. This has 
had two significant effects for Vietnam.  First, officials participating in ASEAN 
affairs are now more diverse, including representatives from the MOFA, the 
National Assembly, the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the Ministry of National 
Defence and other governmental branches. Second, the country‘s participation in 
ASEAN over the past two decades has also brought a younger generation of 
officials into institutional deliberations. At MOFA, this group of younger 
officials, together with those who have gained experience since the early years in 
ASEAN now constitutes the core group in charting out the country‘s orientation 
toward participation in ASEAN, making and implementing concrete proposals on 
a wide range of cooperative schemes.
89
 It was acknowledged in the ten year 
review of participation in ASEAN in 2005 that the expertise, working experience 
in multilateral settings and especially English fluency of Vietnamese officials had 
improved enormously.
90
 The maturity of Vietnamese officials can best be seen in 
the drafting process of the ASEAN Charter in 2007. During this process, former 
ASEAN Secretary-General Ong Keng Yong was impressed by the prominence 
and confidence of Task Force members from Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and 
Vietnam. In his view, ASEAN had become a group of equals, at least in terms of 
negotiating skills.
91
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The expansion of technocrats and experts groups has been a result of 
Vietnam‘s increased participation in institutional life over the past two decades. In 
addition, a process of gradual decentralization of the foreign policy making 
process has meant MOFA now plays a dominant role. Vietnamese officials 
involved in ASEAN activities now can enjoy more latitude; and can be more 
confident and pro-active than those who worked in the latter half of the 1990s.  
The ASEAN Regional Forum  
The ARF is the most important multilateral security forum in the Asia-
Pacific. It was formed in 1994 with eighteen members, including six ASEAN 
states, their dialogue partners and China, Vietnam, Laos, and Papua New 
Guinea.
92
 More members joined as the institution evolved, bringing the total 
current membership to twenty seven.
93
 The ARF‘s membership is therefore not 
only larger, but also more diverse than that of ASEAN. However, in relation to 
socialization theory, except for its large membership, the ARF like ASEAN, also 
shares institutional properties that are arguably conducive to persuasion. The 
Forum‘s franchise recognizes the leadership of ASEAN. That means ASEAN is at 
the core of the ARF‘s operation. The ARF‘s annual foreign ministers meeting is 
held after the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, with an ASEAN member as host 
country in the chair. The ARF‘s mandate is deliberative and its decision-making 
rule is also consensus-based. In Social States Johnston identifies the ARF as a key 
example of where persuasion occurs, leading to China‘s adoption of the 
cooperative security norm.
94
 
 
                                               
92 ―About the ASEAN Regional Forum,‖ ASEAN Regional Forum, accessed October 10, 2010, 
http://www.aseanregionalforum.org. 
93 Ten ASEAN members, the United States, Japan, China, Canada, the EuropeanUnion, Republic 
of Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Russia, Papua New Guinea, India, Mongolia, Democratic 
People‘s Republic of Korea, Pakistan, Timor-Leste, Bangladesh and SriLanka. 
94 Johnston, Social States, chapter 4. 
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However, in order to have a better understanding of the ARF as a social 
environment, its institutional features need clarification. One key feature is 
ASEAN‘s leadership. Although some scholars criticize and downplay the 
organization‘s role,95 for Vietnam as a potential target of socialization, ASEAN is 
a critical reference group. In the early years of participation in the ARF when 
Vietnam sat for the first time alongside former enemies, it was ASEAN that 
Vietnam looked toward as the main reference group, together with China, when 
assessing new information.  
 
A second feature is the ARF‘s mandate. The 1995 Concept Paper set out a 
three-stage process for ARF development: Stage I focuses on confidence-building 
among participants through measures aiming at increasing transparency such as 
dialogue on security perceptions, the voluntary publication of Defence White 
Papers and exchanges between and among defence and military circles; Stage II 
focuses on the development of Preventive Diplomacy through, for example, 
exploring and devising ways and means to prevent conflict; and Stage III is for the 
development of conflict-resolution mechanisms.
96
 Since the ARF‘s participants 
are diverse, the goal of setting a three-stage development is for the ARF to 
proceed at a comfortable pace to all. In particular, the focus on confidence-
building measures (CBMs) in the first stage was designed to help reduce lingering 
mistrust among some participants.
97
 CBMs are critical for socializing a novice 
like Vietnam, whose dichotomy of friends or foes still dominated in the years after 
the Cold War, thus mistrust and suspicion were inevitably unavoidable. 
 
A third feature is the ARF‘s decision-making rules and working methods. 
The Concept Paper provides: ―Decisions should be made by consensus after 
                                               
95 Rizal Sukma, ―The Accidental Driver: ASEAN in the ASEAN Regional Forum,‖ in Cooperative 
Security in the Asia-Pacific: The ASEAN Regional Forum, eds. Jurgen Haacke and Noel M. 
Morada (London & New York: Routledge: 2010), 114. 
96 "The ASEAN Regional Forum: A Concept Paper," ASEAN Regional Forum, accessed August 
13, 2013, http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org. 
97 Khong and Nesadurai, 63. 
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careful and extensive consultations. No voting will take place.‖98 These working 
procedures have long been upheld in inter-sessional group meetings (ISG) - the 
core ARF Track One activities - which discuss such issues as confidence building 
measures, peacekeeping; search and rescue, disaster relief, defence, counter-
terrorism; and non-traditional security issues. For Vietnam, consensus, careful and 
extensive consultations are of significance because embedded in these procedures 
is respect for its independence. In particular, the design of inter-sessional year 
meetings is to facilitate careful and extensive consultations among participants by 
giving them more time and freedom to consider the issues and positions taken by 
others so as to be well-prepared when entering discussions. If consensus cannot be 
reached in one meeting, deliberations will be continued in those that follow.  
 
Taken together, the ARF‘s institutional features - moving at a comfortable 
pace to all, non-binding decisions, voluntary actors‘ responsibilities, 
consultations, respect for actor independence - are conducive to persuasion in the 
sense that they all give the potential targets of socialization a certain degree of 
free choice in assessing the message conveyed by persuaders. Since Vietnam was 
a genuine novice in the 1990s and its perception of security at that time was also 
undergoing a transformation,
99
 the ARF as a social environment would be most 
conducive to persuasion around that time, opening up the possibility for the 
adoption of new security concepts and norms by Vietnamese officials. 
  
With almost two decades of involvement in this institution, Vietnam has 
become less of a novice. Indeed, the group of Vietnamese officials involved in the 
ARF has gradually grown in knowledge, expertise and working experience. They 
also enjoy greater latitude in relationship with their principals as a result of the 
decentralization of the country‘s foreign-policy making process. Because there is 
                                               
98 ―The ASEAN Regional Forum: A Concept Paper,‖ ASEAN Regional Forum, accessed August 
13, 2013, http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org. 
99 See Elliot, Changing Worlds, 63-64; 96-97. 
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no separate department/unit at MOFA to take charge of ARF, the same people in 
the ASEAN Department are also responsible for ARF activities. Their tasks are to 
prepare for and participate in ARF SOMs, EEPs Meetings, and, most importantly, 
the ARF annual meetings with the presence of Foreign Ministers as the highest 
ranking officials. At the domestic level, they coordinate and facilitate the 
participation of officials from other ministries such as the Ministry of National 
Defence or Ministry of Public Security in ARF inter-sessional group meetings on 
specialized areas such as counter-terrorism and transnational crime.
100
  
The United Nations Security Council  
In contrast to ASEAN and the ARF, the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) is a highly institutionalized grouping. As such, it does not have the 
institutional design that Johnston expects to be associated with socialization. 
However, a closer look at specific institutional features suggests what is 
interesting about the UNSC is that it also holds some properties conducive to 
persuasion. First, it has a small membership, at least in comparison with that of 
other UN organs or the ARF. Second, by grouping its members into permanent 
members (P5) and elected non-permanent members (E10), the UNSC recognizes 
the special authoritativeness of the P5 by granting them the veto power and 
continuous membership.
101
 In other words, veto power and permanence give the 
P5 a privileged position in controlling this global institution, while non-permanent 
                                               
100 ASEAN 2010, http://asean2010.vn; As for track II activities, Vietnam is involved mainly in the 
Council for Security Cooperation in Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) activities, including CSCAP Study 
Group on Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) as co-chair with 
the US CSCAP; Export Controls Experts Group (XCXG) - a sub group of the Study Group on 
WMD; and Water Resources Security in Mainland Southeast Asia. Participants in CSCAP Study 
Group on Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction are scholars from the 
Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam.   
101 See Sydney D. Bailey and Sam Daws, The Procedure of the UN Security Council (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1998), 137-53. 
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members are in a disadvantaged position given their lack of veto and two-year 
tenure.
102
  
 
The ―authoritativeness‖ of the P5 refers to their privilege and ―relational 
power‖ in relation to non-permanent members, rather than ―a credible source of 
information‖ defined by Johnston that can influence the way a potential target of 
socialization (i.e. a non-permanent member like Vietnam) assesses the 
information from the persuader (one or more in the P5). However, in the case of 
Vietnam as one potential target of socialization, the presence of China and Russia 
in the P5 is important. These two powers have been Vietnam‘s traditional like-
minded states. As a result, information from them must be more convincing and 
reliable than that from the remaining P5 members, namely the United States, the 
United Kingdom or France. In deliberations and discussions at the Council, it is 
these two powers that Vietnamese officials must look to first when formulating 
their position. As it was noted in the early part of this chapter, the presence of 
like-minded actors in an institution will make it more possible for a potential 
persuadee to change his/her attitude if information comes from these sources.  
 
In addition to a small membership and the presence of China and Russia as 
Vietnam‘s like-minded states, the fact that the Council‘s working methods are 
based primarily on consultation and consensus are other institutional features that 
make the social environment in the UNSC more conducive to persuasion. As 
provided in the UN Charter, the Security Council is charged with the maintenance 
of international peace and security and has three primary functions: making 
recommendations to states as parties to a dispute; making recommendations to the 
General Assembly; and making mandatory (binding) decisions.
103
 For the first 
                                               
102 On the relationship between the P5 and the ten elected non-permanent members, see Kishore 
Mahbubani, "The Permanent and Elected Council Members," in The UN Security Council: From 
the Cold War to the 21st Century, ed. David M. Malone (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2004), 
253-80. 
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two groups, the UNSC acts as an executive body, but for the third one, it 
sometimes acts like a legislature.
104
  
 
Whether acting like an executive or legislature, consultation is the 
Council‘s key working method. As Bailey and Daws observed in 1998, much of 
the Council‘s work was carried out in the so-called ―informal consultations,‖ 
particularly informal consultations of the whole that the gradual formalization has 
given such informal meetings a de facto official status.
105
 These informal 
consultations are not only the private gatherings of all 15 Council members but 
also where bilateral and multilateral consultations between the President and 
individual members of the Council take place.
106
 Today, informal consultations 
are still the main format of meeting of the Council‘s members. 107  
 
In addition, in the 21
st
 Century the trend toward consensus in the Council‘s 
decision-making process has become salient.
108
 The democratization process in 
international relations in general and within the Council in particular has led to 
increased interactions among the Council‘s members and the result is that, as 
Kishore Mahbubani has observed, most Council decisions nowadays are made by 
consensus.
109
 Increased consensus is reflected in the adoption of resolutions by 
unanimity and of the use of President‘s statements. According to Hulton, though 
resolutions are still adopted by vote, nowadays almost all are adopted 
                                               
104 See Ian Johnstone, ―The Security Council as Legislature,‖ in The UN Security Council and the 
Politics of International Authority, eds. Bruce Cronin and Ian Hurd. (London; New York: 
Routledge, 2008), 80-104. 
105 Bailey and Daws, 60-66. 
106 Ibid., 61. 
107 The most recent revisions and updates on these informal meetings and other Council working 
methods were made in 2010. See "Note by the President of the Security Council," the United 
Nations Security Council, S/2010/507, July 26, 2010, 
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unanimously.
110
 The adoption of president‘s statements also requires consensus 
because they are adopted on behalf of the Council‘s members, thus every word 
―has been agreed in advance by all members of the Council.‖111 In short, 
deliberations and consultations with a view to reaching a consensus among 
Council members are the key processes that happen before the Council can come 
to the final step of voting. From a socialization perspective, these processes 
therefore allow considerable space for persuasion and peer pressure to come in to 
influence an actor‘s attitude and preferences.  
 
Vietnam‘s term as a non-permanent member of the Security Council in 
2008-2009 was the first time it had served in this institution and was therefore a 
highly novel environment. Assuming the post presented a significant test for 
Vietnam‘s capability at global level.112 Indeed, the decision to bid for a Council‘s 
non-permanent membership dated back to 1997 and Vietnam had spent ten years 
preparing for its first term.
113
 The training of personnel was the most important 
task. Those chosen to work at the Council had to be sufficiently competent to 
work in such a demanding environment and have English fluency, among other 
criteria. In addition, the lack of familiarity with the Council‘s working procedures 
and of the issues debated required careful preparation prior to officially assuming 
                                               
110 Hulton, "Council Working Methods and Procedure," 237. 
111 Ibid., 238. 
112 Due to the Cold War the relationship between Vietnam and the UN in 1977-1991 was minimal. 
Since 1991 Vietnam has gradually become more active, especially in such areas as peace and 
security, disarmament, socio-economic development, population and environment protection. 
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113 MOFA Department of International Organizations Proposal ―On the bid for a non-permanent 
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the post. For instance, a hotline was set up that allowed Vietnamese officials at the 
Mission in New York to directly report to and seek for instructions from the 
leadership at home. A list of approximately 60 issues, with Vietnam‘s position on 
each, was charted out for Vietnamese officials to act within these parameters.
114
 
The size of Vietnam‘s delegation in New York is relatively small, comprising of 
about 27 people, mostly of a younger generation. However, not all are directly in 
charge of the Council‘s work. According to one official, only six or seven staff 
were directly involved in the Security Council‘s affairs.115  
 
Given its huge workload and design to function continuously - requiring 
its members to convene at any time in response to emergency situations
116
 - the 
Security Council is one of the most intensive interactions in which Vietnamese 
officials as genuine novices found themselves. These situations included: 
 
 Being repeatedly exposed to new issues, intensive exchanges and 
consultations, compelling them to assess new information and think harder 
about the implications of their future decisions for national interests.  
 
 Being the targets of other members, particularly P5, seeking support for 
their positions since there are always circumstances that permanent 
members compete with each other for support from non-permanent 
members so as to adopt certain resolutions. 
 
 Being in a highly cognitive process when receiving and assessing new 
information. It is in this situation that information from the sources of the 
―likes‖ or ―dislikes‖ in P5 will no doubt exert influence on officials‘ 
decisions. 
 
In short, ASEAN, the ARF and the UNSC meet many of the criteria 
required to be conducive to socialization, particularly persuasion, but none is an 
ideal environment for persuasion, especially when it comes to the issue of the 
                                               
114 MOFA Department of International Organizations Research Project ―On Vietnam and the first 
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116 Bailey and Daws, 4-5. 
51 
 
level of agent autonomy. If the level of agent autonomy is confined to the 
relationship between agents and their principals, whereby agents are obligated to 
report to their principals, at least as an administrative requirement, Vietnamese 
officials do not enjoy much freedom, even after the country‘s foreign policy- 
making process was decentralized. However, there is another important aspect of 
agent autonomy that needs to be taken into account. The decentralization of 
foreign policy - making process in Vietnam proceeded in tandem with the 
emergence of different groups of experts (senior officials) who now play a crucial 
role in shaping the country‘s foreign policy as it further integrates into the region 
and the world.
117
 As a result, there is now a reversed trend in foreign policy -
making. It is no longer a top-down process as in the 1990s when instructions were 
given from the top leaders of the State and Party. Rather, it is now a two-way 
process with the bottom-up dimension playing a more important role.  
   
Agent autonomy thus varies across the three selected institutions. In ASEAN, 
the first generation of officials - those who were genuine novices - did not enjoy 
much freedom during the 1990s due to their limited experience and working skills 
and most importantly because of the centralization of the foreign policy - making 
process. The current generation, however, enjoy more freedom, since decision-
making process has been gradually decentralized and their knowledge and 
expertise have been enriched, allowing them to act more confidently and 
proactively. The situation in the ARF is the same since it involves the same 
Vietnamese officials. Meanwhile, Vietnamese officials in the highly novel 
environment of the UNSC did not seem to have much freedom, given the strict 
reporting and coordination mechanisms set up to scrutinize their operation.
118
 This 
                                               
117 In the CPV‘s Documents released every five years, MOFA has been involved in the drafting of 
the sections relating to foreign policy. 
118 A three-level decision making process - Ambassadors and Chief of Mission, the Foreign 
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situation thus appears similar to that of the 1990s when Vietnam prepared to join 
ASEAN. However, the setting up of these mechanisms was primarily technical, 
with a view to making the Mission‘s operation at the UNSC as effective as 
possible. When it came to the resolution of specific issues, no one could have a 
better understanding of the Council‘s work than those at the Mission. Therefore, 
Vietnamese officials in New York played a critical role in making policy 
recommendations on how Vietnam should address the Council‘s agenda items. 
 
In the next three chapters we will explore in detail how these different 
institutional environments affected Vietnam‘s interests and behaviour in ASEAN, 
the ARF and the UNSC.  To conclude here, however, the table below sets out the 
institutional features of ASEAN, the ARF and the UNSC and explains how they 
are conducive to persuasion. 
 
 ASEAN ARF UNSC 
Membership Small (10 
members) 
Large (27 
members) 
Small (with 15 
members) 
Franchise Equal allocation of 
authoritativeness 
Equal allocation of 
authoritativeness 
Legitimately 
unequal allocation 
of 
authoritativeness  
Mandate Deliberative  Deliberative Deliberation and 
Resolution 
Decision making 
rule 
Consensus  Consensus Majority voting 
Agent Autonomy Extremely low 
during 1990s –  
higher recently 
Extremely low 
during 1990s –  
higher recently 
Low in terms of 
reporting 
requirement, but 
relatively high in 
terms of making 
policy 
recommendations 
 
  
                                                                                                                                
the first non-permanent membership at the UNSC 2008-2009: Experiences and Lessons‖ (2012), 
p.75. 
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CHAPTER IV 
ASEAN AND THE CREATION OF A HUMAN RIGHTS BODY 
 
This chapter examines if socialization worked to change Vietnam‘s 
position from opposing to supporting the creation of an ASEAN Human Rights 
Body (HRB). The drafting of the ASEAN Charter in 2007 revealed intense 
debates on whether a human rights body should be established at the regional 
level and if so what functions that body would have. The High Level Task Force 
(HLTF) in charge of drafting the Charter - which was composed of ten senior 
officials from ASEAN members - was split and their deliberations turned into a 
negotiation between two groups: participants from older ASEAN members who 
supported the initiative and those from newer members, namely Cambodia, Laos, 
Myanmar and Vietnam (CLMV) who were reluctant. However, the latter group 
finally agreed to the creation of the HRB. The decision to establish such an 
ASEAN-wide mechanism on human rights was significant: ASEAN members for 
the first time broke the taboo of discussing human rights issues intra-regionally, 
agreeing to take on regional responsibility in this sensitive area.  
 
The chapter is in three parts. The first provides a brief introduction to 
ASEAN and the idea of the human rights body prior to the drafting process. 
Details of the negotiations on the HRB are provided in the second part to assess 
how the Vietnamese representative took part in the negotiations. The third section 
explores if persuasion and social influence can explain Vietnam‘s changed 
attitude from reluctance to endorsement of the creation of the ASEAN HRB.  
 
By examining the social environment in which the Task Force negotiated, 
the characteristics of the Task Force members and their interactions throughout 
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the negotiation process, the chapter argues that rather than being persuaded, it is 
clear that the Vietnamese representative did not trust the intentions of activist 
members. The immediate creation of the HRB proposed by the activists was seen 
as a radical move. Therefore, the Vietnamese participant sought ways to slow 
down the negotiations, preventing the immediate creation of the HRB.  
 
Social influence provides a more plausible explanation for Vietnam‘s 
endorsement of the initiative. The decision was made primarily because of image 
concerns and ―not rocking the boat.‖ On the one hand, Vietnam did not want to be 
seen as blocking the process. On the other hand, attitudinal change on the part of 
other similarly-minded states, namely Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia, to become 
more supportive of the HRB led to change on the part of the Vietnamese. In other 
words, Vietnam would have found itself in a minority if it had not joined the 
majority to go along with the initiative.  
ASEAN and the idea of a Human Rights Body 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations has undergone more than four 
decades of development.
119
 Its evolution can be divided into three major stages: 
(i) in the early decades, members focused on the consolidation of the fragile 
organization; (ii) in the aftermath of the Cold War, ASEAN expanded its 
membership and incorporated new issue areas of cooperation; (iii) following the 
1997-1998 Asian financial crisis regional leaders re-examined ASEAN‘s 
direction, showing great determination to revitalize and strengthen the 
organization so as to pave the way for deeper regional cooperation. Numerous 
initiatives were introduced before ASEAN members made a concerted effort of 
                                               
119 For a review of ASEAN‘s development, see among others Rodolfo C. Severino, ―ASEAN 
Beyond Forty: Towards Political and Economic Integration,‖ Contemporary Southeast Asia 29,  
no. 3 (2007): 406-23; Rodolfo C. Severino, Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community: 
Insights from the Former ASEAN Secretary-General (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 2006); Chin Kin Wah, ―Introduction: ASEAN Facing the Fifth Decade,‖ Contemporary 
Southeast Asia 29, no.3 (2007): 395-405; Shaun Narine, ―ASEAN in the Twenty-first Century: A 
Sceptical Review,‖ Cambridge Review of International Affairs 22, no. 3 (2009): 369-86. 
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community building which took the form of the Bali Concord II.
120
 This 
document envisioned the building of an ASEAN Community based on three 
pillars, namely political and security cooperation, economic cooperation and 
socio-cultural cooperation that are closely intertwined and mutually reinforcing.
121
 
For the first time, ASEAN approached economic, political and security 
cooperation in a more integrated manner.
122 
 
 
Having recognized that the goal of building an ASEAN Community could 
not be achieved without strengthening ASEAN institutions, ASEAN Foreign 
Ministers at their 37
th
 Meeting (June 2004) agreed to work towards the 
development of an ASEAN Charter.
123
 The Document was expected to provide an 
enhanced institutional framework and confer a legal personality on the 
Organization.
124 
At 11
th
 Summit in 2005, ASEAN Leaders agreed to establish an 
Eminent Persons Group (EPG) to examine and provide practical 
recommendations on the directions for ASEAN and the nature of the ASEAN 
Charter and tasked the Ministers to form a High Level Task Force to draft the 
Document.
125
  
 
                                               
120 For example, Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chock Tong introduced in 2002 an initiative of 
building an ASEAN Economic Community. Indonesia proposed to build an ASEAN Security 
Community.  
121 ―Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II),‖ ASEAN, October 7, 2003, 
http://www.aseansec.org/15669.htm. 
122 As Severino observed, a major reason that makes ASEAN fall short of its declared ambitions is 
the fact that its members have not pursued political cohesion and economic integration in an 
intertwined way. See Severino, ―ASEAN Beyond Forty: Towards Political and Economic 
Integration,‖414 -17. 
123 The plan was restated in subsequent ASEAN documents, including the Chairman‘s statement of 
the 10th ASEAN Summit in November 2004; the Joint Communiqué of the 38th ASEAN 
Ministerial Meeting in July 2005; the Chairman‘s Statement of the 11th ASEAN Summit, 
December 2005.  
124 ―The Cebu Declaration on the Blueprint of the ASEAN Charter,‖ ASEAN,  January 13, 2007, 
http://www.asean.org/news/item/cebu-declaration-on-the-blueprint-of-the-asean-charter-cebu-
philippines-13-january-2007.   
125 ―Chairman‘s Statement of the 11th ASEAN Summit,‖ ASEAN, December 12, 2005, 
http://www.aseansec.org/18039.htm. 
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The HLTF had ten months, with a total of 13 meetings, in which to draft 
the ASEAN Charter. They started their work by following up the EPG‘s report 
which included, among others, ambitious proposals to legalize and strengthen 
ASEAN such as creating an ASEAN Union, membership suspension, possible 
change in decision-making, and dispute settlement procedures.
126
 The ASEAN 
Charter was finally completed with 13 chapters, covering various issues ranging 
from goals and objectives to institutional changes. However, it is widely agreed 
that what was reflected in the ASEAN Charter did not meet expectations inside 
and outside ASEAN. As Acharya has observed, the ASEAN Charter was a 
conservative document: the EPG‘s ambitious proposals were all discarded by the 
HLTF; core principles of state sovereignty and non-interference were upheld and 
consensus as a working rule remained unchanged.
127
 Perhaps the only sensitive 
issue in which collective interests appeared to triumph over national interests was 
in the establishment of an ASEAN Human Rights Body.  
 
With the decision to establish a human rights body, ASEAN found a new 
consensus in dealing with a sensitive issue that had been considered a ―taboo‖128 
in the organization‘s affairs and an obstacle in its external relations, particularly 
with Western countries. Externally, the Association as a whole - and its individual 
members - has consistently taken a similar stance in dealing with the human rights 
issue. ASEAN and its members have strongly rejected attempts by outsiders to 
intervene in regional and national affairs in the name of human rights. The 
political crisis in Myanmar in the late 1980s and early 1990s is one example.
129
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How to deal with the situation in Myanmar dominated relations between ASEAN 
and the West. However, the former did not approach the issue from a human 
rights perspective and saw Western calls to isolate and punish Myanmar as a 
challenge to ASEAN‘s doctrine of non-interference and regional autonomy.130  
 
ASEAN‘s awareness of the need to coordinate a common position on 
human rights in the international arena increased as a result of the emergence of 
international discourse on human rights in the 1990s. At the 1993 World 
Conference on Human Rights, ASEAN members joined other Asian countries in 
adopting the Bangkok Declaration, highlighting Asia‘s differences in approaching 
human rights.
131
 They then collectively expressed this position in the Joint 
Communiqué of the 26
th
 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in 1993.
132
 Two 
fundamentals of the Bangkok Declaration were brought into the Joint 
Communiqué which reflected the major difference to the Western approach. First, 
ASEAN stressed the universality of human rights, affirming that human rights are 
interrelated and indivisible comprising civil, political, economic, social and 
cultural rights.
133
 These rights are of equal importance. Second, ASEAN 
emphasized the need to take cognizance of regional uniqueness, paying due regard 
for specific cultural, social, economic and political circumstances and of the 
fundamental principles in inter-state relations such as respect for national 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of 
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states.
134
 The Joint Communiqué also mentioned for the first time that ASEAN 
would consider the establishment of a regional human rights mechanism.
135
 
 
Intra-regionally, ASEAN avoided discussing human rights issues. As one 
leading analyst put it, upholding the principle of non-interference in each other‘s 
internal affairs with respect to human rights means members are encouraged to 
―refrain from criticizing the actions of a member government towards its own 
people, including violations of human rights.‖136 Vietnam‘s HLTF member 
Nguyen Trung Thanh also confirmed that ASEAN‘s avoidance of discussing 
human rights in its official meetings was a ―tactful working way of non-
intervention.‖137 The issue of human rights was regarded as an internal issue for 
individual ASEAN states.  Not criticizing the human rights records of others was 
seen as upholding the principle of non-interference.  
 
ASEAN only made broader commitments to human rights as a 
consequence of the regional financial crisis in 1997-1998.  In the 1998 Hanoi Plan 
of Action (HPA), it was asserted that ASEAN would ―enhance exchange of 
information in the field of human rights freedoms of all peoples in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action.‖138 Indonesia 
played an important role in reorienting the regional discourse on human rights. 
Jakarta proposed building an ASEAN Security Community towards the promotion 
and protection of human rights in ASEAN and the creation of an ASEAN human 
                                               
134 Ibid., paragraph 17. 
135 Ibid., paragraph 18. On building a regional human rights mechanism, see Maznah Mohamad, 
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Contemporary Southeast Asia 24, no. 2 (2002): 230-51; Hao Duy Phan, ―The Evolution Towards 
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rights body. In the Vientiane Action Program 2004 (VAP), ASEAN committed to 
the promotion of human rights and obligations in very general terms.
139
  
 
Writing in 2006, Rodolfo Severino identified several obstacles that needed 
to be overcome if ASEAN was to develop a common voice with the creation of an 
ASEAN-wide mechanism. Specifically, he stressed differences in the 
interpretation of the concepts, the approaches and practices among ASEAN 
members as sources of disagreement.
140
 Similarly, the EPG in their Final Report 
on the ASEAN Charter in December 2006 did not envision the creation of an 
ASEAN HRB. Rather, they simply suggested that ―this worthy idea [the human 
rights mechanism] should be pursued further.‖141 At that time, only some ASEAN 
leaders pushed the proposal. Philippines President Gloria Arroyo, acting in her 
capacity as the Chair of the 12
th
 ASEAN Summit (2006), insisted on the inclusion 
of a provision establishing a human rights mechanism in the draft Charter.
142
 Thai 
Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont also supported the idea.
143
 However, the 
proposal elicited little support from other ASEAN leaders. As a result, official 
documents released after the 12
th
 ASEAN Summit mentioned human rights only 
in very general terms. This meant, just before the HLTF convened its first 
meeting, there was still no consensus among ASEAN leaders on the possibility of 
an ASEAN HRB. 
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Chronology of the negotiations  
Negotiations on the establishment of an ASEAN HRB took place in three 
phases. In the first phase, the HLTF had a preliminary exchange of views. In the 
second phase, it had intense deliberations on whether and when ASEAN should 
create a HRB. The third phase was devoted to discussion on possible forms and 
functions of the body. The HLTF was split in phases two and three. Participants 
from Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore strongly supported the 
initiative, while those from Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar, if not 
explicitly opposed, were extremely reluctant. Deliberations did not lead to 
agreement. As a result, ASEAN Foreign Ministers had to intervene to reconcile 
divergent views of the HLTF members. They quickly decided to establish a HRB 
for ASEAN.  
Phase I: Preliminary exchange of views 
The Task Force members touched upon the issue of the proposed human 
rights body at their second meeting (Cambodia, from  February 28 to March 1, 
2007) when they exchanged views on the skeleton of the ASEAN Charter. 
However, there was no consensus on the issue and the majority of the HLTF 
members seemed to be very reluctant in discussing the proposal in detail. Records 
of the second meeting reveal that the Lao participant questioned whether ASEAN 
even needed a HRB. Myanmar‘s representative said that his leaders did not agree 
with the proposal and the Vietnamese participant preferred to discuss it later in the 
drafting process. Only the Philippines participant showed a more supportive 
attitude by initiating an enabling provision in the Charter for an institution related 
to human rights protection in ASEAN. Generally, the Task Force shared the view 
61 
 
that the issue needed further discussion and was one where they should seek 
instructions from Ministers.
144
 
 
On the sidelines of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting Retreat (Siem Reap, 
Cambodia, March 1 and 2), the HLTF Chair - Rosario Manalo from the 
Philippines - submitted the first progress report to the Ministers and requested 
their instructions on ten points, including the one on a HRB. HLTF members were 
not allowed to attend the Foreign Ministers‘ discussion. Instead, the ASEAN 
Secretary-General worked as an intermediary. Notes, including a list of ten 
specific instructions, were prepared by the Secretary-General and sent to the 
HLTF. The final point on the list was the instruction by the Ministers for the 
HLTF to ―include a draft provision on ASEAN Human Rights Commission as an 
organ.‖ 145  
 
The Task Force discussed the Ministers‘ decisions taken in Siem Riep at 
their third meeting (Manila, the Philippines, March 28-29, 2007). Records of this 
meeting show that, regarding the instruction to include a draft provision on the 
human rights commission, the Vietnamese representative proposed that the Terms 
of Reference (TOR) for the Commission should be developed before Foreign 
Ministers/Heads of States decided whether or not to create such a commission.
146
 
He also added that a draft of the TOR would help facilitate subsequent 
deliberations.
 
The Lao participant proposed that any human rights mechanism 
should only be a consultative body and that ASEAN should have a Declaration on 
Human Rights before setting up the mechanism. Myanmar‘s participant stressed 
the need for the HLTF to move cautiously. Meanwhile, participants from other 
ASEAN members focused on other instructions by Ministers.  However, they took 
note of Vietnam‘s proposal on the TOR for the proposed commission.  
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The issue of a HRB was not discussed in detail in the three subsequent 
meetings - the fourth, fifth and sixth - which were held in Myanmar and Vietnam 
in April and in Malaysia in May 2007, respectively. It was not until the seventh 
meeting (Bali, Indonesia in June) that more substantive discussions took place. 
According to Tommy Koh, the HLTF spent two half-days, in a retreat format, 
discussing two separate issues: the enabling provision and the TOR for the 
proposed human rights commission.
147
 The Task Force members had a brief 
discussion on the need of the TOR when interpreting the Ministers' instruction on 
the enabling provision.
148
 Participants from Myanmar and Malaysia questioned if 
there was agreement among Ministers on the need for the TOR at their first 
meeting in Siem Riep. Meanwhile, participants from Laos, Cambodia and 
Vietnam shared the view that TOR should be worked out first, particularly the 
mandates and functions of the commission.  Ministers would then decide whether 
to have an enabling provision on it in the Charter.
149
 Participants from the 
Philippines and Indonesia agreed to work on the TOR and the enabling provision 
at the same time.
150
 The HLTF then held a retreat to discuss the TOR before they 
had a long discussion with the four heads of the national human rights 
commissions with a view to getting more inputs for their next deliberations. 
 
Koh also reported that in another retreat meeting to discuss the TOR
151
 the 
HLTF agreed that the terms of reference would specify the following:  
 
(i) It would be inter-governmental in composition 
(ii) It would not be a finger-pointing body 
(iii) It would define human rights in an ASEAN context 
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(iv) It represents ASEAN‘s views at international forums, and 
(v) It should have consultative status152 
 
However, according to the Indonesian participant, the draft of the TOR for 
the ASEAN human rights Commission was not completed at the seventh 
meeting.
153
 Therefore, discussions on the TOR continued in the subsequent 
meetings.            
Phase II: Whether to establish an ASEAN Human Rights Body 
             The HRB was ―the most contentious issue‖154 at the eighth meeting 
(Manila, the Philippines, July 2007) where the HLTF had a heated debate on the 
enabling provision. There were divergent views on the need for the TOR in 
relation to the interpretation of the Ministers‘ instruction on the human rights 
commission. This was confirmed in the record of the eighth meeting.
155
 Those 
from Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia preferred to present the TOR to the Ministers, 
emphasizing that the TOR should be improved, so it could be the basis for the 
Ministers to have final decision on whether or not to create such a body within 
ASEAN‘s organizational structure. However, ASEAN Secretary-General Ong 
Keng Yong and the Indonesian participant reaffirmed that there was no instruction 
from Foreign Ministers for the HLTF to work on the TOR. The Indonesian 
participant supported the discussion if this would help HLTF members have a 
better understanding of each other‘s views. The Thai participant said the HLTF 
should work on the enabling provision on a human rights commission as 
instructed. The Vietnamese representative was, however, the first to propose a 
formulation of the enabling provision as follows: 
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ASEAN may establish, as and when deemed necessary, consultative 
bodies, including the ASEAN Human Rights Organ.
156
 
    
Participants from Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Laos, and Cambodia  
followed up with different formulations. The proposals from Laos and Cambodia 
were similar to that of Vietnam, suggesting that the creation of the human rights 
commission should be a future project and that it should only have consultative 
status.
157
 Myanmar‘s participant maintained his reservations, however, arguing 
that he needed to discuss with line ministries at home because this was a sensitive 
issue. Meanwhile, participants from Thailand and Indonesia were more 
supportive. Thailand‘s proposal was as follows: 
  
 Article ….: ASEAN HRs Commission 
1. There shall be an ASEAN HRs Commission to promote the observance 
and protection of HRs in this region; 
2. The mandate of such Commission shall be consistent with the purposes 
and principles of ASEAN and the UN Declaration on HRs and relevant 
international HRs treaties subscribed to by Member States.      
3. Appropriate instruments shall be adopted.
158
  
 
Indonesia‘s proposal had elements in common with the Thai suggestion. It also 
included suggestions on the mandate, rules and procedures and membership of 
the proposed body.
159
 The Chair and Brunei‘s participant meanwhile supported 
formulations proposed by Singapore and Malaysia which were described as 
seizing the middle ground. Malaysia‘s formulation was as follows: 
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ASEAN may establish such bodies/organs and commissions as may be 
required, including a body/organ/commission for the promotion and 
protection of human rights in ASEAN.
160
    
 
Tommy Koh later described the situation where various formulations were put 
forward. He said the ten HLTF members were divided into three camps in the 
deliberations on the draft provision:
  
 
(i) Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam were opposed to the creation 
of an ASEAN Human Rights Commission; 
(ii) Indonesia and Thailand were in favour; and 
(iii) Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore occupied the middle 
ground.
 161
 
 
The HLTF then agreed to work toward a common draft of the enabling provision, 
by revising and regrouping the seven proposals. CLV and Indonesia/Thai 
proposals were revised as follows: 
 
1. The CLV revised proposal: “ASEAN may establish an ASEAN Human 
Rights body at a time acceptable to all of us to promote and protect 
Human Rights and fundamental freedom of the people in ASEAN.”  
 
2. Indonesia/Thailand revised proposal: “ASEAN shall/may establish an 
appropriate Human Rights body/organ/institution/commission at a time 
acceptable/as and when necessary to all ASEAN Member States to uphold 
and protect human rights for promotion and protection of Human Rights 
in ASEAN.”162 
 
 The biggest difference among HLTF members turned out to be the ―timing‖ 
issue: when to create the HRB. Discussions went on with the wording of the 
provision. The Chair and Singaporean representative persuaded those from CLV 
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to use the word “shall” instead of “may” and to remove ―at a time acceptable‖ 
arguing that the phrase conveyed a degree of reluctance.  But CLV participants 
made no concessions. They even watered down the provision by suggesting that 
ASEAN “shall consider establishing…”  The Lao representative added that ―shall 
consider‖ was the most that the CLV could accept.163 Drawing on the two 
proposals of the CLV and of Thailand and Indonesia, the Singaporean participant 
offered a compromise, suggesting the following formulation:  
 
ASEAN shall establish an ASEAN Human Rights body, at a time 
acceptable to all ASEAN Member States, to promote and protect the 
Human Rights and fundamental freedoms of the people in ASEAN.
164
  
 
The Singapore participant also suggested that this proposal was on an ad 
referendum basis, which meant the proposal would be sent to the ASEAN Foreign 
Ministers for further consideration. Vietnam‘s representative emphasized the main 
difference of using the word ―may‖ or ―shall.‖ Then all HLTF members agreed on 
adding the word ―may‖ into Singapore‘s proposal. The HLTF finally adopted the 
following text, keeping both ―shall/may‖ to show their lack of consensus: 
 
ASEAN shall/may establish an ASEAN human rights body, at a time 
acceptable to all ASEAN member states, to promote and protect human 
rights and fundamental freedoms of the people of ASEAN.
165
 
 
A new round of debate took place when the Chair announced that her Minister 
had rejected the ad referendum formulation and introduced the following new 
proposal:  
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ASEAN shall establish an ASEAN Human Rights Commission to 
promote and protect Human Rights and fundamental freedom of the 
people of ASEAN. Participation in the Commission is open to Member 
States ready to do so.
166
 
 
Together with the Philippines Foreign Secretary, Ministers from Singapore, 
Malaysia, and Indonesia reportedly also had a negative response to the ad 
referendum formulation.
167
 They argued that it fell far below what Foreign 
Ministers had agreed at Siem Riep. Regarding the new proposal introduced by the 
Philippines Minister, HLTF representatives from Malaysia, Indonesia, and 
Singapore were supportive, but it met with strong opposition from CLMV 
members.
168
 As Koh later recalled, ―strong words were exchanged and emotions 
ran high.‖169  
  
The record of the eighth HLTF meeting reveals that CLMV participants 
shared a number of concerns regarding the new proposal by the Philippines 
Foreign Minister.
170
 One was the way the proposal was introduced. They saw it as 
an act of intervention by Ministers in the HLTF‘s work. The other was the 
possibility of dividing ASEAN when the Philippines Minister suggested ASEAN 
countries could choose to participate in the human rights commission when they 
were ready. The Cambodian representative feared that there would be some 
ASEAN members taking the lead and pushing the rest on the human rights issue. 
The Vietnamese representative said he would not stand for the proposal and 
stressed that agreement could not be reached without knowing what the 
commission was going to do. He said the HLTF still had time, and therefore the 
group should continue to work on the TOR. CLMV participants repeatedly asked 
the opposing group to spend more time to fully develop the TOR. They were 
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consistent on the issue. However, by the end of the day the HLTF could not 
bridge the gap between the two groups. ASEAN Secretary-General Ong Keng 
Yong came up with a new formulation, suggesting that it would help fill the 
vacuum: 
 
As one of ASEAN’s purposes and principles is to protect and promote 
human rights and fundamental freedom, ASEAN shall cooperate to 
establish a Human Rights body.
171
 
 
The Vietnamese representative did not support the Secretary-General‘s proposal. 
Laos‘ participant suggested some improvements to the Secretary-General‘s 
proposal as follows: 
 
In conformity with the purposes and principles of the ASEAN Charter 
related to the protection and promotion of Human Rights and fundamental 
freedoms, ASEAN shall cooperate to create an ASEAN Human Rights 
organ.
172
 
 
Some other HLTF members supported this draft, but as a group, the HLTF was 
unable to arrive at a consensus. This contentious issue was then referred to the 
Foreign Ministers for their decision.
173
 The second meeting of Foreign Ministers 
was convened on the morning of July 30, 2007. The HLTF submitted their second 
progress report to the Ministers, along with the first draft of the Charter and a 
request for guidance on the 14 points, including the provision on a human rights 
commission.
174
 On the request on the human rights provision, the Foreign 
Ministers decided: 
 
(1) The HLTF to use the following text: ―In conformity with the purposes 
and principles of the ASEAN Charter relating to the promotion and 
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protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, ASEAN shall 
establish an ASEAN human rights body.‖ 
(2) HLTF to submit a TOR, but do not include it in the Charter.175 
  
The question of whether or not to establish an ASEAN HRB was finally decided 
by Foreign Ministers at their second meeting. As Koh observed, the decision by 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers ―was received by some of my colleagues with 
disbelief.‖176 Even though Koh did not specify just who those HLTF members 
were, the Vietnamese HLTF member could be one given the fact that he 
consistently stressed for the completion of the TOR as the basis for the Foreign 
Ministers to have a final say on whether or not to establish the HRB. ASEAN 
Secretary-General Ong Keng Yong later confirmed that at this second meeting of 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers, Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister Le Cong Phung 
finally announced that Vietnam would go along with the decision on the condition 
that ―there must be TOR, and the HRB should only have consultative status.‖177 
Ong Keng Yong also added that Phung‘s announcement settled the issue.178 
Finally, consensus was reached on the creation of the HRB.  
Phase III: The TOR and functions of the HRB 
 The HLTF did not have enough time to discuss the issue of the HRB at its 
ninth meeting (Singapore, August 24-26, 2007). Instead, it dominated the 10
th
 
meeting (Chiang Mai, Thailand, September 10-14, 2007). At this meeting, the 
HLTF disagreed on three issues: 
 
(i) Whether the Ministers had instructed the HLTF to draft the terms of 
reference; and 
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(ii) Whether the terms of reference should be completed before the signing 
of the Charter.
 
 
(iii) The proposal by CLMV of an additional paragraph to the HRs 
provision, clarifying the function of the HRB;
 179
 
 
  The HLTF started their 10
th
 meeting with discussion on the agenda items. 
Participants from the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia formed a 
group opposing the discussion of the TOR, making the argument that the HLTF 
was not mandated to discuss and complete it.
180
 Meanwhile, the CLMV 
participants wanted to settle the TOR first. The Vietnamese participant stressed 
that there must be a TOR and that the HRB should have only consultative status. 
This status should be reflected either in the TOR or in the Charter itself.
181
  
 
The discussion was described as a deadlock.
182
 According to Koh, a 
working dinner was organized in order to facilitate a more relaxed discussion.
183
 
However, this effort also failed. As Koh recalled, at the dinner ―strong words were 
exchanged with one colleague threatening to pack his bag and go home…The 
dinner adjourned in a bad mood and without any common ground.‖184 The 
negotiation continued the whole morning of the next day with two opposing 
groups gathering in two different rooms. The Chair (Tommy Koh from Singapore) 
worked as facilitator, communicating between the two. The CLMV participants 
consulted among themselves. Then Myanmar‘s participant offered on behalf of 
the CLMV group an additional paragraph to the provision on the HRB:  
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This ASEAN Human Rights Body shall be of consultative nature and shall 
be operated in accordance with the Terms of Reference to be determined 
by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers.
185
  
 
The Philippines participant rejected this proposal. She added that she did 
not understand what ―consultative status‖ meant and said that the additional 
paragraph proposed by CLMV participants should only be regarded as a possible 
proposal rather than the HLTF‘s proposal. At the request of the Philippines 
participant, each of the CLMV representatives explained and defended their 
position. Myanmar‘s representative was of the view that human rights were the 
sticking point and if the HLTF could overcome this, they could have the Charter 
in time. He said step-by-step Myanmar had made compromises and the proposed 
additional paragraph was as far it could go. Cambodia‘s representative argued that 
if all members could not reach agreement on the TOR they had to have another 
paragraph relating to the HRB. Vietnam‘s representative stressed the need to 
uphold the principle of sovereignty - not accusing each other - as a basis for the 
HRB to have consultative status.  He emphasized the sensitiveness of the human 
rights issue that compelled the HLTF to determine the TOR in order to go along 
with the proposed body.
186
 Laos‘ representative elaborated on what ―consultative 
nature‖ of the human rights body meant. To him, the terminology composed of 
four ―nos‖: no investigation, no monitoring, no finger pointing, and no country 
reporting.
187
  
 
However, the Philippines representative did not yield. She threatened to 
withdraw from the discussion. Singapore‘s representative agreed with the 
additional paragraph but suggested taking out the phase ―consultative nature‖ 
since the term meant different things to different people. He also proposed to 
discuss the ASEAN Secretariat‘s non-paper on possible elements in the TOR. The 
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Indonesian and Malaysian participants proposed reporting to their Ministers the 
state of the HLTF discussion on this issue. CLMV participants then consulted 
among themselves again, but decided not to make any more concessions. They 
urged the other side to discuss and accept their proposal. According to Tommy 
Koh the final agreement was that both sides accepted a compromise consisting of 
two elements: 
 
(i) The inclusion of an additional paragraph in the Charter on the Human 
Rights body that:  
―The ASEAN human rights body shall operate in accordance with the 
terms of reference to be determined by the ASEAN Foreign 
Ministers‖; 
 
And 
 
(ii) An informal discussion on the ASEAN Secretariat‘s concept paper on 
―Possible Elements for Inclusion in the Terms of Reference of an 
ASEAN Human Rights Body.‖188 
 
 On the final day of the 10
th
 meeting, the HLTF had a preliminary 
discussion on possible elements of the TOR and agreed to include the additional 
paragraph on the HRB in the summary record of the 10
th
 meeting, together with 
three other questions for the Foreign Ministers‘ instruction:  
 
(i) The nature of function of the human rights body.  
(ii) Whether the HLTF had to draft TOR?  
(iii) Should it be completed before the Charter?189 
 
Foreign Ministers responded to these questions at their third meeting, held in 
New York in September 2007. The HLTF members were allowed to attend the 
discussions. The Ministers decided that the HRB should be located in Chapter IV 
of the proposed Charter, after ASEAN National Secretariats and before the 
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ASEAN Foundation. They also endorsed the second paragraph as proposed 
without any revision and decided that the TOR could be a work-in-progress if it 
could not be completed in time.
190
 However, the Ministers did not touch upon the 
functions of the HRB.
191
  
A balanced option reached 
The controversy over the establishment of an ASEAN HRB was finally 
settled. The HLTF did not discuss the issue again in their final meetings. For the 
first time all of ASEAN‘s members had agreed to create an arrangement to 
address human rights issues, marking the end to one ―taboo‖ in their inter-state 
relations. According to the Vietnamese HLTF member, the enabling provision in 
the Charter was the ―best balanced option that may satisfy both those advocating 
for the establishment of an ASEAN Human Rights Body and those who still have 
reservations with this idea.‖192 This ―balanced option‖ was codified in Article 14 
of the ASEAN Charter which reads: 
 
1. In conformity with the purposes and principles of the ASEAN Charter 
relating to the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, ASEAN shall establish an ASEAN human rights body. 
 
2. This ASEAN human rights body shall operate in accordance with the 
terms of reference to be determined by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers 
Meeting. 
 
The above ―balanced option‖ regarding the creation of an ASEAN HRB 
reflects to some extent the common knowledge among ASEAN members that 
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now it was time to substantiate regional cooperation in even the most sensitive 
issue areas. Though the Vietnamese HLTF member did not totally adopt the idea 
of the HRB - as the chronology shows - he appeared proactive in discussing the 
proposal. More importantly, internal documents show that there was a change in 
Vietnam‘s preferences: prior to the drafting process, Vietnam did not support the 
creation of the HRB. A memo prepared by the ASEAN Department of the 
Vietnamese Foreign Ministry specifically for the first HLTF meeting 
recommended Vietnam‘s position on the proposed HRB should be as follows: 
 
We propose that a human rights mechanism should not be created since 
ASEAN‘s organizational structure has been already overlapped. We 
should follow the EPG recommendations to hold regular consultations and 
interactions between ASEAN organs and civil society organizations and 
regional human rights mechanisms. All ASEAN organs are responsible for 
the protection and promotion of human rights.
193
 
 
However, after the seventh HLTF meeting, the establishment of such a HRB was 
no longer a big problem for Vietnam. As MOFA reported afterwards: 
 
Throughout the deliberations, ASEAN members initially agreed on how to 
approach human rights issue intra-regionally. Now the establishment of a 
regional human rights body is not a big controversy. What is more 
controversial is when to create it and what the body is going to do. On the 
latter, the HLTF generally agreed on the first draft of the TOR for ASEAN 
Human Rights body. However, this is just the first step because the 
negotiation is going on and of complicated nature. The Draft of the TOR 
must be completed at the next meeting in Manila before being submitted to 
the Ministers at the 40
th
 AMM.
194
 
 
On the surface it seemed that the activist members had successfully 
persuaded their hesitant Vietnamese counterpart to go along with their initiative. 
So, was this a case of persuasion? A persuasion explanation for Vietnam‘s 
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194 MOFA ASEAN Department Report ―On the Results of the seventh Meeting of the High Level 
Task Force on the Drafting of the ASEAN Charter,‖ July 2007, p. 3. 
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endorsement of the initiative would be that the Vietnamese HLTF member 
through the deliberations assessed the intention and arguments of the advocates as 
trustworthy: the establishment of the HRB was not to intervene in the internal 
affairs of individual members. Rather, it was an effort to translate words into 
deeds at a time when all ASEAN members agreed to make human rights 
protection and promotion an objective in the ASEAN Charter. While the 
chronology of the negotiation provides insights into how the Vietnamese HLTF 
member took part in the negotiations, why Vietnam changed its position remains 
unclear. To explain this shift, we need to look more closely at debates within the 
Vietnamese bureaucracy to see how the Vietnamese representative assessed the 
intention and arguments of activist ASEAN members. 
Persuasion as an explanation 
A persuasion explanation for Vietnam‘s agreement with the HRB would 
be that the Vietnamese Task Force member throughout the deliberations gradually 
came to recognize that the creation of the HRB was necessary if ASEAN was 
going to substantiate cooperation toward building an ASEAN Community and 
that it would not target any particular ASEAN member. Rather, it would be seen 
as an effort by ASEAN to build a common voice in dealing with human rights 
issue both internally and externally.  
 
This section starts with a description of the working environment in the 
drafting process of the ASEAN Charter and the characteristics of the participants 
to see to what extent institutional and individual features are conducive to 
persuasion. It then examines how Vietnam assessed the intentions and arguments 
for the HRB to see if it was persuaded by other advocates to take on regional 
responsibilities in this area. Johnston suggests that an ideal environment for 
persuasion would have the following features: a small number of participants with 
a couple of actors recognized as authoritative (the information they provide is 
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more convincing); deliberation as mandate and consensus as the decision-making 
rule; the actor is a novice with few ingrained attitudes toward the issue in question 
and he/she is relatively autonomous from the principal.  
 
In this case, the working environment in the drafting process of the 
ASEAN Charter and the characteristics of the Vietnamese participants do not 
appear to be conducive to persuasion. First, the drafting process was a negotiation 
- arguably conducive to social influence instead. As mentioned in chapter three, 
negotiations over the distribution of benefits would not give an actor much 
autonomy from his/her principal and as a result he/she cannot make decision on 
their own. This situation makes it more difficult for an actor to be persuaded. This 
is true in the negotiations on the HRB. The Vietnamese representative in the 
negotiation did not enjoy much freedom to decide. As a working procedure and 
given the sensitiveness of human rights, he had to report to and seek instructions 
from the Foreign Minister.  
 
Second, by the time the ASEAN Charter was being drafted, Vietnam was 
not a novice in ASEAN. Rather, its representative had long been involved in 
ASEAN affairs and he was seen to be an equal with counterparts from other states 
in terms of negotiation skills. Third, an ingrained attitude toward human rights 
caused lingering fears of intervention on the part of the Vietnamese. All these 
factors had significant impacts on Vietnam‘s assessment of intentions and 
arguments by advocates. 
Working environment  
The drafting of ASEAN Charter as a negotiation 
The process of drafting the ASEAN Charter was essentially a negotiation 
among veterans of ASEAN over a wide range of issues. The Thai participant, 
Pradap Pibulsonggram, acknowledged that the HLTF members ―began the 
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drafting process as familiar faces to one another, as most of us knew each other 
well through our years of interaction in ASEAN circles or our postings in other 
parts of the world.‖195 Indeed, HLTF members from ASEAN newer members 
were also experienced officials with a long involvement in ASEAN affairs. The 
Vietnamese HLTF member had been involved in ASEAN affairs since the early 
1990s when the country moved to join the group. Thus he was no longer a novice 
in the working environment of the drafting process. Laos‘ participant also had a 
rich experience of working on ASEAN with nine years serving as ASEAN senior 
official and took part in many negotiations since 1998.
196
 Therefore, all members 
of the Task Force had a deep understanding of ASEAN. Long involvement and 
frequent face-to face interactions helped the HLTF members know each other well 
as well as the concerns of their respective governments.
197
  
 
The characteristics of the Vietnamese representative and the like-minded 
members of CLMV group were best described by ASEAN Secretary-General Ong 
Keng Yong. To him, the drafting process was a negotiation among a group of 
―equal members‖: 
 
 The striking feature of the HLTF‘s deliberations over almost one year is 
the proactive and, occasionally, competitive roles of the representatives 
from CLMV. They pushed for their respective formulation of words, 
cajoled other member states‘ representatives to accept their concern about 
the unbridled future direction of ASEAN, and handled the reactions to 
their negotiation tactics in a manner reminiscent of the Ramayana drama 
on stage: slow and steady, and unyielding on the fundamentals. The 
strategic vision for ASEAN and the political acumen displayed by the 
respective CLMV Leaders in managing the ASEAN agenda was digested 
by the CLMV members on the HLTF. Yet, these drafters did not want to 
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miss the opportunity to stamp their own imprimatur on such an important 
document like the ASEAN Charter. They clearly impressed all involved in 
the process that ASEAN is a collective body where each and every 
member state has a stake, a voice and a political wallop (to be used 
judiciously vis-à-vis fellow members when needed). To me, this display of 
dexterity and diplomacy means that ASEAN has come of age, as a 
grouping of equals, and it coincided with the timely establishment of the 
ASEAN Charter.
198
 
 
Ong was clearly impressed with the prominence and confidence of HLTF 
members from CLMV in the negotiations. Indeed, as the chronology shows, the 
Vietnamese participant proactively engaged in the deliberations, navigating the 
drafting process in a way that he believed would best serve his national interests. 
Regarding the HRB, what he expressed in the negotiation was, if not an outright 
rejection of the proposal, the view that Vietnam was not ready for such an 
arrangement at the time of drafting the ASEAN Charter. More specifically, he 
wanted to know exactly what function and form the proposed HRB would take 
before considering whether to go along with it. He was the first to raise the idea of 
the TOR and later proposed his own formulation on the enabling provision on 
human rights. Together with CLM participants, he persuaded his ASEAN 
counterparts to accept their concerns and to make more concessions. The 
discussion of the HLTF at the 10
th
 meeting was a case in point. At that meeting, 
the CLMV participants were successful in persuading participants from old 
ASEAN members to discuss the TOR of the HRB, even without a clear mandate 
from Foreign Ministers.  
 
During the drafting process Task Force members worked under 
tremendous time constraints and considerable pressure because of divergent 
positions, national interests and the drafting deadline.
199
 In a negotiation like the 
drafting process where there were high expectations of, and an urgent call for, 
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ASEAN members to take on regional responsibilities, all HLTF members had to 
think hard about how best to balance their national interests and that of the wider 
region. Most members agreed that the climax of the entire process came at the 
eighth HLTF meeting. This was the longest meeting (lasting for eight days) and 
the Task Force was split when it came to the issue of the HRB. As the Brunei 
representative observed, the pressure of drafting became ―demanding and tense‖ 
as they dealt with the article referring to the establishment of the ASEAN HRB.
200
 
He added that ―of all our debate, this [human rights body] was the most explosive 
and tense of all.‖ The negotiation on the HRB, in the words of Kao Kim Hourn, 
reflected a struggle among ASEAN members on how to balance ―domestic 
political pressures‖ and ―a new layer of regional responsibilities.‖201 The 
Indonesian representative also stressed the difficulty in balancing national 
interests and managing broader expectations. He had to take into account, among 
others, ―the interests of Indonesia‘s stakeholders with regional realities.‖202  
 
Vietnam‘s initial preference was clear: it preferred not to have a regional 
HRB. Rather, it wanted to hold regular consultations and interactions on the issue. 
During the negotiations, the Vietnamese representative implied that Vietnam was 
not ready for such arrangement at the time of the drafting process. However, since 
the proposed HRB was an item on the agenda, he had no choice but to participate 
in the deliberations. On the one hand, there was fear on the part of the Vietnamese 
representative that if he did not take part in the process, advocates for the HRB 
would take the lead, setting the rules and others would have to follow. The fear 
was expressed by the CLMV group at the eighth HLTF in response to the 
Philippines proposal. Therefore, the Vietnamese participant had to engage in the 
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deliberations in order to control the process of the creation of the HRB and to set 
the rules that would be in Vietnam‘s interests if the body were created.203 On the 
other hand, engaging in the HRB deliberations was also a way to show that 
Vietnam had no fears about touching upon this sensitive issue.
204
 Raising the idea 
of the TOR therefore could be seen as killing two birds with one stone: it was a 
tactic to try and delay the establishment of the body and set the rules for its future 
operation if it were created, and at the same time it let Vietnam show that it was 
not trying to block the process. Engagement in the HRB deliberations, however, 
did not mean Vietnam had already agreed with the creation of the HRB. 
 
Another crucial point in the drafting process of the ASEAN Charter was 
that consensus as decision rule was often challenged. Ong Keng Yong reported 
that, from time to time, he had to intervene ―to urge consensus after prolonged 
debates on specific issues or particular forms of words.‖205 The Malaysian HLTF 
member painted a more detailed picture:  
 
―Negotiation through the 13 meetings held by the HLTF was not without 
tension, occasional outburst of emotions or dramatic moments. The 
absence of ―undue pressure‖ did not mean the complete absence of 
―threats‖ exhibited by some members from time to time. Such conduct or 
negotiating techniques reflected the burden held by the HLTF members in 
protecting their respective national interest pertaining to key provisions in 
the Charter. The older ASEAN member states namely Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand even had to counter the 
notion of being seen to be ―too generous‖ in conceding to the CLMV 
(Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam) member states on various 
critical and sensitive issues in the Charter.‖206 
 
                                               
203 Interviews by author in Hanoi, January 10, 2012. 
204 Ibid. 
205 Yong, 112. 
206 Tan Sri Ahmad Fuzi bin Abdul Razak, ―Facing Unfair Criticisms,‖ in The Making of the 
ASEAN Charter, eds. Tommy Koh, Rosario G. Manalo and Walter Woon (Singapore; Hackensack, 
NJ: World Scientific Pub. Co., 2009), 21. 
81 
 
Violation of the consensus principle thus caused tensions among all 
members of the Task Force. For example, the Philippines participant in response 
to a CLMV proposal of an additional paragraph to the enabling provision said she 
was shocked and felt she was being coerced rather than being persuaded.
207
 
Meanwhile, Laos‘ representative described the negotiations as sometimes tense 
and forceful, though amity and mutual respect prevailed.
208
  
Agent Autonomy 
The nature of a negotiation in which participants had to protect their 
national interests and the sensitiveness of the issue negotiated - the human rights 
issue - did not allow the Vietnamese representative much autonomy of action or 
some ―degree of free choice‖ as theory suggests would be the case for an instance 
of persuasion. The chronology shows that the ASEAN Ministers had to intervene 
three times to get a final decision on the HRB. The Vietnamese HLTF member 
was no exception. While the policy-making process at the MOFA is increasingly 
decentralized and members of the ASEAN Department play the key role in 
shaping the country‘s policy on ASEAN issues, the Vietnamese participant still 
had to directly report to and receive instruction from the Foreign Minister about 
any progress with the negotiations. Being an expert on ASEAN affairs and 
serving as Vietnam‘s Senior Official for ASEAN, Nguyen Trung Thanh was in a 
more advantageous position to put forward policy recommendations.
209
 The idea 
of the TOR was his own.
210
 However, the sensitive nature of the human rights 
issue in Vietnam‘s external relations211 also required the involvement of various 
MOFA departments such as the Department of International Organizations and 
the Department of International Treaties and Laws and other government agencies 
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such as the Ministry of Public Security and the Ministry of Defence.
212
 Therefore, 
during the negotiations the Vietnamese HLTF member had to consult with 
multiple agencies regarding the substance of the TOR.
213
 
Agent Properties  
The Vietnamese entered the negotiations with a deeply held attitude 
toward human rights: the issue has long been perceived as being hijacked by 
Western countries
214
 and a number of hostile forces
215
 to intervene in the 
country‘s internal affairs with a view to implementing the so-called ―peaceful 
evolution.‖216 Regarding the HRB, Ong Keng Yong reported to the Task Force 
that in their first meeting in Siem Riep in March 2007 the Vietnamese Foreign 
Minister said it had a problem with human rights because ―it is being used as an 
excuse to intervene in our internal affairs.‖217 During the HLTF negotiations, in 
addition to the fear the body could have monitoring functions as mentioned above, 
internal Vietnamese documents reveal that there was also concern about the 
possibility that the body would be manipulated if it were allowed to receive 
foreign financial support.
218
 Vietnam also wanted clarification about the body‘s 
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possible additional tasks and about the vague role possibly anticipated for the 
ASEAN Secretary-General.
219
  
 
This ingrained attitude or perceived threat of intervention under the name 
of human rights among the Vietnamese has been developed and consolidated 
through the process of the country‘s integration into the international community 
since the early 1990s.  First, it was the Western countries that placed human rights 
as a conditionality in the process of normalization of diplomatic relations with 
Vietnam. For example, the EU included specific provisions on human rights 
protection and promotion in the 1995 EU-Vietnam Framework Agreement.
220
 
Similarly, in Vietnam-US relations, annual dialogues on human rights started even 
before the two countries normalized diplomatic relations in 1995.
221
 Therefore, 
defending against outside pressure and intervention in the guise of human rights 
has been considered a long political struggle - a struggle that would intensify as 
Vietnam expanded and deepened its relationship with countries with different 
political system, especially the United States.
222
  
 
Throughout the 1990s and in the early 2000s Vietnam adopted a largely 
reactive posture on the human rights issue. Since joining in ASEAN in 1995 
Vietnam has tried to delay the establishment of a human rights body for 
ASEAN.
223
 For example, in a talking point on ―Democracy and Human Rights‖ 
prepared for the 33
rd
 ASEAN Ministers' Meeting (Thailand, 2000), Vietnam was 
of the view that: 
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It is of primary importance that we cannot allow the acts by several 
countries to use democracy and human rights as the pretext for interfering 
with the internal affairs of other countries. It should be stressed that 
respect for sovereignty and non-interference in each other‘s internal affairs 
are the most fundamental principles of international relations. On the 
proposed establishment of an ASEAN Human Rights mechanism, due to 
the diversity and the current regional situation, it is not the right time to 
establish an ASEAN human rights mechanism; many of the countries in 
the region do not yet have a national human rights body to coordinate 
activities in this area. However, we could consider continuing exchanges 
of views on this issue in order to gain a better understanding and form a 
common voice to preserve the fine values of Southeast Asia and Asia. 
What is also important is that at the moment ASEAN should concentrate 
its efforts on addressing the consequences of regional crisis, recovering 
and sustaining economic growth, eliminating hunger and alleviating 
poverty with a view to ensuring the most fundamental and pressing human 
rights, that is the right to development and prosperity.
224
 
 
It was not until recently that Vietnam changed its posture, from reactive to 
proactive, in dealing with the human rights issue. In 2005, Vietnam published the 
White Book on Vietnam’s Achievements in the Protection and Promotion of 
Human Rights, expressing for the first time its official position and showing its 
preparedness for dialogues with all concerned countries, international and regional 
organizations on the issue.
225
 This proactive posture was then confirmed at the 
Xth National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam held in 2006: 
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To proactively participate in the common struggle for human rights. To 
stand ready for dialogues with concerned countries, international and 
regional organizations on human rights issues. To be determined to foil all 
plots and attempts to distort and abuse ―democracy‖, ―human rights‖, 
―ethnicity‖, and ―religion‖ issues expecting to intervene into the internal 
affairs, infringing Vietnam‘s independence, sovereignty, territorial 
integrity, security, and political stability.
226
 
 
Regarding the ASEAN HRB, this proactive posture was articulated by MOFA as 
follows: 
 
When the ASEAN human rights body is created we should participate in 
its activities in a proactive manner. At the same time, we should actively 
contribute to developing an ASEAN Declaration of Human Rights which 
includes not only human rights norms enshrined in UN Conventions but 
also Asian values and norms, and ASEAN identity. We should be well-
prepared to develop our persuasive arguments against the Western posture 
on the issue.
227
 
 
However, the changed posture does not necessarily lead to change in the 
ingrained attitude on the issue, particularly toward the creation of a regional HRB. 
During the negotiations, together with CLM participants, the Vietnamese 
participant showed that he would not easily yield on this fundamental issue.  
Deliberations on the TOR at the 10
th
 HLTF meeting clearly confirmed this point, 
when the Vietnamese Task Force member stressed that he could only go along 
with the proposed HRB as long as the TOR was worked out and that the body 
would only have consultative status. 
 
In sum, of all the conditions conducive for persuasion, only one - small 
membership - was present during the drafting process of the ASEAN Charter. 
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Vietnam‘s HLTF member was not a novice in ASEAN affairs. Being confident 
and equal to others in terms of negotiation skills made it difficult for him to yield 
to others‘ arguments. The tight schedule of the negotiation, the pressure felt when 
activist members wanted to move faster, rather than in a pace comfortable to all, 
and the sensitive nature of the issue caused concern and even fear on the part of 
the reluctant members. This working environment did not facilitate flexible 
cognition among reluctant members or give them some degree of choice when it 
came to assessing the advocates‘ intentions and arguments. 
Assessing intentions of the advocates 
How the Vietnamese HLTF member judged the intentions of the activist 
members and the trust worthiness of their message needs to be examined in a 
broader context of Vietnam-ASEAN relations in which struggle and cooperation 
are seen by the former as the two aspects of the relationship. In general, Vu 
Khoan elaborated these two sides of the same coin as follows:  
[On our part] we always wish and determine to promote cooperation in the 
principles of equality and mutual interests. But at the same time, we 
resolutely struggle against acts of encroaching upon Vietnam's 
independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national interests. 
Rather than retarding cooperation this struggle is carried out with a view to 
promoting cooperation in a more effective manner.
228
 
 
Expanding and deepening the Vietnam-ASEAN relationship has unfolded 
along these lines. A MOFA review of the first five years of Vietnam‘s 
participation in ASEAN concluded that one of the major lessons for Vietnam was 
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to resolutely implement this strategy of struggle and cooperation.
229
 The aspect of 
struggle in Vietnam-ASEAN relations in the first ten years of participation could 
be seen in Vietnam‘s efforts to defend and uphold ASEAN‘s core principles in 
response to radical initiatives proposed by some old ASEAN members. In the late 
1990s, Vietnam saw a tendency among some ASEAN members to relax and 
change the organization‘s core principles and to drive it in a way that was 
contradictory to common interests.
230
 For example, the initiative of ―flexible 
engagement‖ proposed by Thailand and supported by the Philippines was seen as 
contrary to the principle of non-interference that ASEAN had upheld for so long. 
Flexible engagement failed because of the strong opposition from the rest of 
ASEAN‘s members. Vietnam considered its success in the struggle to uphold 
ASEAN‘s core principles as one of its most important achievements. The review 
of the first five years of Vietnam‘s participation stated that:   
 
Vietnam has actively participated in the struggle to uphold the 
Association‘s core principles, especially consensus and non-interference in 
internal affairs. In the aftermath of the 1997 financial crisis, Thailand took 
the advantage of the division among ASEAN, particularly the difficult 
situation in Indonesia - once the leading member in ASEAN - to propose 
the initiative of ―flexible engagement‖ at the 38th AMM (7/1998) which 
was essentially aimed to change the principle of non-interference in 
internal affairs. Only the Philippines supported the initiative. Other 
ASEAN members rejected it outright. Although the initiative was a failure, 
Thailand pushed forth ASEAN Troika in order to materialize the initiative. 
In response, Vietnam and other ASEAN members firmly upheld the non-
interference principle if ASEAN Troika was to be created. As a result, 
ASEAN Troika would only be constituted as an ad hoc body as and when 
it is necessary with the consensus of all ten ASEAN Foreign Ministers. It 
is not a decision-making body. Rather, it is a body to support and assist the 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers. ASEAN Troika will operate in accordance 
with consensus and non-interference principles.
231
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From a Vietnamese perspective, this struggle has its roots in the 
differences among ASEAN members in terms of history, culture, level of 
economic development, political systems and divergent national interests. On the 
one hand, these differences ―are the main obstacle for ASEAN members to 
achieve substantive cooperation in sensitive issue areas, including human 
rights.‖232 On the other hand, these differences ―require sympathy, mutual respect 
and understanding among ASEAN members if they are to promote regional 
cooperation and to ensure the solidarity and unity within the Organization.‖ 233  
The spirit of struggle and cooperation can also be found in the preparation 
for Vietnam‘s participation in the drafting of the ASEAN Charter, however with a 
softened tone regarding the struggle aspect:  
We should actively participate in the drafting process of ASEAN Charter 
in order to chart out the Organization‘s future orientation; to increase the 
effectiveness of regional cooperation; to consolidate regional solidarity 
and unity on the basis of firmly holding the existing goals, objectives and 
principles; to guard against acts by some of ASEAN members which may 
have negative implications so as to ensure the development of ASEAN 
would be in our interests.
234
 
 
 During the negotiations on the HRB, the biggest difference among activist 
and reluctant members was on the ―timing‖ of the creation of the body. While 
participants from the activist group pushed for the immediate creation of the 
HRB, the Vietnamese representative preferred an incremental approach: first 
developing ASEAN norms on the protection and promotion of human rights, 
including an ASEAN Declaration on Human Rights, and second establishing a 
HRB as a step to implement the Declaration. The different approaches were 
summed up by the Vietnamese HLTF member in the report of the seventh 
meeting: 
                                               
232 Ibid., 11. 
233 Ibid., 109. 
234 MOFA ASEAN Department Report ―On Ten Years of Vietnam‘s Participation in ASEAN,‖ 
(2005), 12. 
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The most controversial issue now is the roadmap of implementation: 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand want to create the 
human rights body first, by including an enabling provision on human 
rights body in the ASEAN Charter, then develop concepts or adopt an 
ASEAN Declaration on Human Rights. The remaining, including 
Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, while in principle can agree on the creation 
of the human rights body, want to slow down the process through 
developing ASEAN norms on the promotion and protection of human 
rights, including the adoption of an ASEAN Declaration on Human 
Rights, before creating the human rights body.
235
 
 
 Therefore, the Philippines‘ strong support for the proposed HRB at the 
eighth HLTF meeting was seen by the Vietnamese participant (and the other CLM 
representatives) as ―radical‖236 making them suspicious of the advocates‘ real 
motives. Vietnam‘s representative believed that the activist members wanted to 
take the lead in the area of human rights and democracy and impose their 
standards on others. It should be recalled that at the eighth HLTF meeting, the 
Philippines Foreign Minister had rejected the proposed enabling provision by the 
HLTF and offered his own proposal with the suggestion that those ASEAN 
members who felt prepared could join first. This proposal was seen by the CLMV 
group as an attempt to set (new) rules for the old game. Therefore, the main 
concern for the Vietnamese participant was the possibility that radical ASEAN 
members might manipulate the process of creating the human rights body: 
 
In order to implement our Minister‘s instruction at the AMM Retreat in 
Siem Riep on the need to clarify what the proposed human rights body is 
going to do before deciding whether or not to create it and the instruction 
from the Prime Minister given in the Government Office Document 
No.2618 on Vietnam‘s participation in the Project on Assistance for the 
establishment of an ASEAN Human Rights body dated May 18, 2007 our 
delegation has actively worked with those from Laos, Cambodia, and 
Myanmar as well as those from Singapore and Brunei who to some extent 
                                               
235 MOFA ASEAN Department Report ―On the Result of the seventh Meeting of the High Level 
Task Force on the Drafting of the ASEAN Charter,‖ July 2007, pp. 3-4. 
236 Interview by author in Hanoi, January 10, 2012. 
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shared our views in navigating the negotiation process in a positive 
manner to ensure that (if and once the human rights body is created) its 
principles and operation would be in our interests, thus preventing 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand from having a radical 
approach on the issue and manipulating the process.
237
 
 
Myanmar‘s participant Aung Bwa shared the same concern when he observed that 
―some of our colleagues were assuming the role of champions of human rights 
and adopting a ‗holier-than-the-Pope‘ approach.‖238 Vietnam‘s HLTF member 
was also concerned about the possibility of interfering in the internal affairs if the 
HRB had a monitoring function. At the 10
th
 HLTF meeting, the Vietnamese 
representative stressed that the body created could only have consultative status. 
He also preferred to put it in the category of ―other organs‖ in ASEAN‘s structure. 
Internal documents show that, in preparation for the subsequent deliberations, 
Vietnam‘s HLTF group had summed up the situation of discussion at the eighth 
meeting and recommended Vietnam‘s position on the function and location of the 
HRB as follows: 
 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand preferred the human 
rights body to be one of ASEAN principal organs and the item on the TOR 
to be deleted. Meanwhile, Vietnam, Laos, and Myanmar consisted that the 
human rights body could only have a consultative status and that TOR 
must be a basis for the creation of the human rights body in the future. 
Brunei and Singapore seized the middle ground. Singapore - acting as the 
new Chair of the HLTF and with a view to pushing forward the ASEAN 
Charter drafting process so that the Document could be approved as 
scheduled at the 13
th
 ASEAN Summit in Singapore - suggested ASEAN‘s 
organizational structure should not be divided into principal and other 
organs. Instead, they should be put under the category of ‗ASEAN‘s 
organ.‘ 
 
  
                                               
237 MOFA ASEAN Department Report ―On the Result of the seventh Meeting of the High Level 
Task Force on the Drafting of the ASEAN Charter,‖ July 2007, p. 3. 
238 Aung Bwa, ―The Jewel in My Crown,‖ in The Making of the ASEAN Charter, eds. Tommy 
Koh, Rosario G. Manalo and Walter Woon (Singapore; Hackensack, NJ: World Scientific Pub. 
Co., 2009), 33.  
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Therefore, in subsequent meeting: 
 We should emphasize that in the Chapter 4 on ASEAN‘s organizational 
structure there should be a clear distinction between policy-making organs 
and policy implementation organs and between assisting organs and 
consultative organs. We do not support Singapore‘s proposal (because this 
is one way to blur the location of the human rights body later when it is 
created.) 
 
 The human rights body, if it is to be created, can only have consultative 
function. Therefore, it should not be put under category of ASEAN‘s 
principal organs. In addition, ASEAN Ministers have not touched upon the 
issue.
 239
 
 
However, as the chronology shows, the Ministers at their third meeting did 
not touch upon the function of the HRB. They only decided on its location (in 
Chapter 4 of the Charter). Right up until this meeting, Vietnam‘s HLTF member 
continued to raise his opposition to this arrangement.
240
 Further, while admitting 
that old ASEAN members had made great progress in the areas of human rights 
and democracy, most notably the creation of national human rights commissions 
in Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia, to the Vietnamese these 
ASEAN members still faced a lot of their own human rights issues. Therefore, 
they were not in a position to teach others on how to protect and promote human 
rights.
241
 Differences in approaching the creation of the HRB caused suspicion 
among the Vietnamese about the real intentions of those supporting it. This 
suspicion forced the Vietnamese representative to engage in the deliberations so 
as to prevent the activists from manipulating the process and potentially 
controlling the operation of the HRB when it was created. And as the chronology 
shows, Vietnam did not agree with the creation of the HRB until the second 
meeting of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers on July 30, 2007.  
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Issue of the Establishment of ASEAN Human Rights Body in the ASEAN Charter in the 
Preparation for the ninth HLTF Meeting on the Drafting of the ASEAN Charter,‖ August 2007, 
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In short, internal documents show that throughout the negotiations, 
Vietnam was primarily concerned with what it thought were the intentions, rather 
than arguments, of those advocating for the HRB. This concern was caused by the 
ingrained attitude toward human rights - the assumption that the human rights 
issue was a pretext used by outsiders to intervene in Vietnam‘s internal affairs. In 
addition, different approaches to human rights further deepened this concern: the 
Vietnamese HLTF member saw the effort by activist members to push for an 
immediate creation of the HRB as a radical move, putting more pressure on those 
with reservations. As a result, the Vietnamese representative did not trust the 
intentions of activist members. He did not yield to HRB proponents, stressing that 
Vietnam could only go along with it if it was a consultative body. Therefore, it 
was clear enough that the Vietnamese were not persuaded by advocates to go 
along with the HRB. 
Social influence as an explanation 
An alternative account drawing on socialization theory is that social influence was 
at work in this case. Did concerns about image and ―not rocking the boat‖ lead to 
a cooperative attitude on the part of the Vietnamese toward the creation of the 
HRB? The working environment of the drafting process of the ASEAN Charter 
appears to be more conducive to social influence and there seem to be several 
reasons in favour of a social influence explanation. For instance, a Vietnamese 
senior diplomat admitted in an interview that Vietnam‘s national interest in 
ASEAN, especially in the context of ASEAN Community building, was to 
―maintain its credibility and status‖ and that the creation of the HRB should also 
be examined in this context.
242
 The decision to go along with the HRB would 
contribute to realizing that social goal. One member in the Vietnamese HLTF 
group also admitted in an interview that ―they were sensitive to how their actions 
                                               
242 Interview by the author in Hanoi, January 4, 2012. 
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were perceived and did not want to be seen as blocking the negotiations.‖243 
Internal documents also reveal that the Vietnamese did not want to create negative 
impressions among activist members that they avoided dealing with the issue:  
 
The idea of a regional human rights mechanism was adopted very early at 
the 26
th
 AMM in Singapore and restated in annual AMM Joint 
Communiqués. Since then, the Working Group on the Regional Human 
Rights Mechanism - which was composed of four national human rights 
mechanisms from Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand and a 
number of regional NGOs - has actively lobbied for the creation of this 
human rights mechanism. Since joining ASEAN, we have tried to delay 
the materialization of the idea. However, at present some ASEAN 
members repeatedly urged for the creation of such a human rights 
mechanism to prevent external forces - taking the advantage of lacking a 
human rights mechanism in the region - from imposing pressure on and 
intervening in ASEAN internal affairs. Therefore, it is now time for us not 
to avoid the issue. Instead, we should participate directly and actively in 
the process of creating such body in order to set the ‗rules of the game,‘ 
not creating the impressions that we avoid dealing with regional human 
rights issue.
244
 
 
The message clearly shows that in addition to the material goal of setting the 
operational rules for the future HRB that would be in its national interests, 
Vietnam also had a social goal - seeking to avoid criticism from active 
participants, thus creating a good image in the eyes of other members. In a 
research project done by Vietnam‘s Diplomatic Academy on the establishment of 
the ASEAN HRB and Vietnam‘s policy, this social objective was further 
elaborated: 
 
 Participation in the establishment of the ASEAN Human Rights Body is a 
manifestation of Vietnam‘s integration into the common trends of the 
world and the region on human rights issue. Other members of the world 
community would highly appreciate our proactive posture in the protection 
of human rights. This would be beneficiary to Vietnam‘s external relations 
and helps boost our status in the international arena. 
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 Participation in the establishment of the ASEAN Human Rights Body 
significantly contributes to improving our image in the area of human 
rights protection and thus rejecting fabrications and false allegations of our 
human rights records. 
 
 Participation in the ASEAN Human Rights Body is also an expression of 
the Vietnam‘s spirit of cooperation and solidarity, striving for the 
Organization‘s interests.245  
 
 In addition to the desire to appear as a responsible and proactive member 
of ASEAN, the possibility of being in a minority group might have also led to 
change in attitude of the Vietnamese. More specifically, change by the formerly 
like-minded participants from Lao, Myanmar and Cambodia toward a more 
cooperative stance might have led to similar change on the part of the Vietnamese 
participant. During the negotiations Cambodia‘s HLTF member appeared to be a 
little bit independent of others in the group.
246
 Indeed, at the eighth HLTF 
meeting, Kao said:  
 
 ―This human rights body has to be established as part of the evolutionary 
process… We agreed that there would be a process. The question is speed 
where we may not share the same view. Some countries have already had 
national human rights body. In the case of Cambodia, we are in the 
process of setting up one. We are not against at all. We respect the process 
to be done to take care of all concerns of other countries. We can go either 
way.‖247  
 
Kao‘s reflection after the ASEAN Charter was completed on the implications of a 
two-tier ASEAN helps us understand his position (and that of the Cambodian 
government that he represented) during the HRB negotiations. Kao argued that it 
                                               
245 The Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam Research Project ―On the Establishment of the ASEAN 
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was time for ASEAN to overcome ―the old thinking of dividing ASEAN into old 
and new members‖ since this old thinking would not ―serve ASEAN well‖ and 
that ―it could only undermine ASEAN unity.‖248 He further stressed that ―there is 
the need to distinguish between domestic political pressures and a new layer of 
regional responsibilities, and thereby a plan to reconcile these two conflicting sets 
of demands for the benefit of all. This requires acumen in the international arena, 
rather than simply a reflexive bowing to internal populist, reactionary forces.‖249 
With particular reference to human rights as the only issue that divided ASEAN 
into two groups, Kao‘s emphasis on ASEAN‘s unity and the benefit for all 
reflected his (government‘s) support for collective interests when ASEAN entered 
a deeper level of regional integration.  
 
 Although Cambodia‘s progress on human rights and democracy remains 
modest, the fact that it permitted the establishment of domestic non-government 
organizations on human rights represents the great strides it has taken in 
comparison to the situation in Vietnam and Laos. Cambodia has also been in the 
process of establishing a national human rights institution.
250
 Its representative 
therefore might have been more comfortable discussing human rights issue than 
others in the reluctant camp.  
 
             The relative independence of Cambodia was also confirmed by internal 
Vietnamese MOFA documents, which show that Myanmar and Laos were the 
main partners that Vietnam relied on for a coordinated position in the HRB 
deliberations. For example, in preparation for the ninth meeting, particularly on 
two issues of the location of the HRB and the draft of the TOR, Vietnamese 
HLTF members recommended that:  
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On the location of the human rights body in Chapter 4, we will actively 
cooperate with Laos and Myanmar in negotiation in order to put this 
body in the category of ‗Other Organs,‘ may be after the existing bodies 
because it is not yet created.
251
  
 
And on the draft of the TOR, Vietnam‘s position was recommended as follows: 
 
We should emphasize that at the 40
th
 AMM ASEAN Foreign Ministers 
instructed the HLTF to improve the TOR. Therefore, the HLTF should 
push forward the completion of the Document so as to submit to the 
Ministers for consideration. At the same time, we should work with Laos 
and Myanmar in emphasizing that TOR must be the basis and 
prerequisite for the future formation of the human rights body.
252
 
  
 Thus, it is clear that among the CLMV group, Cambodia appeared more 
supportive of the HRB. It was revealed that at the seventh HLTF meeting, 
participants from Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar also came to agree with the 
proposed HRB, at least in principle. A report on the result of the seventh meeting 
by the Vietnamese HLTF members confirmed this point when it stated that the 
issue of whether or not to create the human rights body was no longer a major 
controversy and that ―even participants from Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar, 
initially strongly opposed the idea, now became more proactive in discussing the 
substance of the TOR though they still needed to ask for instruction from home 
before officially approving it.‖253  
 
However, the critical moment came at the second meeting of the ASEAN 
Foreign Ministers when Vietnam‘s Deputy Foreign Minister Le Cong Phung 
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finally announced Vietnam‘s decision to go along with the initiative, subject to 
the TOR and the consultative status of the HRB. As ASEAN Secretary-General 
Ong Keng Yong observed, at the meeting only two or three Foreign Ministers said 
they would refer to it (the HRB) after the TOR were agreed.
254
 That meant a clear 
majority of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers agreed with the initiative and Vietnam 
was left in a minority. Phung‘s announcement, according to Ong, helped put an 
end to the debate whether or not to create a HRB for ASEAN.
255
 In an interview, 
one member of the Vietnamese HLTF group conceded that even Laos and 
Myanmar agreed with it before Vietnam.
256
  
 
 Change on the part of other in-group members was reconfirmed at a 
meeting in Hanoi right after the eighth HLTF meeting. The meeting brought 
together Vietnamese officials from relevant departments to discuss the HRB. The 
Vietnamese HLTF member chaired the meeting. He reported on the progress of 
the ASEAN Charter drafting process and stressed that the objective of the meeting 
was to discuss how Vietnam should go along with the proposed HRB when the 
majority of ASEAN members supported it, including Cambodia and Laos.
 
The 
meeting did not focus on whether or not Vietnam would agree with it, rather, 
participants were required to make policy recommendations on the possible form 
and function of and specific issues and tasks taken by the body when it was 
created.
257
 
  
 
 In short, it can be concluded that Vietnam came to agree with the HRB 
because it did not want to be isolated when a majority of ASEAN members finally 
came to agree with the initiative. Social influence, which emphasizes image 
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concerns and ―not rocking the boat‖ therefore provides a more plausible 
explanation for Vietnam‘s cooperative attitude toward the creation of the HRB.  
Conclusion 
The above analysis shows that during the drafting of the ASEAN Charter, 
activist members did not successfully persuade the Vietnamese representative to 
go along with their plan. Rather, the Vietnamese participant remained suspicious 
of their intentions. The push for the immediate creation of the HRB was seen as a 
radical move and the Vietnamese feared that the body could be manipulated by 
activist ASEAN members. As a result, the Vietnamese representative actively 
participated in the negotiation from the outset so as to control the process in a way 
that if the body were to be created, its operation would not be hostile to 
Vietnamese interests.  
 
Social influence provides a more plausible explanation for Vietnam‘s 
decision to go along with the initiative. On the one hand, image concerns 
prevented the Vietnamese representative from avoiding human rights issue 
altogether, especially when there was a shared understanding among ASEAN 
members on human rights protection and promotion as a goal. On the other hand, 
being left in the minority eventually forced the Vietnamese to change their 
attitude toward supporting the creation of the HRB.  
 
Vietnam‘s endorsement of the HRB, however, reflected a change in 
preference. Initially, Vietnam preferred continued consultations on human rights, 
rather than establishing a regional mechanism on the issue. And the decision was 
made in an environment where threats and material side payments were not 
present. Internal documents on the drafting process of the ASEAN Charter do not 
show any evidence that the activist members, individually or collectively, offered 
material rewards in exchange for support from the more reluctant states. Their 
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pressure throughout the negotiations did not constitute a threat, either. Although 
activist members appeared ―radical‖ in pushing the initiative forward, the 
Vietnamese representative did not feel threatened in not moving from his initial 
position. Rather, as the chronology shows, he did not yield to arguments by 
activist members. And the decision to go along with the HRB, when it came, 
came from a higher-ranking official. 
  
There is also no evidence that outside intervention helped elicit Vietnam‘s 
cooperative behaviour towards the creation of the HRB. Although human rights 
issues have long been an obstacle in bilateral relationships between individual 
ASEAN members - and the Association as a whole - and the West, records of the 
HLTF meetings do not show any efforts by Western governments to intervene in 
the work of the Task Force so as to facilitate progress on the HRB. Concerns were 
raised in the West following Myanmar‘s crackdown on protesters in August and 
September 2007.
258
 However, the debate on whether to establish a HRB was 
settled in July, before protests broke out in Myanmar. Thus the possibility that the 
West took advantage of Myanmar‘s human rights situation to put pressure on 
ASEAN to create a regional human rights mechanism can be ruled out.  
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CHAPTER V 
THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM AND 
PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY 
This chapter explores if Vietnam has endorsed the Preventive Diplomacy 
papers and hence accepted the norm of preventive diplomacy as a result of 
socialization in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). It is in two parts. The first 
section provides background on the ARF‘s debates about PD, focusing on 
deliberations between two broad groups of states in the period 1997-2001. 
Vietnam was part of a reluctant group that also included China, Russia, India and 
almost all ASEAN members.
 
Meanwhile, a group of activist members including 
Japan, the United States, Australia and Singapore pressed for the acceptance of 
PD. Deliberations eventually led to the adoption of three documents in 2001, 
namely the Paper on Concepts and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy (PD 
paper), the Terms of Reference for the ARF Experts/Eminent Persons Register 
and the Paper on the Enhanced Role of the ARF Chair (hereinafter PD papers 
collectively).
259
  
 
The second section explores three possible explanations - mimicking, 
social influence and persuasion - for Vietnam‘s endorsement of the PD papers. 
First, socialization suggests that Vietnam‘s decision to go along with PD was an 
act of mimicking: that as a novice in the ARF, Vietnamese officials simply 
believed that they should act like others and endorse the PD documents. The 
decision was taken without Vietnam coming to accept the benefits of PD. Second, 
a social influence explanation would argue Vietnam came to agree with the PD 
papers because of image concerns and a desire to ―not rock the boat.‖ In other 
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words, Vietnamese officials found themselves in a minority when other like-
minded participants changed their attitude to be more supportive of PD documents 
and realized that they would be seen as blocking the ARF process if they did not 
follow the majority to endorse the adoption of these documents. A third 
explanation is that persuasion was at work and Vietnamese officials finally came 
to judge the arguments advanced by advocates as convincing: by taking up PD the 
ARF would remain relevant and more capable of responding to regional security 
issues. Put differently, taking up PD was in the collective interests rather than 
against the national interests of participating countries. 
 
By tracing internal debates on PD, the thesis argues that Vietnam‘s action 
was not strictly an act of mimicking in order to stay safe when the ARF was in an 
uncertain transition period. Rather, state representatives saw a potential threat if 
they took up PD: moving the ARF towards the second stage and employing PD 
measures might give activists an opportunity to interfere in Vietnam‘s internal 
affairs. As a result, a course of action was carefully charted out whereby 
Vietnamese officials allied with the reluctant camp to counter PD advocates. 
Similarly, there is little evidence that persuasion occurred. Vietnamese officials 
did not trust the PD advocates and were suspicious of their attempts to push PD 
forward. Therefore, they sought to slow down PD discussions and delay the 
adoption of PD papers.  
 
Social influence appears to be the most plausible explanation. Vietnamese 
officials found that they were in a minority when the Chinese - who they had seen 
as a behaviour exemplar - suddenly changed their attitude to become more 
receptive to PD. Given the limited role of the ARF Chair in setting the agenda, 
Vietnam had little choice but to accommodate the major powers‘ preferences to 
incorporate the adoption of PD papers into the 8
th
 ARF agenda in 2001. However, 
attitudinal change on the part of the Vietnamese did not necessarily mean a 
change in preference. In PD deliberations from 2001 onward Vietnamese officials 
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still sought to prevent the ARF from entering the PD stage and institutionalizing 
it. They did not even take advantage of holding the ARF Chair in 2010 to push 
forward the PD agenda at least to show a more positive attitude when there was 
urgent call for the ARF to embark on the second stage of development by 
implementing some specific PD measures. On the contrary, Vietnam remains 
reluctant, especially when it comes to intra-state PD measures. 
PD deliberations and Vietnam’s participation: A chronology 
Debates about PD at Track I started in 1997. According to Yuzawa, at the 
4
th
 ARF Senior Officials Meeting (SOM), Japanese officials proposed establishing 
an inter-sessional working group on PD.
260
 The proposal was supported by the 
United States, Canada, Australia and Singapore, but was sharply criticized by 
China.
261
 The Chinese argued that ―the definitions of PD were still too diverse and 
it was therefore too early to launch a discussion at the Track I level.‖262 Fear of 
interference in its domestic affairs was often cited as the main reason for Beijing‘s 
opposition to any such initiative.
263
 As the Chair of the 4
th
 ARF, Malaysia 
suggested a compromise to overcome the split between the two groups by putting 
PD on the agenda of the Inter-Sessional Group meeting on Confidence Building 
Measures (ISG-CBM) so the two issues could be discussed in tandem. This 
consensus was then reflected in the Chairman‘s Statement of the 4th ARF.264  
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As mandated in the 4
th
 ARF Chairman‘s Statement, the two subsequent 
ISG-CBM meetings held in November 1997 in Brunei and in March 1998 in 
Australia discussed areas of overlap between CBMs and PD. Four specific areas 
of overlap were identified, including (i) an enhanced role for the ARF Chair, 
particularly the idea of a good offices role; (ii) the development of a register of 
Experts and Eminent Persons among ARF participants; (iii) an annual Security 
Outlook (ASO); and (iv) voluntary background briefing on regional security 
issues.
265
 While some participants suggested the possibility of considering 
common approaches and understandings on preventive diplomacy, the summary 
reports still stressed the importance of proceeding in an ―incremental and step-by-
step manner and of taking decisions by consensus while taking into consideration 
the interests and comfort level of all ARF participants.‖266 This way of 
approaching PD clearly reflected the preference of the reluctant members who 
found themselves unprepared to take on PD. Meanwhile, activist members such as 
the US felt frustrated.
267
 The then US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stated 
that: ―We should take the next steps in this process by investigating the overlap 
between CBMs and PD. While the confidence building foundations must be solid, 
the ARF must also move forward if it is to remain vital and relevant because the 
traditional security challenges the ARF was established to address must be 
met.‖268  
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At the 6
th
 ARF in July 1999, there was a consensus among participants on 
the continued implementation of CBMs and at the same time to start discussion on 
the concept and principles of PD and four areas of overlap between CBMs and 
PD. Substantial discussions on PD were then conducted in 2000-2001. The 
process started with Singapore‘s offer on behalf of ASEAN to prepare a draft 
paper on the concept and principles of PD. At the second ISG-CBM held in April 
2000 in Singapore, Japan, acting as a co-chair, presented its paper on an enhanced 
role for the Chair. Then, the 7
th
 ARF held in July 2000 in Thailand reached an 
agreement that the ARF Chair would be the contact person for the Register of the 
use of the EEPs. South Korea drafted this paper as a basis for discussions on the 
procedures, scope and financial principles.  
Subsequent PD deliberations focused on these three papers. Vietnamese 
officials were most concerned with the first two: the concept and principles of PD 
and the enhanced role of the Chair. They believed that the adoption of these 
papers would mark a turning point for the ARF to officially enter its second stage 
of development - a trend they felt they had to prevent.
269
 Meanwhile, the paper on 
the Register of the EEPs only involved technical issues such as modalities, scope, 
procedures and financial issues. Thus, they were less concerned with this paper. 
PD deliberations in inter-sessional year 1999-2000 
The state of the ARF‘s evolution and of the PD discussions in 1999-2000 
was summed up by the Vietnamese officials as follows: 
ARF‘s activities have been increased both in intensity and scope. The 
institution is entering a complicated transition period marked by possible 
changes in substance of cooperation and institutional building: substantial 
and more binding CBMs are being implemented and the forum is to move 
to the next stage of preventive diplomacy. The United States, Japan and 
other Western participating countries want to institutionalize the ARF and 
move it forwards the PD stage. Meanwhile, China, India, and Russia are 
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reluctant. Regarding PD stage, ASEAN is split into two groups with 
Thailand, Singapore, the Philippines and Brunei on the activist side and 
the remaining on the reluctant side. However, ASEAN members have the 
same concern on the possibility of the ARF to be institutionalized, given 
the fear of losing their role as the driving force. The challenge for ASEAN 
now is how to properly deal with these two issues so as to maintain its 
central role in the ARF and for the forum to develop and remain relevant. 
At present, CBMs are being implemented in conjunction with the 
discussions on PD definition and concepts as well as the four measures in 
overlap, including an enhanced role for the ARF Chair, particularly the 
idea of a good offices role, the development of a register of Experts or 
Eminent Persons, annual Security Outlook, and voluntary background 
briefing on regional security issues.
270
 
Against this background, Vietnam found itself unprepared and remained 
cautious of attempts by activists to move the ARF forward. Although it did not 
oppose discussion of the substance of the PD papers, in the Vietnamese 
perspective CBMs should continue to be the foundation and the main thrust of the 
ARF process and that fundamental principles of the institution must be upheld. In 
other words, Vietnam‘s preference was not to move the ARF to the second stage 
of preventive diplomacy which its officials saw as having possible negative 
implications for the country‘s security and development.271  
On Concept and Principles of PD 
In October 1999 ASEAN approved Singapore‘s Draft Paper and the 
document was introduced at the first ISG-CBM meeting in inter-sessional year 
1999-2000 held in Tokyo in 13-14 November, 1999. The definition of PD offered 
in this draft paper was based on the proposed definition worked out by a 
                                               
270 MOFA ASEAN Department Background Documents ―On the ARF‖ prepared for the 7th ARF, 
July 2000. 
271 Ibid. 
106 
 
Workshop organized by the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific 
(CSCAP) in 1999.
272
 It read: 
Preventive diplomacy is consensual diplomatic and political action with the 
aim of: 
 Preventing severe disputes and conflicts from arising between States 
which pose a serious threat to regional peace and stability; 
 Preventing such disputes and conflicts from escalating into armed 
confrontation; and  
 Preventing such disputes and conflicts from spreading geographically.273 
 The co-chairs‘ summary report said that participants at the first ISG-CBM in 
inter-sessional year 1999-2000 in Tokyo had exchanged preliminary views on the 
concept and principles of PD and fuller discussion was expected to be carried out 
at the second ISG-CBM in Singapore.
274
 In preparation for the second ISG-CBM, 
participants were requested to submit their written comments to Singapore by 
February 1, 2000. The first round of the debate on Singapore‘s paper was 
primarily with ARF‘s non-ASEAN members. The United States, Canada, 
Australia, Japan and Singapore agreed with all three objectives mentioned above. 
They also stressed the importance of the third objective - preventing disputes and 
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conflicts from spreading geographically - when it came to humanitarian issues.
275
 
Meanwhile, on February 1, 2000 China offered an amended definition of PD. 
China defined PD as ―peaceful diplomatic actions undertaken by sovereign states 
to prevent armed conflicts between states in the region with the consent of all 
states directly involved in a dispute.‖276 It also proposed to delete the first and the 
third objectives in Singapore‘s paper. Acharya described the negotiations between 
China and Singapore as follows: 
China had also recommended the deletion of ―preventing such disputes 
and conflicts from spreading geographically‘ from the original ASEAN 
definition, on the ground that this belonged to the third stage of the ARF, 
known as ‗elaboration of approaches to conflicts‘, and hence was 
premature at the PD stage. The Singapore Concept Paper rephrased it: ―to 
help minimize the impact of such disputes and conflicts on a region‘. 
Another of China‘s proposed amendments was to delete the phrase: 
‗preventing severe disputes and conflicts from arising between States 
which pose a serious threat to regional peace and stability‘, altogether, 
because as the Chinese put it, ‗conflicts usually refer to armed actions, 
hence are not at the same level with disputes would render the ARF‘s 
mandate too ‗ambitious‘. But the Singapore-drafted Concept Paper kept 
the reference to ‗dispute.‘277 
Singapore then revised the draft paper based primarily on the comments 
by non-ASEAN members. In the end, the Concept Paper on PD dated 5 April 
2000 drafted and circulated by Singapore at the second ISG-CBM, 5-6 April 
2000, accepted the language proposed by Beijing as follows: 
―PD is consensual diplomatic and political action taken by sovereign states 
with the consent of all directly involved parties; 
To help prevent disputes and conflicts from arising between States that 
could potentially pose a threat to regional peace and stability; 
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To help prevent such disputes and conflicts from escalating into armed 
confrontation;  
To help minimize the impact of such disputes and conflicts on the 
region.‖278 
Vietnam fully developed its position on PD in preparation for the 7
th
 ARF 
in July 2000. On Singapore‘s paper, its representatives suggested the paper should 
be revised to restate that the ―ARF is a forum for political and security dialogue 
and cooperation with a view to enhancing peace and stability in the region and 
that confidence building measure is the foundation and main thrust of the whole 
ARF.‖279 Specifically, on the definition of PD, Vietnam was of the following 
views: 
PD is a way to pursue the motto ―better prevention than cure.‖ Therefore, 
PD should apply only to pre-crisis conflicts between states, having the 
effect of early warning for early prevention. It is not supposed to apply in 
a circumstance where armed conflict already happened. If it fails to detect 
and prevent the problems from escalating into armed conflicts then we 
need approaches to conflict resolution, which falls into the third stage of 
the ARF process.  
We can go along with the first two objectives. With regard to the third 
objective, the idea of ―minimize the impacts of such disputes and conflicts 
on the region‖ is rather vague, and may lead to different interpretation. 
Therefore, we would like to see the formulation of the third objective be 
modified or deleted.
280
  
 On PD as a concept, Vietnamese officials proposed to delete the whole 
section on the Role of the Chair as a PD measure whereby the ARF Chair could 
play a role as determined by ARF members.
281
 They saw the inclusion of the role 
of the ARF Chair as a PD measure problematic at this stage, arguing that the ARF 
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was still in the process of considering the issue of enhancing the role of the ARF 
Chair. In other words, for them ―it was premature to include the role of the ARF 
Chair as a PD measure.‖282 On PD principles, while agreeing with all proposed 
principles, Vietnamese participants proposed reordering these principles so as to 
reflect first and foremost the importance of universally recognized basic principles 
of international law and inter-state relations.
283  
On measures of overlap between CBMs and PD 
At the second ISG-CBM held in Singapore in April 2000, the Japanese co-
chair presented its paper on the enhanced role of the Chair which included the 
following specific recommendations: 
 Providing early warning by drawing attention to potential regional 
disputes and conflicts that might hurt regional stability. 
 Convening emergency meetings 
 Issuing statements at the chair‘s discretion (without consent of ARF 
members) 
 Facilitating discussion on the building of norms in the ARF 
 Enhancing liaison with external parties such as international organizations 
and Track Two forums. 
 Promoting confidence building among ARF members by facilitating 
information exchange and dialogue. 
 Facilitating discussion among ARF members on potential areas of 
cooperation.
284
 
 Activists strongly supported giving the Chair responsibilities to call for 
special sessions or to issue a Chairman‘s statement as situations warrant. 
Vietnamese participants argued that it was premature to discuss about that and 
such a role for the Chair ―was not suitable for ARF process in the foreseeable 
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future.‖285 Vietnam‘s position on the enhanced role for the Chair was articulated 
in MOFA talking points prepared for the 7
th
 ARF as follows: first, regarding the 
Chair‘s liaisoning role with external parties, Vietnamese officials were of the view 
that the Chair could conduct the role on an informal and case-by-case basis with 
prior consent of the ARF participants for the purpose of exchanging information 
and sharing experiences and not representing the ARF in any way in other fora. In 
addition, they supported informal dialogue between the Chair and representatives 
of Track Two but only on a case-by-case basis for information sharing; second, 
Vietnamese officials were of the view that the role of the Chair in coordinating 
between meetings should be limited. They recommended the ARF Chair act as 
focal point to co-ordinate positions among ARF members, mainly with a view to 
making annual ARF Chairman‘s statements and compiling the ASO without 
editing. They supported the proposal that the ARF Chair could act as a conduit for 
information sharing among the ARF participants but on a voluntary basis
 
only; 
third, regarding the role for good offices, Vietnamese officials recommended the 
following: 
 
 The Chair‘s role should limit to facilitating contacts, information 
exchanges and dialogue among parties concerned, facilitating the search 
for a conciliatory and peaceful solution. 
 
 The Chair should not involve in fact finding mission, negotiating or 
imposing a solution. 
 
 In order to carry out the job, the Chair should have consent of the ARF 
participating and all the parties concerned. He should strictly observe the 
principles of full respect for the independence, sovereignty and non-
interference into the internal affairs of other countries. 
 
 It is premature to talk about regular support mechanism for the ARF 
Chairman because ARF itself does not have its secretariat. ARF should 
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take primary responsibility. The possibility of using the ARF Troika 
mechanism might be further considered.
286
 
 
As for the registration of experts or eminent persons, Vietnamese 
officials took note of the usefulness of the proposal as a ―pool of resources‖ 
whereby ―they could provide non-binding professional advice and 
recommendations and carry in depth studies upon request by the ARF 
participants.‖287 However, they were concerned with a number of issues such 
as modalities, scope, procedures and financial implications which needed to be 
properly addressed before they could go along with it. 
PD deliberations in inter-sessional year 2000-2001 
At the first ISG-CBM held in Seoul in November 1-3, 2000 it was reported 
that participants did not discuss the three Papers, given various divergent views. 
Instead, it was decided that participants should submit their written comments to 
Singapore, Japan and Korea for review and the three mediators would then 
provide some suggestions on areas for future discussion at the second ISG-CBM 
in Kuala Lumpur in April 2001.
288
 The state of PD discussions before the ISG-
CBM in Kuala Lumpur was summed up by the Vietnamese participants as 
follows: 
The meeting is being held at a time when the ARF is in a complicated 
period: the United States, Japan and other Western participating countries 
argued that the forum is at a standstill, thus calling for moving onto PD 
stage and institutionalizing the forum. Meanwhile, China is cautious, 
stressing on confidence building, and unprepared to move onto the PD 
stage and to institutionalize the forum. ASEAN is on the one hand 
reluctant to move on PD stage and to institutionalize the forum given the 
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fear of losing the role of the driving force. On the other hand, it also wants 
to have some progress so as for the ARF to get out of the current 
situation.
289
 
Indeed, US officials urged ARF participants to take advantage of the 
current regional situation - regional countries enjoyed good relations with one 
another and the region was free from interstate conflict - ―to develop and equip 
the ARF with tools needed to respond effectively and in a timely way to emerging 
crisis.‖290 In particular, they supported proposals on the enhanced role of the Chair 
and the Register of the EEPs, seeing them as ―the most important proposals now 
being considered to strengthen the ARF.‖291 US officials also argue that progress 
on these issues which were seen as the operational side of the discussion of the 
PD Concept and Principles would ―enhance significantly the ARF‘s capability to 
play a constructive, stabilizing role in the region.‖292 Australian officials had the 
same view, arguing that it was the time for the ARF to ―move beyond theoretical 
discussion to start work on practical preventive diplomacy mechanisms.‖293 They 
called for agreement on the three papers at the ISG-CBM meeting in Kuala 
Lumpur even if the ―agreed areas‖ of the papers were reduced.294 Canadian 
participants also proposed the ARF to chart its course in PD by beginning to ‗test 
the waters‘ in those areas of PD with which the group was comfortable.295 
Chinese diplomats meanwhile repeatedly stated that they did not agree 
with the first and third objectives in Singapore‘s paper and proposed their 
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deletion.
296
 Regarding the second objective, China proposed to reword the 
sentence into ―for the purpose of preventing the existing disputes between and 
among states from developing into armed conflict.‖297 China also proposed to 
include one more principle, asserting that PD ―rests upon principle of neutrality, 
justice and impartiality.‖298 Regarding the enhanced role of the Chair, as Yuzawa 
observed, prior to the ISG-CBM in Kuala Lumpur Chinese participants continued 
to oppose substantial discussion on the topic, arguing that it should be discussed 
later after the ARF had finalized the concept and principles of PD.
299
 Specifically, 
China did not agree with the proposal for the Chair to convene special sessions, 
arguing that ―the meetings that have been regularized such as the annual ARF 
ministerial meetings, senior official meetings, and the ISG-CBM provided enough 
occasions and exchange of views.‖300 
Vietnam‘s position on Singapore‘s paper on Concept and Principles of PD 
remained unchanged since it was developed for the 7
th
 ARF in July 2000. There 
were, however, some changes in its position toward Japan‘s paper on the 
enhanced role of the Chair, reflecting a more cautious attitude. On principles 
proposed in the paper, particularly on the enhanced role of the Chair in ―good 
offices‖ and ―coordination‖ in between ARF meetings, Vietnamese officials 
proposed that activities under such roles must be taken ―on an informal and case 
by case basis and with prior consultation with and consent of all ARF 
participants.‖ 301 In addition, the ARF Chair when performing such roles ―must 
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observe basic principles of international law and established ARF practices and 
principles, particularly the principles of respect for sovereignty and non-
interference in the internal affairs of any countries.‖302 
Furthermore, Vietnamese officials did not agree for the Chair to convene 
emergency meetings (or special sessions) and to carry out activities during 
intervals, fearing that this may lead to the formation of an ARF Troika.
303
 Other 
proposed revisions included replacing ―mechanism‖ with ―modalities‖ in 
responding to the suggestion in Japan‘s paper that ―the ARF should discuss an 
appropriate mechanism to support the ARF Chair so that the Chair can carry out 
the role in ‗good offices‘ and ‗co-ordination in between ARF meetings‘ smoothly 
and effectively.‖304 Vietnamese officials appeared to be sensitive to phrases that 
they saw as attempts by activists to form binding mechanisms. They also 
repeatedly stressed the need to have the consent of all ARF participants for the 
Chair to carry out the proposed activities. Vietnamese officials stated that they 
could go along with the proposal that ―the ARF Chair could draw on expertise and 
resources of the ARF members and that of external parties and Track II 
organizations‖ if such activity was undertaken informally upon request by the 
Chair and with consent of ARF participants.
305
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There were divergent views among ARF participants prior to the Kuala 
Lumpur ISG-CBM in April 2001, especially on two issues: the PD definition and 
the role of the ARF Chair. Singaporean diplomats therefore suggested the ISG-
CBM in Kuala Lumpur focus on these two issues.
306
 Detailed discussion took 
place at the meeting. Participants agreed to adopt the PD paper as a snapshot of 
the state of current discussion on PD in the ARF.
307
 At the same time, they 
decided that the ISG-CBM would continue to discuss PD and focus on those 
issues where there remained divergence of views.‖308 Japan was asked to further 
revise its paper based on the suggestions of ARF countries.
309
 Therefore, prior to 
the ARF SOM in May 2001, it seemed unlikely that the three PD papers would be 
adopted. 
However, as it turned out, the three papers were quickly adopted at the 8
th
 
ARF in Hanoi, July 2001. Since the ARF SOM is the key mechanism to set up the 
agenda for the annual ARF meetings, consensus and the decision to adopt the 
three papers must have been reached at the ARF SOM held in Hanoi in May. The 
adoption of the three PD documents therefore reflected the temporary consensus 
among ARF participants. Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Dy Nien as the 
Chair of the 8
th
 ARF stated that ―the meeting agreed only on the concept of PD 
and the ARF still emphasized confidence building as the main thrust.‖310 This 
meant PD would be a work in progress and that even the definition and principles 
were still subject to change. Furthermore, the content of the ARF concept and 
principles of PD were argued to be further watered down in many aspects. 
According to Yuzawa, the adoption of the PD papers at the 8
th
 ARF was to show 
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that the Forum could make some progress on PD in response to criticism from 
inside and outside ARF, rather than reflecting a common understanding on PD 
among participants.
311
  
De facto consensus on PD 
The above chronology shows that PD deliberations at Track I were most 
robust in 2000-2001. There were clearly two camps. A group of activist members 
included Japan, the US, Australia, Canada and some ASEAN members such as 
Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines. Within this group the US, Australia and 
Japan were the most outspoken. The activist members advanced the argument 
that, to maintain its relevance, it was the right time for ARF to take up PD. They 
also proposed many concrete PD measures that were arguably applicable to the 
Asia-Pacific, where a number of hot spots existed such as the South China Sea 
dispute. Meanwhile, the more reluctant members were China, Russia, India, 
Vietnam, and other ASEAN members. They stressed moving ARF at a pace 
comfortable to all in its evolution from the stage of confidence building measures 
to the development of PD and insisted on discussion of PD concept and principles 
before working on concrete PD measures. Singapore and Japan as activist 
members played a mediating role between the two camps.  
Deliberations at Track I finally resulted in the adoption of the three papers 
on PD in 2001. At the time of their adoption, the PD papers were seen as a 
reflection on the state of PD discussions among ARF members rather than a 
consensus or compromise they had reached. However, given that there have been 
no substantial deliberations on PD in general in subsequent ISG - CBM meetings 
since 2001 what was agreed in the PD papers has become a de facto consensus 
when it comes to the issue of PD in Asia-Pacific context. No matter how much the 
contents of the Papers were watered down, Vietnam like other reluctant members 
had come to agree with PD, at least in principle.  
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Did socialization work? 
Vietnam‘s endorsement of the PD papers seems to mark a sudden change 
in its preferences. Internal MOFA documents reveal that prior to the ARF SOM in 
May 2001 at which the adoption of the PD papers was decided, Vietnam‘s 
preference was to slow down the PD discussions, thus delaying the adoption of 
the PD documents.
312
 Why did Vietnamese participants suddenly change their 
position to agree with the adoption of the PD papers? Socialization theory 
provides three possible explanations for Vietnam‘s decision. First, it could be seen 
as an act of mimicking. As a novice in the ARF and in order to stay safe - 
especially when the institution was in a period of transition - Vietnamese officials 
simply believed that they should act like others in the group, adopting the PD 
papers without being aware of the benefits of doing so. Second, it could be a 
result of social influence. Vietnamese officials came to agree with the adoption of 
PD papers because of social pressure from other in-groups. Specifically, they 
decided not to ―rock the boat,‖ joining the majority to approve the documents. A 
third explanation is that persuasion was at work and Vietnamese officials 
endorsed the PD papers because they found the arguments advanced by activist 
members convincing: they came to believe that the ARF, if equipped with PD 
measures, would be better able to respond to regional security issues.  
Persuasion as an explanation 
This section will follow Johnston‘s approach and look at the institutional 
environment and the characteristics of Vietnamese representatives to measure the 
extent to which these institutional and individual features are conducive to 
persuasion. It then examines whether persuasion was at work, making Vietnamese 
officials change their minds to go along with the adoption of the PD documents. 
                                               
312 MOFA ASEAN Department Report submitted to the Foreign Minister ―On some issues relating 
to the ARF SOM in Hanoi, May 2001.‖ p. 2. 
118 
 
Working environment 
The working environment in the ARF‘s deliberations on PD had some 
features arguably conducive to persuasion. As Johnston suggests, an institution 
with deliberation as its mandate and consensus as its decision-making rule should 
help create a working environment that gives participants some degree of free 
choice and facilitates their flexible cognition when assessing counter-arguments. 
In Social States, Johnston points out that ―flexible consensus‖ was one of the key 
institutional features that makes the working environment in the ARF conducive 
to persuasion. In his view, flexible consensus ensures that ―the institution does not 
move far ahead of the interests of the most sceptical state‖ and ―it is a logical 
mechanism for reassuring member states that the institution will not threaten 
sovereignty or national unity.‖313 Flexible consensus is therefore conducive to 
persuasion in the sense that it helps create a non-threatening environment for 
potential targets of socialization. 
The PD deliberations appear to have taken place in such an environment. 
For the reluctant group, careful and extensive deliberations on PD gave them an 
opportunity to raise their voice, express concerns and defend their positions. For 
the advocates, it was through these careful and extensive discussions that they 
wanted to show their respect for reluctant states and could reassure them about 
their concerns about PD‘s implications.  
The message of reassurance by the activists was conveyed through the 
working procedures that required participants to submit their written comments to 
the mediators - Singapore, Japan and Korea - for revision before meetings were 
convened. With the written comments sent to all participants prior to ISG-CBM 
meetings, everyone knew well in advance the positions and attitudes of others. 
And the intervals between the two ISG-CBM meetings gave participants more 
time to reflect on and formulate their arguments on proposals and 
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recommendations. The mediators then revised and circulated papers at meetings. 
Participants only needed to discuss those issues where there were differences as 
recommended by the mediators, so as to incrementally narrow the gaps and build 
common ground. In short, these working procedures were set up to give reluctant 
participants more time and a certain degree of free choice taking into 
consideration positions of the activists before deciding whether or not to hold their 
initial attitude and preferences. With these working procedures, reluctant 
participants would not feel under much pressure imposed by the activists.  
Furthermore, the tone as reflected in written comments submitted by the 
activist members was milder than that in the previous speeches delivered by their 
respective leaders. For example, in 1998 Stanley Roth, the then Assistant 
Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific, called for the ARF members ―to 
be prepared to surrender a degree of sovereignty for the greater good.‖314 His call 
reflected US frustration with the slow process of the ARF and at the same time 
aroused suspicion among reluctant states. However, US written comments in 
response to the PD Paper drafted by Singapore appeared more constructive. The 
US stated that ―the ARF will need to maintain consensus and proceed at a pace 
comfortable to all. Attaining this goal will require compromise on the part of all 
participants so that the ARF is neither too slow nor too fast.‖315 Though Australia 
appeared similarly frustrated, its representatives also tried to soften the tone 
saying that ―we should try to reach agreement on the three papers at the next ISG 
meeting in Kuala Lumpur, even if this means the ‗agreed areas‘ of the papers are 
somewhat reduced.‖316 Japan and Singapore, as activist members and mediators, 
were patient in engaging and accommodating China with a view to making 
                                               
314 Quoted in Brad Glosserman, ―The United States and the ASEAN Regional Forum: A Delicate 
Balancing Act,‖ 42. 
315 MOFA ASEAN Department Background Documents ―US comments on Singapore‘s paper and 
Japan‘s paper‖ prepared for the 2nd ISG-CBM, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, April15-20, 2001. 
316 MOFA ASEAN Department Background Documents ―Aide Memoire by Australia High 
Commission Singapore dated January 29, 2001‖ prepared for the 2nd ISG-CBM, Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia, April 15-20, 2001. 
120 
 
progress on the drafted papers. By doing so, advocates expected that they would 
not be seen as trying to impose their positions on the reluctant members.  
In such a non-threatening environment, novice Vietnamese officials might 
have found themselves under less pressure: submitting comments in written form 
meant they did not always have to engage in oral presentations where they might 
feel less confident.
317
 More importantly, they also had more time to carefully 
assess and judge the arguments of the advocates. This is significant from a 
persuasion perspective. As Johnston pointed out, flexible consensus does not only 
mean that the institution does not move far ahead of the interests of the most 
sceptical state, but it is also to ―ensure that the most sceptical state cannot easily 
veto its evolution.‖318 That means flexible consensus as a decision-making rule in 
a multilateral setting like the ARF also requires balancing between collective and 
national interests on the part of its members. As it was noted in chapter three, it is 
through the assessment of counter-attitudinal information and the recognition of 
the need to balance between collective and national interests that the Vietnamese 
participants had to carefully consider the implications of holding their initial 
attitude - opposing PD. Therefore, through this process - assessing arguments for 
PD and taking into consideration the protection of national interests but in a way 
that would not go against the collective interests of the institution - the probability 
of attitudinal change on the part of the Vietnamese might increase.  
Characteristics of Vietnamese participants 
The ARF‘s PD deliberations in 1997-2001 took place when Vietnam was 
still in its initial stage of regional integration characterized by the country‘s 
joining a number of regional institutions such as ASEAN, the ARF and APEC. 
Therefore, Vietnamese officials were real novices in the working environments of 
these institutions. Given noviceness is the key individual feature conducive to 
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socialization, it would be more likely for Vietnamese officials to endorse PD 
papers. However, what noviceness meant to Vietnamese participants needs to be 
worked out first.  
In addition to capacity building,
319
 the key aspect of noviceness when it 
comes to interactions in the ARF in the early years was the lingering fear and 
suspicion on the part of the Vietnamese officials when working with their old 
enemies.
320
 As Carlyle Thayer observed in the late 1990s, ideological 
conservatives in the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) feared ―developing close 
political ties with non-socialist states and the impact this might have on domestic 
affairs.‖321 He predicted that in Vietnam-US relations and in the ARF framework, 
it was the threat of peaceful evolution on the part of the Vietnamese that would 
impede progress in the area of political and security cooperation.
322
 Other scholars 
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made the same observation. According to Nguyen Manh Hung, Party 
conservatives were cautious about improving relations with the US given their 
fear of the threat of peaceful evolution indirectly triggered by the US policy on 
human rights and democracy.
323
Alexander Vuving observed that under the 
leadership of Le Kha Phieu from 1997-2001, Vietnam ―pursued a hard-line anti-
imperialism in foreign policy.‖324 In particular, conservatives within the Party 
remained suspicious of the capitalist ASEAN partners and saw China as a 
strategic ally. This reality reflected the competition between anti-imperialists (or 
conservatives) and integrationists (or reformers) in the CPV in which the former 
sought to get closer to China and the later tried to make a counterbalance by 
strengthening relationships with the United States and other capitalist countries.
325
 
However, in that period the anti-imperialists prevailed, getting closer to China.
326
 
In the early years of participation in regional institutions such as ASEAN 
and the ARF, Vietnam‘s position or views essentially reflected those of the 
conservatives in the conduct of external relations who tended to interpret any 
actions on the part of the capitalist countries as attempts to interfere in their 
internal affairs.
327
 This way of seeing others thus determined Vietnam‘s 
assessment of arguments by PD advocates. 
Judging the intentions and arguments by PD advocates 
As the previous chapter showed, efforts by some established ASEAN 
members in the late 1990s to relax the principle of non-interference were seen by 
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Vietnamese officials as attempts to interfere in others‘ internal affairs. The same 
situation was observed in the ARF in the early years of Vietnam‘s participation. 
Vietnamese officials found that the ARF in these years was in a ―sensitive‖ 
transition period which could have negative implications for Vietnam‘s security 
and development.
328
 In particular, they found themselves in a disadvantageous 
position when participants from the United States, other Western countries and 
old ASEAN members attempted to move the ARF towards the next stage of PD 
and to institutionalize the forum.  
MOFA documents prepared for the 7
th
 ARF in 2000 highlighted several 
major concerns.
329
 First, Vietnamese officials found themselves unprepared to 
move to the PD stage. They believed that as long as the foundation of the ARF - 
confidence building - was not strongly built it was hasty to move on to PD. 
Hastening the ARF process might undermine mutual trust and confidence if not 
all participants are ready. Therefore, they proposed that the forum should continue 
to focus on implementing confidence building measures to further enhance and 
deepen mutual trust and confidence in order to create a solid foundation for 
further steps to be taken. Second, Vietnamese officials were of the view that the 
principles guiding the forum‘s operation were being challenged. Since the ARF 
was still in its early stage of development, these principles must be upheld, 
including the principle of evolutionary and step-by-step development, at a pace 
comfortable to all and decision making by consultation and consensus and 
voluntary implementation in accordance with the capacity of its participants. 
Third, in the Vietnamese perspective it was not realistic to institutionalize the 
ARF because it was a forum for regional political and security dialogue and 
cooperation rather than for conflict management. A highly institutionalized 
mechanism for political and security issues was arguably not suitable to the 
diversity of Asia and the Pacific and might be counter-productive. Therefore, 
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Vietnam‘s preference was to uphold the ARF‘s key principles and to prevent the 
forum from entering the PD stage and being institutionalized. 
 
Given the perceived risks of taking up PD, Vietnamese officials from the 
outset of the PD deliberations carefully charted out their course of action. 
Regarding ―ends‖, Vietnam aimed to ―uphold key principles, to ensure that 
ASEAN is in the driving seat and that ARF is an evolutionary process in which 
confidence-building is the main thrust.‖330 Government representatives believed 
that ―their contribution to the substance of the meetings was to maintain and 
strengthen positive trends in ASEAN and the ARF that were in our national 
interests, and at the same time to minimize the negative implications of some 
other trends and issues, thus contributing to the creation of a favourable 
international environment for the country‘s economic development and 
security.‖331 As for ―means‖, internal documents suggested Vietnamese diplomats 
should ―do our utmost to coordinate with those who share our views, thus 
opposing the early implementation of some PD measures and preventing attempts 
by some members to manipulate the ARF to interfere in internal affairs of 
others.‖332 Vietnamese officials believed that their interests would be better 
secured by coordinating with like-minded participants.  
As a result, officials were in a defensive posture throughout the PD 
deliberations. Numerous MOFA documents recommended Vietnamese officials 
not be the first to speak or should only speak if they were asked.
333
 Further, they 
were recommended to lobby or let others raise their voice first, particularly the 
hardliners such as the Chinese.
334
 They pursued a strategy of ―not taking the lead, 
                                               
330 MOFA ASEAN Department Memo ―On Our participation in the 33rd ASEAN Ministerial 
Meeting,‖ pp.1-2. 
331 Ibid. 
332 Ibid. 
333 MOFA ASEAN Department, ―Talking points and Documents prepared for the 7th and the 8th 
ARF.‖ 
334 MOFA ASEAN Department Memo dated April 4, 2001 ―On Participation in the 2nd ISG-CBM 
in Malaysia, April 15-20, 2001,‖ p. 3. 
125 
 
not to be the last, not to be in the minority and not the only one to oppose.‖335 
They closely watched any moves on the part of major powers representing the two 
camps to decide how and the extent to which they should participate in the 
discussions. The ARF‘s developments and the state of PD discussions were 
regularly updated with special attention paid to the attitudes of the US participants 
on the one hand and the Chinese on the other.  
Having identified with the reluctant group, Vietnamese officials saw the 
Chinese participants as a behavioural exemplar. As the chronology shows, 
Vietnamese officials shared concerns with their Chinese counterparts. For 
instance, they disagreed with the proposed convening of special sessions of the 
ARF SOM or Ministerial meeting to address an issue, arguing that the ARF is 
only a political and diplomatic forum for the exchange of views and that the 
institution provides enough occasions for such exchanges.
336
  
As novices, Vietnamese participants might have enjoyed greater comfort 
to express their views in written form than in oral presentations. They also had a 
chance to compare the views of a wider group of participants, so as to fully 
develop their position and potentially build common ground on at least some 
issues on which views among participants were not too far apart. However, 
internal documents showed little evidence that Vietnamese officials came to 
accept the activists‘ message that moving the ARF on to the PD stage and 
employing specific measures would make the institution capable of responding to 
regional security issues in an effective and timely manner. Rather, given their 
distrust and suspicion of the activists‘ attempts to push PD forward, Vietnamese 
officials rejected almost all proposals they interpreted as potential pretexts to 
interfere in internal affairs. Therefore, they consistently sought to slow down 
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discussions and delay the adoption of the PD papers. Indeed, MOFA documents 
prepared for the 7th ARF in July 2000 suggested Vietnam‘s position as follows: 
We should state that confidence building measures are the foundation and 
the main thrust of the ARF. Therefore, focus must be on the continued 
implementation of CBMs, rather than on moving on to the PD stage. 
ARF‘s key principles must be upheld, including the principle of 
evolutionary and step-by-step development, decision making by 
consultation and consensus and voluntary implementation. ASEAN must 
play the leading role, especially as the ARF Chair. We should push 
forward the continued implementation of CBMs, seeking ways to slow 
down and prevent the ARF from moving on to PD stage and being 
institutionalized. We do not oppose the discussions on PD concept and 
principles and the measures in overlap. However, on the four measures in 
overlap we should try to minimize the scope and the extent of these 
measures and that the implementation of these measures should be on a 
voluntary basis.
337
 
In order to delay PD discussions, MOFA documents prepared for the 7th 
ARF encourage Vietnamese participants to do the following: (i) to raise our 
concerns on a number of issues, including the third PD objective (preventing such 
disputes and conflicts from spreading geographically), specific measures such as 
the role of ARF Chair, and even general PD principles; (ii) to argue that the third 
objective was vague and could be used to interfere in internal affairs of others; 
(iii)  to stress the need to uphold the principles of consultation and consensus in 
response to Western countries‘ proposal for the PD exercise in a timely manner.  
MOFA documents prepared for the 7th ARF also suggested that while 
acknowledging that reaching agreement on the PD concept and principles would 
serve as a basis for moving the ARF on to the next stage, Vietnamese participants 
should stress that if this paper were adopted it would not be a legal document. 
Rather, it would only be a document that reflected a shared understanding of PD 
among participating countries and would be applicable to the ARF only, given 
regional differences. Vietnamese participants feared that they would be tied to 
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binding decisions in political and security areas. Therefore, they repeatedly 
stressed that the ARF was a forum for political and security dialogue and 
cooperation. They also believed that if the paper on the concept and principles of 
PD was a document reflecting shared understanding it would be easier to be 
modified later.
338
 
Regarding the enhanced role of the Chair, Vietnamese diplomats were of 
the view that its functions and scope of actions should be limited. MOFA 
documents prepared for the 7th ARF encourage Vietnamese officials to seek ways 
to delay the adoption of Japan‘s paper by opposing ―late PD measures‖ initiated 
by the US and other Western countries such as mediation and the formation of 
fact-finding missions. A similar stand was recommended on the Register of the 
EEPs. The same MOFA documents prepared for the 7
th
 ARF suggested Vietnam‘s 
officials: 
[We should try] to slow down this process and to minimize the role, 
functions and scope of activities of this group. Therefore, we should 
propose to clarify since the outset the EEPs‘ functions, principles and 
scope of their actions. We uphold the principles of voluntary 
implementation, with the consent of all participants, and non-interference 
in internal affairs of others. The EEPs‘ functions and scope of actions 
should be limited to making non-binding professional advice and 
recommendations and carrying out indepth studies. The EEPs should not 
be encouraged to play the role of mediators and their operation should be 
on an ad hoc basis.
339
 
Vietnam‘s efforts to slow down PD discussions can also be observed at the 
ISG-CBM held in Seoul, Korea in November 2000. In a cable message sent to 
Hanoi from the Vietnamese Embassy in Seoul, it was reported that before the 
meeting took place Vietnamese officials acting as the Chair of the ASEAN 
Standing Committee (ASC) and the ARF held separate meetings with the two co-
chairs (Korea and Malaysia) and delegations from the US, China, Singapore and 
Thailand to exchange views and discuss the issues to be examined at the ARF 
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meetings in Hanoi in 2001.
340
 Due to divergent views, it was decided that the 
meeting would not discuss the three PD papers. Rather, participating countries 
were requested to submit their written comments for further revision. The fact that 
the ISG-CBM in Seoul did not discuss the three papers was considered by the 
Vietnamese participants as a success in their efforts to slow down PD 
discussions.
341
 
Prior to the ISG-CBM in Kula Lumpur in April and the ARF SOM in 
Hanoi in May 2001, Vietnam‘s position remained essentially unchanged. In a 
MOFA report submitted to the Foreign Minister in preparation for the ARF SOM, 
it was stressed that Vietnam should continue to delay the adoption of the first two 
PD papers, thus preventing the ARF from moving on to the second stage. Only a 
minor change occurred with the paper on the Register of the EEPs. It was 
proposed that ―if the paper is revised, clarifying the financial issue and other 
participating countries agree with it, so we could support its adoption at the 
meeting, thus making a progress in the ARF process.‖342 
In short, prior to the ARF SOM in May, Vietnamese officials tried to 
prevent the adoption of the papers on the PD concept and principles and on the 
enhanced role of the Chair. Fearing that the ARF could be manipulated by activist 
members to interfere in internal affairs, Vietnamese officials were deeply cautious 
about PD. The belief that they were not the only ones to hold this view also 
helped them maintain this position. As a result, Vietnamese officials did not feel 
under much pressure to endorse PD papers. These factors thus impeded the effects 
of persuasion in eliciting cooperation from Vietnamese representatives.  
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Social influence as an explanation  
A social influence explanation for Vietnam‘s eventual endorsement of PD 
papers argues that since Vietnamese officials looked toward their Chinese 
counterparts and to some extent those from Russia and India as a reference group, 
the latter‘s attitudinal change to become more cooperative on PD helped elicit 
similar change on the former. Put differently, social influence suggests that 
Vietnamese officials found themselves in a minority when other like-minded ones 
changed their position. Not wanting to rock the boat, they followed like-minded 
participants by endorsing the PD papers, though knowing that their decision 
would later bring about negative consequences. 
 There is some evidence in favour of a social influence explanation. After 
Vietnam assumed the Chairmanship of the ARF in July 2000 its representatives 
continued to strictly follow the strategy of coordinating with other reluctant 
members and closely watching any moves on the part of the Chinese. The 
seemingly unchanged attitudes on the part of China, Russia and India prior to the 
ARF SOM in May 2001 consolidated Vietnam‘s perception that divergent views 
on PD papers could not be bridged any time soon and so it would not be easy for 
PD to move forward. A MOFA Memo prepared for the 2
nd
 ISG-CBM in April 
2001 noted that ―China was still cautious and wanted to focus on CBM, and 
resolutely opposed moving ARF on to PD stage and institutionalizing the 
forum.‖343 Against this backdrop, the then Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister 
and ASEAN SOM Le Cong Phung was of the view that PD could not be moved 
forward. He instructed Vietnamese officials ―not to raise our voice.‖344 He also 
recommended, ―in the role of the Chair, we should only sum up the meeting, 
stressing that due to the lack of agreement we should focus on CBMs and 
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continue to work on PD.‖345 Vietnamese officials therefore did not anticipate any 
possible change on the part of China and other reluctant members at the ARF 
SOM in May. 
However, at the May ARF SOM, China suddenly changed its position to 
endorse the three PD papers, thus leading to consensus among the participants on 
the adoption of these papers. Dang Dinh Quy - a senior official at MOFA who 
attended the ARF SOM in Hanoi - confirmed the shift on the part of the Chinese 
and acknowledged that Vietnam‘s efforts to delay the adoption of these papers 
had failed.
346
 As Dang observed, ―China‘s changed attitude came as a shock‖ and 
the then ASEAN SOM Le Cong Phung, who chaired the meeting, found himself 
in a very difficult situation because Vietnamese officials failed to anticipate such 
change by the Chinese.
347
 China‘s changed attitude helped generate consensus 
among major powers on the adoption of the PD papers.
348
 Since the role of 
ASEAN in agenda setting,
 as Rizal Sukma has observed, is limited to taking ―an 
accommodation position vis-à-vis the preferences of major powers,‖349 Vietnam 
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had no choice as Chair but to follow the major powers and adopt three papers as a 
part of the 8
th
 ARF‘s agenda.  
Consensus reached on the adoption of three papers at the ARF SOM in 
May was later confirmed in a MOFA Document prepared for the 8th ARF in 
Hanoi, July 2001, which stated that ―after the three papers are adopted the US and 
some Western countries want the meeting to focus on the completion of CBMs 
and the implementation of the two papers on the enhanced role of the ARF Chair 
and the Register of the EEPs.‖350 Another MOFA document prepared for Vietnam 
to be the co-chair of ISG-CBM with India from July 2001 to July 2002 also took 
note that ―those who were previously reluctant on PD such as China, India, and 
Russia now changed their attitude toward more supportive of the implementation 
of measures in overlap between CBMs and PD, including moving on to PD 
stage.‖351 
In addition to the impact of China‘s attitudinal change, image concerns as 
the ARF Chair played a part in eliciting more cooperative behaviour on the part of 
the Vietnamese officials. Indeed, they were sensitive not to be seen as blocking 
the process or making impossible some progress in the ARF process. Internal 
documents revealed that Vietnamese officials found themselves in a dilemma 
when assuming the ARF Chair. On the one hand, they believed that something 
had to be done to facilitate the ARF‘s process if it were to remain relevant. On the 
other hand, they also sought ways to slow down PD discussions and delay the 
adoption of PD papers, thus preventing the ARF process from entering the PD 
stage. These proved to be difficult tasks when the ARF was in a complicated 
transition period and the voice of ASEAN was weak in the international arena.
352
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Vietnamese officials found that this situation would challenge Vietnam‘s 
successful chairmanships of the ASC and the 8
th
 ARF.
353 
 
As a result, they had to take into consideration those items on which their 
position should be adjusted or flexible. For example, prior to the 7
th
 ARF in July 
2000, Vietnam‘s position was to slow down PD discussions and delay the 
adoption of the paper on the concept and principles of PD by raising its concerns 
on some issues such as the third objective, the role of the ARF Chair and 
principles. However, it was also suggested that the position on these issues might 
be subject to change when Vietnam officially took up the Chair.
354
 Vietnamese 
officials were also encouraged to reconsider the publication of the Annual 
Security Outlook which their preference was to delay by raising technical and 
financial difficulties as the main obstacle for unpreparedness.
355
 In preparation for 
the ISG-CBM in Kuala Lumpur in April 2001 Vietnam‘s position was stated as 
follows: 
[On the one hand] We should skilfully prevent the ARF from moving 
towards PD and being institutionalized, avoiding the formation of binding 
mechanisms whereby we would be put in a disadvantageous situation on 
political and security areas or that can be used to interfere in our internal 
affairs and have negative impacts on the ASEAN‘s role; we should restate 
that the ARF should focus on confidence building and this would be the 
main thrust of the ARF process, and we should work together with other 
ASEAN members to resolutely maintain its role as the driving force of the 
ARF.
356
 
On the other hand, acting as the ARF Chair, we should show our 
flexibility thus creating the impression that, rather than blocking it, 
Vietnam is working to move the ARF in the right direction and trying to 
make progress on those issues that are less sensitive. We should coordinate 
with the two co-chairs in order to make some progress on the papers on 
PD, the enhanced role of the ARF Chair and the Register of the EEPs. The 
remaining two documents might be more complicated and their adoption is 
                                               
353 Ibid. 
354 MOFA ASEAN Department Background Documents dated July 10, 2000 ―On the ARF‖ 
prepared for the 7th ARF meeting in July 2000,‖ p. 5. 
355 Ibid. 
356 Original italics. 
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less likely. In so doing, the meeting could make some progress in the 
deliberations and report to the ARF SOM in May, 2001.
357
 
This position was reaffirmed in a MOFA memo prepared for the ASEAN 
Ministerial Meeting (AMM Informal Retreat) in Rangoon, Myanmar on 30 April 
2001 which read: 
[On the ARF] our position is to prevent the ARF from moving on to the 
next stage and being institutionalized, to restate CBMs should be the main 
thrust of the process, to uphold ARF‘s core principles and to maintain the 
role of ASEAN as the driving force. However, in the role of the ARF 
Chair, we should also show our flexibility on some issues that are not in 
principle.
358
 
 At the ISG-CBM in Kuala Lumpur, the Vietnamese diplomats were 
recommended not speak up or to take the lead in opposing the PD papers, thus 
creating the impression that Vietnam wanted to block the process. In addition, 
Vietnamese diplomats were encouraged to show their flexibility on the revised 
paper on the Registration of the EEPs which was seen as in Vietnam‘s interests 
given the mandate of experts was limited to doing research and make non-binding 
recommendations. Vietnam saw no major disagreement among a majority of ARF 
members on this paper. Thus it was suggested that if financial arrangements could 
be clarified, Vietnam could follow the majority to adopt the paper so as to make 
some progress in the ARF process.
359
  
Image concerns as the ARF Chair determined to a certain extent the 
flexibility on the part of Vietnamese officials toward PD papers, particularly the 
Register of the EEPs. However, Vietnam‘s decision to go along with PD was 
primarily because of the change on the part of the Chinese as representative of the 
reluctant group toward cooperating with activist members in moving PD forward. 
Given their limited role in setting the ARF agenda, Vietnamese officials had to 
                                               
357 MOFA ASEAN Department Memo dated 4th April, 2001 prepared for the 2nd ISG-CBM, 
Malaysia April15-20, 2001. 
358 MOFA ASEAN Department Memo dated April12, 2001 ―On chairing the AMM Retreat, 
Rangoon, Myanmar, April 30, 2001,‖ p. 4. Emphasis added. 
359 Ibid. p. 4. 
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accommodate the preferences of major powers. In addition, not rocking the boat 
and joining the majority to adopt PD papers was in line with the guiding principle 
that Vietnamese officials set out in conducting external relations, particularly in 
engaging in PD deliberations: never be in the minority. 
Conclusion 
Persuasion did not elicit cooperation on the part of the Vietnamese in this 
case. A working procedure which should have been conducive to persuasion did 
not facilitate the assessment among Vietnamese officials of the arguments for PD 
so as to narrow differences and build common ground. On the contrary, the 
deliberative process actually helped them slow down PD discussions and delay 
the adoption of PD papers. Noviceness and a deliberative working environment, 
as the key individual and institutional features arguably conducive to persuasion, 
did not exert much influence in eliciting cooperative behaviour on the part of the 
Vietnamese as theory would expect. Rather, the perceived risks of change 
determined the way Vietnamese officials interacted and pursued their objectives. 
Because of their distrust and suspicion of activist states, Vietnamese officials 
carefully set out their objectives and actions and strictly followed these 
throughout the PD deliberations.  
 
Another important factor that impeded the effects of persuasion was that 
Vietnamese officials were not the main target for the activist members. China was 
the primary focus of their efforts. Indeed, it was widely observed that in the early 
years of participation in the ARF, Western countries aimed to engage China in 
multilateral security norms and practices.
360
 PD deliberations were an example of 
such effort. The chronology clearly showed Singapore and Japan in their 
                                               
360 Glosserman, ―The United States and the ASEAN Regional Forum: A delicate Balancing Act,‖ 
48; China was an important factor for the formation of the ARF, see among others, Mely 
Caballero-Anthony, Regional Security in Southeast Asia: Beyond the ASEAN Way (Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), 121-123; Severino, Southeast Asia in Search of an 
ASEAN Community, 189-98. 
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mediating role worked primarily with Chinese officials as representatives of the 
reluctant side in revising the proposed papers. As Yuzawa observed, Japanese 
officials even visited Beijing to discuss the paper with their Chinese counterparts 
and to reconcile differing views.
361
 They even made concessions to the Chinese 
preferences so as to facilitate the deliberations.  
 
In such circumstances, one might argue that perhaps there was persuasion 
but the activist states persuaded China rather than Vietnam though the latter was 
also in the reluctant camp. They may suggest that Vietnam would have been 
persuaded if activist countries put all their efforts into persuading Hanoi rather 
than Beijing. This seems unlikely because as was noted in the previous sections, 
Vietnam in the 1990s remained suspicious of capitalist countries and saw China as 
a behavioural exemplar. A senior Vietnamese official admitted in an interview 
that in that period ―Vietnam looked toward and followed China in formulating its 
positions on major international issues.‖362  
 
Still others might even go further, arguing that activists such as the US and 
Japan might have offered some material incentives and these were made on other 
occasions (such as bilateral meetings) unrelated to the ARF in exchange for 
Vietnam‘s support for the adoption of PD papers. This argument does not hold, 
however. Realities show that, to a large extent, Vietnam has successfully delinked 
and pursued economic and trade cooperation from political and security issues. 
Vietnam-US bilateral relationship is a case in point. In 1999-2000 when PD 
deliberations were going on, Vietnam and the US were also negotiating for a 
bilateral trade agreement. However, this agreement was signed in 2000, one year 
before ARF members reached consensus on the adoption of PD papers.
363
 Thus, 
                                               
361 Yuzawa, ―The Evolution of Preventive Diplomacy in the ASEAN Regional Forum,‖ 796. 
362 Interview by author in Hanoi, December 29, 2011. 
363 "Chronology of key Events in U.S. - Vietnam Relations," Embassy of the United States, 
accessed April 12, 2014, http://www.usvtc.org/us-vietnam/Chronology/Chronology%20of%20US-
VN%20Relations%2022May08.pdf. 
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the possibility that the US had placed progress on this bilateral trade agreement as 
conditionality in exchange for Vietnam's cooperation in political and security area 
in the ARF can be ruled out.  
 
Similarly, Vietnam-Japan economic and trade cooperation has gone 
smoothly without any pressures from the Japanese side arising from political and 
security issues. Indeed, Japan has long been the largest ODA donor for 
Vietnam.
364
 The only exception was in 2008 when the former suspended its ODA 
provision for the latter. However, this was due to a corruption scandal involving a 
Japanese company and the suspension did not last for long. Japan then announced 
to resume ODA to Vietnam in early 2009.
365
 Generally, Vietnam-Japan bilateral 
relations have been described as "problem free" and if there is any, it is primarily 
technical one.
366
  
 
Social influence appears to be the most plausible explanation for 
Vietnam‘s endorsement of the PD papers. Choosing China as a behavioural 
exemplar, the Vietnamese participants in the chairmanship of the ARF had no 
choice but to follow their Chinese counterparts when the latter suddenly changed 
its position and supported the adoption of PD Papers. In this sense, Vietnam‘s 
decision to adopt the PD papers was an act of mimicking - copying the behaviour 
of others - but not in the strict sense Johnston suggests, that is, to survive in a 
novel environment. Rather, mimicking in the ARF case came as a result of social 
pressure because in the capacity of the ARF Chair Vietnam would be seen as 
blocking the process if it opposed the adoption of PD documents. As the ARF 
                                               
364 "Vietnam - Japan Relations," the Vietnamese Government, accessed April 12, 2014. 
http://chinhphu.vn/portal/page/portal/chinhphu/NuocCHXHCNVietNam/ChiTietVeQuocGia?dipl
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365 "Japan resumes ODA to Vietnam," Asia Economic Institute, accessed April 12, 2014, 
http://www.asiaecon.org/special_articles/read_sp/12808. 
366 For a review of Vietnam-Japan relations, see among others, Thi Binh Khong, "China-Vietnam-
Japan: A Strategic Triangle?" in Southeast Asia between China and Japan, eds. Lam Peng Er and 
Victor Teo (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2012), 123-142. 
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Chair, Vietnam had to accommodate the preferences of major powers to adopt the 
PD papers as a part of the forum‘s agenda.  
However, following China to adopt these documents did not lead to 
change in Vietnam‘s preferences. Rather, in ARF meetings since the 8th ARF 
Vietnamese officials have continued to seek to prevent the ARF from entering the 
PD stage by slowing down the implementation of the papers on the enhanced role 
of the Chair and on the Register of EEPs which the activist members saw as the 
operational side of PD in Asia-Pacific region.  
As mandated at the 8
th
 ARF, Vietnam and India co-chaired the ISG-CBM 
from July 2001 to July 2002. Although efforts to delay the adoption of PD papers 
failed, Vietnam‘s preference to slow down the ARF‘s transition period from stage 
I to stage II remained unchanged. A MOFA Memo prepared for the first ISG-
CBM in New Delhi, December 2001 noted that the implementation of the three 
papers and PD measures would be on the top of the meeting agenda and 
recommended: 
[On the Paper on Concept and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy] we 
should slow down the discussions on these papers, thus delaying ARF 
moving on to PD. We should ask Malaysia as the co-chair of the previous 
ISG-CBM to inform the meeting of the divergent views on the PD paper 
so that participants could continue their discussions with a view to 
building a shared understanding. We should only listen to others. If 
requested to discuss it in detail, we should reaffirm that we only agree with 
the first two objectives. The third objective belongs to the third stage.
367
 
Arguments against the implementation of the paper on the enhanced role 
of the ARF Chair and the paper on the Register of EEPs also remained 
unchanged. Vietnamese diplomats at this meeting also feared that after the 9/11 
terrorist attacks some participants could raise again the possibility for the ARF 
Chair to convene special meetings in emergency situation. They were also 
                                               
367 MOFA ASEAN Department Memo dated December 5, 2001 ―On the Co-Chairmanship of the 
first ISG-CBM, New Delhi, December 19-21, 2001‖, p. 3. 
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reminded that previously Chinese participants had strongly opposed this proposal. 
Thus Vietnamese diplomats were recommended not to speak up on the issue.
368
 
However, the co-chair‘s summary report of the ISG-CBM in New Delhi showed 
no progress on PD discussions. Instead, counter-terrorism became a dominant 
issue for regional discussion and cooperation.
369
 On the ARF‘s activities, it was 
reported in a MOFA document that ―those were previously cautious about ARF 
evolution now appeared more flexible. China announced that it would be more 
open and actively participate in the ARF process. However, the priority is now 
given to counter-terrorism, thus ARF is not yet moving on to PD stage and being 
institutionalized.‖ 370 
As a result, there was no more substantial progress on PD in subsequent 
ARF meetings.  Prior to the 15
th
 anniversary of the institution in 2008, there was 
an urgent call to move the ARF forward, particularly embarking on the second 
stage of PD.
371
 At the 15
th
 ARF in Singapore on July 24, 2008, the ARF adopted 
the Singapore Declaration in which ARF members committed to ―further the 
                                               
368 Ibid. 
369
 “Co-Chairmen's Summary Report of the Meetings of the ARF Inter-sessional Support Group on 
Confidence Building Measures,‖ ASEAN Regional Forum, New Delhi, December 19-21, 2001 
and Hanoi, April 22-24, 2002, http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/library/arf-chairmans-
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371 For example, at the ARF Workshop on Confidence Building Measures and Preventive 
Diplomacy in Asia and Europe held in Berlin, March 12-14, 2008 co-chaired by Indonesia and the 
EU, Singaporean participants argued that what the ARF achieved on PD was not sufficient to 
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(iii) enhancing concrete, practical cooperation; (iv) streamlining decision-making; (v) 
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enhancing cooperation with Track Two and external organizations. Meanwhile, other participants, 
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sovereign equality, territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs and argued that 
the ARF‘s concept of preventive diplomacy would therefore be different from that of former UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan, for example.  
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development of appropriate Preventive Diplomacy concepts‖ while ensuring that 
―future development would continue to be based on the values and roadmap 
contained in the 1995 ARF Concept Paper, 2001 ARF Concept and Principles of 
Preventive Diplomacy, and Paper on the Review of the ARF.‖372 
 
Vietnam was more supportive of PD in 2010 when the country assumed 
the chairmanship of ASEAN and the ARF. While the Vietnamese representatives 
continued to emphasize the importance of the ARF as the main forum for regional 
political and security dialogue and cooperation and of CBMs as the main thrust of 
the ARF process, they endorsed the implementation of some PD measures if these 
were ―appropriate and feasible.‖373 Assuming the 17th ARF Chair, Vietnamese 
officials had to handle the implementation of the ASEAN Regional Forum Vision 
Statement and thus they were expected to propose some PD measures. However, 
internal debates reveal that two related issues emerged in debating what PD 
measures to be proposed which included: (i) scope of cooperation and (ii) intra-
state PD measures. Vietnamese officials were more concerned with the second 
issue.
374
 As a result, it was decided to develop and implement an ARF PD work 
plan which was later incorporated into the Hanoi Plan of Action to Implement the 
ASEAN Regional Forum Vision Statement but without any substance.
375
 The task 
to work out the substance of an ARF Preventive Diplomacy Work Plan was left to 
Singapore.  
The adoption of an ARF Preventive Diplomacy Work Plan at the 18
th
 ARF 
in 2011 was the most recent development in the ARF‘s slow move to its second 
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phase.
376
 However, PD activists would be disappointed with the list of PD 
measures, given that they are all about confidence building. Approaches that 
might be considered closer to a traditional understanding of PD, such as 
mediation, are proposed only as long-term measures. The adoption of the Work 
Plan should therefore be seen as a largely cosmetic response to recent calls for the 
ARF to be a more action-oriented institution or else risk irrelevance. It does not 
reflect serious efforts among participants to embark on PD. Indeed, there are 
echoes of 1999-2001 when the ARF Concept and Principles of PD was adopted in 
order to deflect similar criticism of the Forum.  
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CHAPTER VI 
THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND 
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT  
This chapter examines if Vietnam‘s endorsement of the Responsibility to 
Protect (RtoP) was a result of socialization in the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC). The chapter begins with an overview of RtoP‘s evolution and Vietnam‘s 
position as a non-permanent member of the Security Council for the 2008-2009 
term. The chapter then explores persuasion, social influence and mimicking as the 
three possible explanations.
 
A persuasion explanation argues that through 
deliberations, Vietnamese officials came to judge that RtoP was justified and that 
positive attitudinal change was then reflected in public statements. Conversely, a 
social influence explanation argues that the decision to go along with RtoP was 
made to build an image of Vietnam as a responsible member of the world 
community and to ―not rock the boat.‖ A third explanation - mimicking - argues 
that as novices at the Security Council, Vietnamese representatives adopted RtoP 
in order to adapt to the new working environment and that they did so without 
clear understanding of the costs and benefits. 
 
Contrary to the findings in the two previous chapters where social 
influence proved to be the most plausible explanation for Vietnam‘s decision to 
accept the ASEAN Human Rights Body and Preventive Diplomacy Documents, 
this chapter argues that combined effects of mimicking, social influence and 
persuasion help explain Vietnam‘s endorsement of RtoP. In particular, mimicking 
and social influence occurred and paved the way for persuasion to occur over 
time: accepting RtoP in principle and engaging in the deliberations and 
resolutions of RtoP-related issues gradually helped Vietnamese officials gain a 
better understanding of RtoP as a concept. They saw it as less threatening than 
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they had done and then became convinced of the rightness and the necessity of 
RtoP in the world today.  
 
However, for the purpose of delineating their social effects, the chapter 
examines these processes in separate sections. There is some evidence that 
persuasion was at work and that as a result Vietnamese representatives saw RtoP 
as less threatening than they had done, and they became more comfortable with 
the concept. This attitudinal change came via two routes. First, participation in 
Security Council deliberations helped Vietnamese officials gain a better 
understanding of RtoP as a concept and thus removed some of their fear of its 
implications. Second, with personal experience drawn from involvement in a 
number of potential RtoP situations, Vietnamese officials came to judge that RtoP 
was necessary. This positive attitudinal change was observed among a small 
group of Vietnamese officials directly working at the Security Council.  
 
A social influence explanation sheds light on Vietnam‘s endorsement of 
RtoP in an indirect way. Unlike the social influence instances we have seen in the 
two previous chapters, there was no single, critical moment when Vietnamese 
officials found themselves under pressure to make a sudden change from 
opposing to supporting RtoP. Rather, Vietnam‘s decision to go along with RtoP 
was to join its reference group which included members from the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM) and other like-minded states who already endorsed the norm, 
though to varying degrees. In addition, the decision was taken in a context where 
the country‘s leadership saw the non-permanent membership at the UNSC as an 
opportunity to build the image of Vietnam as a responsible member of the 
international community. Opposing RtoP would undermine such a social goal and 
put the country in a minority group - a situation that officials had long sought to 
avoid as a guiding principle of conducting external relations in general. 
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Mimicking was also at work. Being novices in the working environment of 
the Security Council, Vietnamese officials had to follow their counterparts to 
participate in RtoP deliberations. They started using the general RtoP language 
without a clear understanding of the concept. They did not have clear preferences 
over it upon the entry into the deliberations either. Participation in discussions and 
using RtoP language even without prior knowledge of costs or benefits of doing 
so was an effort on the part of Vietnamese officials to adapt to a new working 
environment and expose themselves to a new issue.  
The evolution of RtoP and Vietnam’s position 
The origins of RtoP and its development from an idea to a new 
international norm have been extensively studied.
377
 As Weiss and Thakur 
observe, ―no idea has moved faster in the international normative arena than the 
responsibility to protect.‖378 RtoP was first introduced in the eponymous 2001 
report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(ICISS, hereinafter the Commission).
379
 The report was a response to the call by 
the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan for international consensus on the use of 
coercive action to respond to situations when gross and systematic violations of 
human rights take place.
380
 The Commission first reformulated the debate of how 
to reconcile sovereignty and intervention by reconceptualizing sovereignty as 
responsibility, which included an external responsibility to respect the sovereignty 
of other states and an internal responsibility to respect the dignity and basic rights 
                                               
377 See for example, Alex J Bellamy, ―Wither the Responsibility to Protect? Humanitarian 
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378 Weiss and Thakur, Global Governance and the UN: An Unfinished Journey, 308. 
379 ICISS was established by the Canadian Government in 2000 and operated as an independent 
research institution.  
380 ―The Responsibility to Protect,‖ International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty, December 2001, http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf.  
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of all the people within a state.
381
 With a focus on the latter aspect of sovereignty - 
the protection of a state‘s population - the Commission said that states bear the 
primary responsibility, but in a case where a state is unable or unwilling to fulfil 
its responsibility, or is itself the perpetrator, then it becomes the responsibility of 
the international community to act in its place.
382
 The Commission proposed that 
the international community, in order to exercise its responsibility to protect, 
could take a wide range of measures, including military action as a last resort and 
subject to criteria including right authority, just cause, right intention, proportional 
means and reasonable prospects.  
 
However, the introduction of RtoP in the ICISS‘s report was 
overshadowed by the 11 September terrorist attacks in the United States and the 
subsequent war on terror. In 2004, RtoP was reintroduced in the report of the 
United Nations High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change.
383
 Formed 
in 2003 at the request of the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the High-level 
Panel was asked inter alia to study the possibility of using force to address the 
threats that Annan argued the UN‘s collective security system failed to deal 
with.
384
 The Panel proposed the use of military force in circumstances where the 
threat was primarily internal, ―saving lives within countries in situation of mass 
atrocity.‖385  
 
While acknowledging that governments bear the primary responsibility to 
protect their people, the Panel endorsed ―a collective international responsibility‖ 
for the wider international community to take up if governments are unable or 
                                               
381 Ibid., 16. 
382 Ibid., 23. 
383 ―A more Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility,‖ the United Nations, December 1, 2004, 
A/59/565, http://www.un.org/secureworld. 
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unwilling to do so.
386
 Further, in order for the international community to exercise 
such collective responsibility, the Panel was of the view that, under the Security 
Council‘s authority, military intervention should be allowed as a last resort. The 
scope of military intervention was restricted to genocide, other large-scale 
killings, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian law. 
In addition, coercive actions had to meet the threshold criteria, including 
seriousness of the threat, proper purpose, last resort, proportional means and 
balance of consequences.
387
 
 
Former Secretary-General Kofi Annan in his report In Larger Freedom: 
Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, released in March 
2005, endorsed the collective responsibility to protect and proposed that the 
Security Council should use a wide range of methods, including enforcement 
action, to exercise such responsibility.
388
 Following up the Panel‘s 
recommendations, Annan called for a new consensus on the interpretation of 
Article 51 of the UN Charter so as to cover not only attacks that have already 
happened but also imminent and latent threats to international peace and 
security.
389
 In his view, crimes such as genocide, ethnic cleansing or crimes 
against humanity were latent threats to international peace and security and should 
therefore fall under the purview of the Security Council. He urged the Security 
Council to adopt a resolution setting out principles for the use of military force 
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―not only to preserve international security and peace in general but also in 
responding to genocide, ethnic cleansing and others such as crimes against 
humanity arguably threats to international peace and security.‖390  
 
Before the release of these two reports, RtoP was a completely new idea to 
the Vietnamese diplomats at the UN.
391
 In the General Assembly debate on the 
Secretary-General‘s report in April 2005, the Vietnamese representative treated 
the use of force and RtoP as if they were two separate issues. He opposed the 
attempts to reinterpret Article 51, arguing that it would provide states with an 
expanded scope to take military action, particularly in response to a perceived 
imminent threat.
392
 In this respect Vietnamese concerns had been stoked by the 
invasion of Iraq in 2003.
393
 He also told the debate that Vietnam did not endorse 
responsibility to protect as an emerging norm of international law.
394
 This official 
later confirmed in the interview that he believed ―the rationale behind the West‘s 
push forward RtoP, in addition to human protection purposes, was to interfere into 
internal affairs of other states.‖395 He said, given the fact that RtoP was an issue 
pressed by the Secretary-General, Vietnam watched the process closely. However 
its participation in RtoP deliberations in 2005 was modest.  
 
At the World Summit held in New York in September 2005, RtoP was 
reportedly one of the few substantive items to survive the negotiations. It was 
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mentioned in three paragraphs (138, 139, and 140) of the Outcome Document.
396
 
First, it is provided that the responsibility to protect lies first and foremost with 
individual states and their responsibility is ―to protect its population from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.‖397 Second, 
the international community has a responsibility to assist states to fulfil their 
responsibilities. And third, in case governments manifestly fail to protect their 
people and that peaceful means prove inadequate, the international community 
should take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, to protect the 
population at risk.
398
   
 
There are two important differences between RtoP as provided in the 
Outcome Document and that initially proposed in the ICISS‘ report. First, while 
the ICISS‘s report proposed a wide scope of RtoP application,399 the post 2005 
concept restricted its application only to the four worst crimes, namely genocide, 
ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Second, the Outcome 
Document acknowledges the special role of the Security Council in exercising 
collective international responsibility. It is the only body that can sanction the use 
of pillar three measures, especially force. This was a major shift from the ICISS 
report, which sought to find a way to act even when the Security Council was 
deadlocked.
400
   
 
At the World Summit, Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Dy Nien 
expressed his support for the Secretary-General‘s views in his report In Larger 
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Freedom and the commitments contained in the World Summit Outcome 
Document.
401
 Notably, he mentioned RtoP in relation to human rights protection 
and called for ―more in-depth discussion‖ if the concept was to have broader 
support. This subtle shift evinced a more positive attitude toward the new concept. 
In 2006-2007, Vietnamese officials at the UN started using the language of 
responsibility to protect. In November 2007, the Vietnamese representative Le 
Luong Minh told a Council meeting on the protection of civilians in armed 
conflict, that ―states bear the primary responsibility within their jurisdiction for 
the protection of their own populations.
‖402
 As a non-permanent member of the 
UNSC in 2008-2009, Vietnam became increasingly engaged with RtoP. Support 
for the concept was reaffirmed in various statements. As Bellamy and Davies 
observe, Vietnam‘s position shifted from opposition to positive engagement in a 
short period of time. Prior to the 2005 World Summit, Vietnam opposed RtoP; in 
2005-2007, the country was described as one of a group of ―fence-sitters‖ and 
then became ―RtoP-engaged‖ in 2008-2009.403 While this simple typology 
usefully captures the change in Vietnam‘s position, how Vietnam came to endorse 
RtoP needs a closer look, especially the period that relates to debates about the 
implementation of RtoP. 
 
In January 2009, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon released a major report 
on implementing RtoP. The report broke down RtoP into three pillars: (i) the 
state‘s own responsibility to protect all peoples on its territory; (ii) international 
assistance to help build a state‘s capacity to deliberate on its responsibility; and 
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(iii) the international responsibility to protect.
404
 Vietnam‘s position on RtoP was 
fully elaborated for the first time in a subsequent debate on the report.
405
 Speaking 
to the General Assembly, Ambassador Bui The Giang reaffirmed Vietnam‘s 
endorsement of RtoP, particularly the first pillar. Reservations remained, 
however, with respect to some aspects of the second and the third pillars. For 
example, in the Vietnamese perspective, international assistance should be 
provided in a manner so that it would not infringe on states‘ sovereignty. Timely 
and decisive collective action should not be interpreted as confined to coercive 
military action.
406
 Fear that RtoP might be abused to justify intervention in states‘ 
internal affairs was also raised.
407
 
On the first pillar 
Vietnam totally endorses the first pillar of RtoP. This position was 
reiterated in various statements in 2008-2009 that states bear the primary 
responsibility for the protection of civilians. The Security Council‘s debates 
relating to RtoP cover primarily the issue of protection of civilians in armed 
conflict, particularly women and children as the most vulnerable groups. Having 
struggled with prolonged wars, Vietnam strongly endorsed support for these two 
groups. On various occasions, Vietnamese officials expressed their deep concern 
with the worsening situations, particularly in many African states, where an 
increased number of women and children were falling victim to killing, sexual 
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violence, maiming, abuse, humiliation and inhumane treatment.
408
 They also 
believed that Vietnam‘s own remarkable achievements in the protection of women 
and children during the process of national reconstruction and development, 
meant it could share its experiences and make a tangible contribution to the cause 
at the global level.  
 
As President of the Security Council in July 2008, Vietnam initiated an 
open debate on the protection of children in armed conflict. Foreign Minister 
Pham Gia Khiem told the debate that ―Vietnam is committed to defending and 
promoting the best interests of children in every circumstance and our concerns 
for children affected by armed conflict are beyond conventional reasoning.‖409 
The debate ended with the issuance of a statement by the President of the Security 
Council in which Vietnam on behalf of the Council reiterated its commitment to 
address the widespread impact of armed conflict on children and its determination 
to ensure respect for and implementation of all resolutions on this issue.
410
 In 
October 2009, Vietnam (again in the presidency) took the initiative to organize an 
open debate on women, peace and security. Pham Gia Khiem shared experiences 
about the protection and empowerment of women in the country‘s reconstruction 
process, stressing the critical role of the state and society in making 
comprehensive efforts to provide basic needs for people.
411
 The debate resulted in 
the adoption of Resolution 1889 on women, peace and security - the first 
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resolution that Vietnam had successfully led in thirty years of participation in the 
UN.
412
 
In addition, Vietnam consistently pursued a comprehensive preventive 
strategy on RtoP. Pham Gia Khiem told the Council meeting on children in armed 
conflict in July 2008 that: 
 
Vietnam attaches great importance to a preventive strategy, one that has a 
dual objective of preventing armed conflict in the first place by addressing 
its root cause and preventing children from being affected by armed 
conflict. Such a comprehensive prevention approach must include 
promoting sustainable development, poverty eradication, national 
reconciliation, good governance, democracy, the rule of law and respect 
for and protection of human rights and reintegration and rehabilitation of 
children associated with armed forces and armed groups.
413
 
 
Vietnamese Deputy Permanent Representative Bui The Giang at the 
debate on Ban Ki-moon‘s report on RtoP implementation in July 2009 reaffirmed 
the country‘s comprehensive and preventive approach to RtoP, saying that ―the 
best way to protect the population is to prevent wars and conflicts and to address 
the root causes of conflicts and social tensions, which lie in poverty and economic 
underdevelopment.‖414 The process of addressing the root causes of conflicts, in 
the Vietnamese perspective, requires the UN‘s contribution as the world‘s largest 
pool of experience and expertise. Vietnam therefore supports the role of the 
international community through the UN in assisting states in need as reflected in 
the second pillar of RtoP.
 415
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On the second pillar 
Vietnam endorses the second pillar of RtoP, namely that ―the international 
community should, as appropriate, encourage and help states to exercise their 
responsibility.‖416 Vietnam supports international assistance mainly in the form of 
capacity building. Addressing a Council meeting on the protection of civilians in 
May 2008, the Vietnamese representative recommended the United Nations help 
improve national capacity by providing technical assistance and conducting 
awareness-raising activities, for instance through training courses.
417
 
 
Vietnam‘s primary concern with the second pillar of RtoP was how to 
make international assistance effective and sustainable. Specifically, Vietnamese 
representatives expressed concern about the potential infringements on 
sovereignty if the international community was going to provide assistance to 
concerned governments. They argued that international assistance in whatever 
form must be provided in a manner that respects states‘ independence, 
sovereignty, and territorial integrity. Officials highlighted a number of 
circumstances in which infringements of states‘ sovereignty could occur. For 
example, it might involve the creation of international mechanisms in order to 
help a state improve its national capacity. On this issue, Vietnam‘s position was 
articulated as follows: 
 
[we hold that] the creation and application of any international mechanism 
should be thoroughly studied with a view to ensuring its efficient, effective 
and sustainable performance without resulting in an unnecessary financial 
burden for States, and that such act should respect national sovereignty, 
territorial integrity, ownership and self-determination and should be in 
accordance with the United Nations Charter and international law.
418
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Second, when the situation in a given state is referred to international 
criminal courts or similar mechanisms, Vietnam recommended that such reference 
should only be considered on a case-by-case basis to avoid the risk of infringing 
on state sovereignty.
419
 A third potential infringement on states‘ sovereignty 
might involve humanitarian access during a conflict situation. At a Council debate 
on the protection of civilians in armed conflict in May 2008, Vietnam‘s 
representative Bui The Giang stressed that ―humanitarian access and assistance 
should be independent of political and military measures, and in keeping with the 
principle of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence, and in 
conformity with national and international law.‖420  
 
The concern about possible infringement of sovereignty came up in the 
context of the humanitarian crisis caused by Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar in May 
2008. In response to slow progress on the part of the Myanmar government in 
facilitating international relief efforts, French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner 
called for the UN Security Council to invoke RtoP and issue a resolution 
authorizing the delivery of aid to Myanmar people, even without Myanmar‘s 
consent.
421
 At the same time, France and the United Kingdom (UK) called on the 
Council to discuss humanitarian assistance for Myanmar.
422
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Vietnamese officials saw the proposal by France, the UK and other 
Western countries as an attempt to politicize the issue of humanitarian aid for 
Myanmar, as part of their pressure on the military government over its human 
rights record.
423
 Vietnam and other ASEAN members preferred that ASEAN 
would play the leading role in helping Myanmar address the consequences of the 
Cyclone.
424
 A senior Vietnamese official said in the interview that in a private 
meeting between the UN Secretary-General and ASEAN representatives on this 
issue, Vietnam, while acknowledging assistance was needed, expressed concern 
about a possible intervention in Myanmar on humanitarian grounds. He believed 
that ―ASEAN alone could help, if Myanmar requested, and therefore there was no 
need for assistance or intervention from outside ASEAN.‖ 425   
 
At the Council, in coordination with the Chinese, Russian and 
Indonesians, Vietnamese officials argued that a natural disaster was not an issue 
of international peace and security and therefore was not under the purview of the 
UNSC. Collectively they opposed holding a separate meeting on the issue and 
indirectly rejected the French proposal to invoke RtoP,
426
 so as to lessen pressure 
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on Myanmar.
427
 ASEAN and the UN then facilitated a conference on relief efforts 
and reconstruction for Myanmar.
428
 
 
In the case of Myanmar, Vietnam feared the Council‘s mandate might be 
expanded to include natural disasters, thus creating more opportunities for its 
powerful members to intervene in others‘ internal affairs - a trend that Vietnam 
wanted to prevent.
429
 If France had been successful in seeking the Council‘s 
authorization of aid delivery without Myanmar‘s consent, the act would have been 
seen as an infringement of Myanmar‘s sovereignty. Vietnam therefore 
emphasized the consent of the state concerned as a prerequisite when the 
international community assists states in need. The Vietnamese representative told 
the debate on Ban Ki-moon‘s report that ―international assistance can be most 
effective if it is based on engagement and cooperation with related states.‖430 In 
short, the voice of governments must be heard and their sovereignty respected 
when the international community exercises its responsibility to help states 
concerned. 
On the third pillar 
While endorsing the third pillar, Vietnam remains cautious on the so-
called ―timely and decisive collective action‖ that may be taken by the 
international community to exercise the responsibility to protect. The Vietnamese 
representative also told the General Assembly‘s plenary meeting on RtoP in July 
2009 that the concept of ―collective action‖ should be further clarified so that it 
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would not be interpreted as solely confined to coercive military action.
431
 He 
reemphasized the need to have consent of state concerned and its voluntary 
engagement should timely and decisive collective action be taken by the 
international community to protect civilians from the four prescribed crimes. 
Furthermore, the application of other measures proposed in the Secretary-
General‘s report - such as economic sanctions and reference to the International 
Criminal Court - should be on a case-by-case basis, free from politicization, 
selectivity and double standards. These concerns reflect Vietnam‘s continued 
preference for upholding the principle of non-interference through preventing or 
limiting the application of intervention measures.
432
  
 
Vietnam‘s concern about the application of the third pillar was most 
apparent in the case of Zimbabwe. According to a Vietnamese official, Zimbabwe 
was a case where a majority of the Security Council‘s members strongly urged for 
intervention by invoking RtoP.
433
 A violent political crisis broke out in Zimbabwe 
during the 2008 presidential election in which the government of President Robert 
Mugabe was alleged to have targeted political opponents and committed serious 
human rights violations.
434
 Briefing the Security Council in June, Under 
Secretary-General Lynn Pascoe said the situation in Zimbabwe had deteriorated to 
alarming levels.
435
 The Zimbabwean government was warned that it had the 
primary responsibility to ensure the security for all citizens, had to create 
conditions for free and fair elections, stop violence and intimidation and bring 
those responsible to justice.
436
 In another briefing at the Council, Deputy 
Secretary-General Asha-Rose Migoro again warned that ―it is the urgent 
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responsibility of the Government of Zimbabwe to protect its citizens and to cease 
immediately all forms of violence.‖437 The Deputy Secretary-General also added 
that those who perpetrated crimes must be held to account and the victims of 
violence deserved justice. 
 
Despite these warnings and regional efforts at mediating the crisis, the 
situation in Zimbabwe continued to worsen. The Security Council was then 
obliged to take collective action in order to prevent the situation from further 
deteriorating. A majority of the Council‘s members supported open debate on 
Zimbabwe. The United States, the UK and Italy proposed making the situation in 
Zimbabwe a regular item on the agenda.
438
 In June 2008, the President of the 
Security Council issued a statement condemning the campaign of violence 
intentionally carried out by the Zimbabwean government which had resulted in 
the killings, beating and displacement of thousands of people, denying the right of 
political opponents to campaign freely and suspension of the operations of 
humanitarian organizations.
439
  
 
At the same time, the United States, with support from a group of UN 
members,
440
 drafted a resolution on Zimbabwe. The message conveyed in the 
draft resolution was that there were serious and widespread violations of human 
rights in Zimbabwe and that the Zimbabwean government had failed to fulfil its 
responsibility to protect. By ignoring the warnings and refusing assistance from 
the international community, the Zimbabwean government had become the 
persecutor instead of the protector of its people. The US draft resolution outlined 
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various measures as provided for in the Chapter VII of the UN Charter, including 
travel restrictions targeting a number of Zimbabwean officials, an arms embargo, 
and a freeze on financial assets.
441
 It also called for the appointment of an UN 
special envoy to Zimbabwe and for provision of humanitarian assistance. 
 
Security Council members then discussed the draft resolution at their 
meeting on Peace and Security in Africa on July 11, 2008.
442
 Speaking in favour 
of the draft resolution, UK representative Sir John Sawers argued that the 
Zimbabwe situation constituted a grave humanitarian crisis for which the 
government of Zimbabwe bore full responsibility, pointing out that Mugabe‘s 
government had ignored appeals to lift restrictions on humanitarian supplies. The 
representative from Costa Rica supported the inclusion in the draft solution of 
language concerning the need to fix responsibility for human rights abuses. 
Explaining France‘s support for the draft resolution, the French representative 
said that, in addition to political dialogue, pressure is also necessary in order to 
protect the people and to hold accountable those who are blocking the current 
political process. He also told the Council that the European Union was 
considering intensifying the sanctions it already had in place. Croatia‘s 
representative supported the proposed measures and argued that the Council‘s 
action - the draft resolution - was timely and long awaited. 
 
The draft resolution, however, did not receive support from China, Russia, 
South Africa, Libya or Vietnam. The Vietnamese permanent representative Le 
Luong Minh said Vietnam could not support it, arguing that the situation in 
Zimbabwe did not constitute a threat to regional or international peace and 
security and therefore it was not within the mandated purview of the Security 
Council. In addition, he said the proposed sanctions, if applied, ―would set a 
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dangerous precedent for intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states and 
would run counter to the fundamental principles of international law and the 
Charter of the United Nations.‖443  
 
MOFA internal documents reveal that Vietnam did not want the situation 
in Zimbabwe to be politicized and further complicated. Therefore, in response to 
the proposal by the majority of the Council to hold an open debate on the situation 
in Zimbabwe, Vietnam, (together with China, Russia, South Africa, Indonesia and 
Libya) proposed a closed meeting.
444
 Vietnamese officials also believed the US 
draft was ill-intentioned and contained strong intervention measures.
445
 In an 
exchange of views with Chinese diplomats in Hanoi, Vietnamese officials agreed 
with the Chinese position that the Security Council ought to be cautious on the 
issue and opposed the application of sanctions on Zimbabwe.
446
 It was also 
revealed that in their informal discussions representatives from China, South 
Africa, Libya, Indonesia and Vietnam had mentioned the possibility of accepting 
a Security Council resolution on Zimbabwe on the condition that all ―sensitive 
issues‖ were removed.447 Vietnam‘s position on the draft resolution on Zimbabwe 
was then summed up as follows: 
 
We do not have direct interests in the case of Zimbabwe, albeit our strong 
relationship with the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) led by 
Mugabe before ZANU took the power in 1980. However, we should 
uphold the principle of non-interference in internal affairs of states, 
avoiding the creation of precedents for Western countries through the 
Security Council to interfere in states‘ internal affairs in response to the 
complicated situations involving elections in a number of developing 
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countries and members of the Non-Aligned Movement, including those in 
Southeast Asia and our neighbouring countries.
448
 
 
In the event that the draft resolution was put to the vote, Vietnam should follow 
the scenarios below: 
Scenario 1: We would abstain if China and Russia veto (or one of the two 
vetoes) and non-aligned members agree with our position to abstain.  
  
Scenario 2: If China and Russia (or one of the two) and one non-aligned 
member vote against, we would do the same.
449
 
 
The Zimbabwe case shows that Vietnam still had concerns about 
intervention and sought to prevent the Council from acting on behalf of the 
international community and using RtoP to the interfere in internal affairs of 
states. Vietnam and the other reluctant Council members were successful. China 
and Russia exercised their vetoes and the draft resolution on Zimbabwe was not 
adopted.
450
  
An increased comfort level with RtoP 
While Vietnam still had reservations, as was evident in the cases of 
Myanmar and Zimbabwe, it was generally becoming more supportive of RtoP. 
Indeed, in July 2009 Deputy Permanent Representative Bui The Giang said with 
confidence that ―we now do not have to discuss whether R2P is necessary…and 
we do not have to struggle to define the scope of this concept.‖451 In comparison 
with statements delivered in 2004-2005, the language of this statement reflected 
an increased comfort level toward RtoP among Vietnamese officials in New York. 
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Theory would suggest that this comfort level is evidence of successful persuasion. 
The following section explores how, through deliberations, Vietnamese diplomats 
judged the contents of RtoP in order to see if their attitudinal change was a result 
of persuasion. It also considers two alternative explanations: social influence and 
mimicking. A social influence explanation argues that Vietnam‘s decision to 
endorse RtoP was part of its efforts to realize the social goal of building a good 
image of Vietnam as a proactive and responsible member in the world 
community. ―Not rocking the boat‖ also prevented Vietnamese officials from 
opposing RtoP at a time when majority UN members had endorsed the principle.  
 
Mimicking suggests that novices will copy what others are doing in order 
to adapt to a new and uncertain environment and they do so without knowing 
what the costs and benefits are. A mimicking explanation for Vietnam‘s 
endorsement of RtoP would be that Vietnamese representatives as novices in the 
Security Council found that the best way to adapt to the working procedures and 
environment was to follow others, engaging in the deliberations on RtoP 
irrespective of the potential costs or benefits. 
Persuasion as an explanation  
As Johnston states, an optimal environment for persuasion would have the 
following features: (i) small membership; (ii) a couple of actors are recognized as 
authoritative (information they provide is more convincing); (iii) decision making 
rules are based on consensus; (iv) the institution‘s mandate is deliberative; and (v) 
agents enjoy high levels of autonomy from their principals. Johnston argues that 
for a novice, information from in-groups or from sources that are ―liked‖ is more 
convincing than that from out-groups or the ―disliked.‖ Thus, in an institution 
with small membership, the effects of social liking and in-group identity will be 
strongest. In addition, consensus as the decision-making rule and deliberation as 
mandate are the two institutional features that help facilitate the assessment of 
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counter-attitudinal arguments and give actors some degree of free choice when 
considering the implications of (not) holding to their initial attitudes. Similarly, 
the higher the degree of independence the actors enjoy in relation to their 
principals the more likely that actors can be persuaded. 
 
To what extent is the working environment in the UNSC conducive to 
persuasion against the above criteria? On the surface, two features do not appear 
to be conducive to persuasion. First, deliberations on RtoP did not take place 
among a small group of participants. Rather, discussions were conducted at both 
the General Assembly and the Security Council and involved a wide range of 
actors. The UNSC meeting on RtoP in December 2008 is one example. 
Participants attending the meeting were diverse, including representatives from 
Security Council members and many experts in the field.
452
 The debate in the 
General Assembly following Ban Ki-moon‘s report on RtoP implementation in 
July 2009 lasted for two days with 94 statements from UN members and 
observers.
453
 In these debates and at other Security Council‘s deliberations on 
RtoP - related issues, Vietnam had multiple reference groups: China and Russia as 
major powers that had been traditionally ―like-minded‖; ASEAN states both 
inside and outside the UNSC; non-aligned members and other UN members.  
 
Second, in terms of agent autonomy, Vietnamese representatives in New 
York did not enjoy much freedom to take positions, given strict reporting 
obligations, coordinating mechanisms and fixed guiding principles which 
regulated activities at the UNSC. For example, they had to seek instructions from 
                                               
452 For the list of participants, see Appendix I, ―Letter dated 30 December 2008 from the 
Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations addressed to the President of the 
Security Council,‖ S/2008/836, December 31, 2008, 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/48abd5980.html. 
453 ―Report on the General Assembly Plenary Debate on the Responsibility to Protect,‖ 
International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, September 15, 2009, 
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICRtoP%20Report-
General_Assembly_Debate_on_the_Responsibility_to_Protect%20FINAL%209_22_09.pdf. 
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and submit periodical reports to Hanoi. These reports - monthly, six-monthly and 
annually - on Vietnam‘s operations at the Council went to MOFA‘s leaders, the 
Prime Minister and the Politburo.
454
  
 
These features do not match the criteria believed to be conducive to 
persuasion. In reality, however, these institutional features do not limit persuasion 
effects. Unlike the negotiations on the ASEAN Human Rights Body and the 
ARF‘s deliberations on Preventive Diplomacy, RtoP deliberations at the UN were 
not so sharply divided that it led to the formation of two opposing groups. Rather, 
participants came with a shared understanding of the necessity of RtoP and 
endorsed the concept, although with varying degrees of support. As William R. 
Pace observed, RtoP was not a ―northern or western agenda,‖455 on which 
Western countries sought to impose norms or values on others. RtoP supporters 
included many states in the developing world and in the Non-Aligned 
Movement.
456
 In such a working environment, Vietnamese officials did not have 
to take sides or find themselves under pressure from one particular group.  
 
In addition, because RtoP was a new concept and Vietnamese officials in 
New York were the first to engage in RtoP discussions and were in charge of 
dealing with RtoP - related issues, they had an advantage over their colleagues in 
Hanoi when it came to making recommendations on building a national position 
on the topic. They had first hand experience of RtoP issues and debates. One 
official confirmed in an interview that recommendations about RtoP from New 
York ―were always accepted.‖457 Put differently, while routine reporting was 
                                               
454 MOFA Department of International Organizations Research Project ―On the Role of the UNSC 
and Vietnam‘s Future Participation,‖ (2005), p. 98. 
455 William R. Pace is Executive Director of the World Federalist Movement‘s Institute for Global 
Policy. He was a presenter at  the meeting on RtoP organized by South Africa, December 1, 2008. 
456 NAM members accepted RtoP in principle, see ―Statement by H.E. Ambassador Maged A. 
Abdelaziz, Permanent Representative of Egypt on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement on report 
of the Secretary-General,‖ The International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, July 23, 
2009, http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/NAM_Egypt_ENG(1).pdf. 
457 Interview by author in Hanoi, April 8, 2013. 
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required, Vietnamese officials in New York actually played the key role in 
planning how Vietnam should operate at the Council and what it should say on the 
issues debated.  
 
Furthermore, the goal of the discussions was to reach consensus on RtoP 
as a concept and its future implementation. For example, the purpose of the 
Council‘s meeting on RtoP in December 2008 was to build a common 
understanding of the issues set out in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the WSOD, 
particularly to remove some of the misunderstandings surrounding the concept, so 
as to make a contribution to the debate on the Secretary-General's report on RtoP 
implementation.
458
 In this meeting, RtoP advocates persuaded those who 
harboured reservations to provide more support for the concept by presenting their 
arguments for RtoP and conveying the overall message of RtoP in a way that 
made the concept seem less threatening. For instance, they stressed the non-
military aspects of RtoP. Ban Ki-moon‘s report was also presented in that way, 
stressing the preventive aspect of RtoP. For Vietnamese officials who were 
unfamiliar with RtoP, these meetings provided them with a chance to listen to 
diverse perspectives with some degree of free choice, thus facilitating a better 
understanding of the concept. 
Attitudinal change as result of discussions on RtoP  
One Vietnamese official admitted in an interview that initially he saw 
―RtoP as humanitarian intervention in disguise.‖459 Another believed that ―the real 
motive of some Western governments when intervening was to assist opposition 
movements inside states they disliked in order to achieve regime change.‖460 
Generally, in the Vietnamese perspective, humanitarian intervention was often 
                                               
458 Appendix I, ―Letter dated 30 December 2008 from the Permanent Representative of South 
Africa to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council,‖ S/2008/836, 
December 31, 2008, http://www.refworld.org/docid/48abd5980.html.  
459 Interview by author in Hanoi, December 30, 2011. 
460 Interview by author in Hanoi, February 10, 2012. 
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invoked by an individual or group of states and used to intervene in other states‘ 
affairs.
461
 The 2003 US military intervention in Iraq was often cited as the most 
recent case.
462
 As such, humanitarian intervention has no basis in international 
law and its application constitutes an infringement on state sovereignty, thus 
giving major powers more opportunities to impose their values and norms on 
others.
463
 Vietnamese representatives were therefore concerned about the 
motivations behind calls for the protection of civilians on RtoP grounds.  
 
However, Vietnamese officials in New York gradually came to have a 
better understanding of the concept. The senior official who initially saw RtoP as 
humanitarian intervention in disguise admitted in the same interview that 
participating in the meeting on RtoP organized by South Africa in December 2008 
―had caused a change in his perception of the concept because the distinction 
between RtoP and humanitarian intervention was clarified.‖464 As he understood 
it, ―RtoP did not refer exclusively to military intervention potentially taken by 
powerful states to intervene in others‘ internal affairs.‖ Therefore, he no longer 
saw RtoP as humanitarian intervention in disguise. This official also added that 
learning more about RtoP helped Vietnamese officials deal more quickly with 
related issues at the Council.  
 
Another senior official, Nguyen Thi Thanh Ha, had the same observation 
and came to conclude that ―the main difference between RtoP and humanitarian 
intervention was that collective action on RtoP grounds could only take place 
within a UN framework, particularly through the Security Council, and had to 
                                               
461 See Lê Minh, "Về cái gọi là can thiệp nhân đạo‖ [On the so-called humanitarian intervention], 
Tạp chí Cộng sản Online, August 28, 2008, 
http://www.tapchicongsan.org.vn/Home/PrintStory.aspx?distribution=2665&print=true. 
462 Other US military interventions that Vietnam perceived as humanitarian intervention and which 
consolidated its fear included those in Grenada, Panama, and Kosovo. 
463 Lê Minh, "Về cái gọi là can thiệp nhân đạo‖ [On the so-called humanitarian intervention]. 
464 Interview by author in Hanoi, December 30, 2011. 
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adhere to provisions in the UN Charter and in international law.‖465 In contrast, 
humanitarian intervention could include actions deployed outside the UN 
framework and could therefore be used arbitrarily by individual or groups of 
states for their own purposes.
466
 Contrary to humanitarian intervention, RtoP‘s 
objectives, its scope and threshold for implementation were clearly defined and 
had support from majority of UN members.
467
  
 
In addition to many other meetings and workshops that Vietnamese 
officials attended, the meeting on RtoP organized by South Africa at the Security 
Council in December 2008 had an important role in providing Vietnamese 
officials with a better understanding of RtoP as a concept.
468
 A close reading of 
the summaries of presentations delivered at this meeting show that the majority of 
arguments for RtoP were in line with Vietnam‘s interests. Vietnamese officials 
also found that other participants had similar concerns relating to RtoP and its 
future operationalization. Some of the views expressed were as follows:
469
 
 
First, participants stressed the need to distinguish between RtoP and 
humanitarian intervention. Indeed, almost all presenters stressed the aspects of 
RtoP that were related to non-military action. A number of participants believed 
that as a concept RtoP was much broader than humanitarian intervention and the 
measures to be taken under the name of RtoP were also diverse, not exclusively 
military intervention. Those advancing the argument included, among others, the 
                                               
465 Nguyễn Thị Thanh Hà, "Sự khác nhau giữa trách nhiệm bảo vệ và can thiệp nhân đạo‖ [The 
differences between the Responsibility to Protect and Humanitarian Intervention], Thế giới và Việt 
Nam, September 12, 2009, http://www.tgvn.com.vn/printContent.aspx?ID=7476. 
466 Ibid. 
467 Ibid. 
468 This was the only meeting at the Security Council in 2008 devoted to the discussion of RtoP as 
a concept. A senior official said in the interviews that she had also attended various workshops on 
RtoP, including those organized by the American Peace Research Institute, to learn more about the 
concept. 
469 Appendix I, ―Letter dated 30 December 2008 from the Permanent Representative of South 
Africa to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council,‖ accessed  
September 23, 2012, http://www.refworld.org/docid/48abd5980.html.   
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South African Permanent Representative Dumisani Kumalo and Edward Luck - 
Special Adviser to the Secretary-General. Kumalo stressed that RtoP 
encompassed the whole continuum of available measures, not just military 
intervention. Luck told the meeting that RtoP was to support states rather than 
undermine them when explaining why the word ―intervention‖ was not used in the 
2005 WSOD. An observer from the African Union also underscored the 
importance of a non-military approach when implementing RtoP. At the same 
time, a representative of the International Crisis Group (ICG) - a NGO - reassured 
those critics worried about being the target of an intervention, by saying that RtoP 
focused on the protection of the affected populations, rather than on the notion of 
intervention and that military action should only be the last resort. For Vietnam‘s 
representatives who had thought of RtoP as humanitarian intervention under a 
new name, identifying the differences between the two concepts helped remove 
their fear that the concept only meant military action. 
 
Second, presenters at the meeting primarily took a preventive approach to 
RtoP. The representative of Burkina Faso stated that RtoP was primarily a 
responsibility to prevent. Other participants stressed that the priority in RtoP 
implementation should be given to development, preventing conflict, 
strengthening national capacities to protect, addressing the root causes of the 
conflict, such as combating poverty and ending all incitement to violence. As was 
mentioned above, Vietnam had taken the same approach to RtoP and this position 
was reflected in various Vietnamese statements in the Security Council in 2008-9.  
 
Third, there were many calls in the meeting for an increased role for the 
General Assembly and particularly the Secretary-General in the process of RtoP 
implementation. Edward Luck argued that while the Security Council had a 
critical role to play in terms of RtoP, it should also interact with other UN organs. 
He supported an increased role for the General Assembly in prevention, 
mediation, monitoring and investigation. He added that the Assembly could also 
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invoke ―Uniting for Peace‖ if the Council was unable to act. Similarly, the 
representative of Costa Rica called for the Secretary-General‘s Special Adviser on 
the Prevention of Genocide to have a role with regard to early warning and quick 
response. 
 
 Supporting an increased role for the General Assembly was clearly in 
Vietnam‘s interests. The country‘s leadership has repeatedly supported the 
reforms of the UN, through reinforcing the central role and power of the General 
Assembly and improving the working methods of the Security Council.
470
 Giving 
more power to the General Assembly in RtoP implementation, in the Vietnamese 
perspective, would help counter the trend of the Security Council‘s expanding 
mandate, thus giving this exclusive body more opportunity to intervene in states‘ 
internal affairs. 
 
Finally, like Vietnam, participants had concerns about the possible abuse 
of RtoP by powerful states. To address this, Edward Luck called for the 
development of a clear framework for the implementation of the responsibility to 
protect in a collective and legal manner. He gave two examples of preventive use 
of force which had been applied with government consent in the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia and Sierra Leone. Luck‘s emphasis on ―legal manner‖ 
when implementing RtoP was in line with Vietnam‘s position that consent or 
engagement with the state concerned should be sought as precondition for 
international assistance to be delivered. In response to the proposal for expanding 
the scope of RtoP to include natural disasters, Luck stressed the importance of 
keeping the concept focused, rather than stretching it. The mention of natural 
disaster in the meeting was obviously the result of the previous debates at the 
Council on the humanitarian crisis in Myanmar when Vietnam and other members 
                                               
470 ―Statement by H.E  Mr. Nguyen Dy Nien, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic 
of Vietnam to the 60th Session of the United Nations General Assembly,‖ the United Nations, 
September 21, 2005, http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/60/statements/viet050921eng.pdf. 
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had rejected invoking RtoP for the Council‘s action. Luck‘s view therefore helped 
remove the fear on the part of Vietnamese officials of the possibility that scope of 
RtoP would be expanded.    
 
In short, clarifying the distinction between RtoP and humanitarian 
intervention with respect to actions to be taken by the international community 
helped remove the fear on the part of Vietnamese officials that RtoP measures 
might be arbitrarily employed. They found the concept less threatening than they 
had before. More importantly, with emphasis placed on the preventive aspect of 
RtoP (something which was further elaborated in Ban Ki-moon‘s report), these 
officials felt assured that state sovereignty would still be respected, rather than 
being undermined. This increased comfort level with RtoP was reflected in their 
public statements. As the Vietnamese representative told the General Assembly‘s 
plenary meeting on implementing RtoP in July 2009, there was no need to discuss 
about whether RtoP was necessary and about its scope. He added that RtoP was 
now ―more imperative and urgent than ever before when conflicts continue to 
spread and escalate in many parts of the world.‖471 The statement showed just 
how far Vietnamese officials had come and that they now accepted RtoP as 
justified. 
Attitudinal change as result of involvement in possible RtoP situations 
With about two-thirds of the Security Council‘s agenda items on Africa,472 
a representative of Belgium observed that Africa was ―the theatre for the 
                                               
471 ―Statement by H.E. Ambassador Bui The Giang, Deputy Permanent Representative of Viet 
Nam, at the General Assembly Plenary Meeting on Responsibility to Protect (R2P),‖ Permanent 
Mission of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam to the United Nations, July 24, 2009, 
http://www.vietnam-un.org/en/vnun.php?id=151&cid=23.    
472 MOFA Department of International Organizations Research Project ―On the Role of the UNSC 
and Vietnam‘s Future Participation,‖ (2005), p. 98. 
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responsibility to protect situations.‖473 However, due to the lack of substantial 
relationships with African states, Vietnamese officials had a limited knowledge of 
situations on the continent.
474
 Some Vietnamese diplomats at the UN Mission 
admitted that for the first several months working at the Council, they did not 
fully understand situations debated at the Council in general and those in African 
states in particular.
475
 Subsequent direct involvement in the Council‘s work 
helped them learn more about the situation on the ground in the states concerned. 
For example, Vietnam held the chairmanship of the 1132 Committee on Sierra 
Leone and vice chairmanship of the Committees on Congo, Lebanon and counter-
terrorism. This learning process influenced the perception of state representatives 
on RtoP in both direct and indirect ways.  
 
First, as one diplomat contended, ―the situations in a number of African 
countries could not be resolved without the UN and as a member of the Security 
Council Vietnam could not ignore or go against the interests of the state 
concerned.‖476 For instance, on assuming the chairmanship of the 1132 
Committee on Sierra Leone in 2008-2009, Vietnamese representatives, together 
with members of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, travelled to the country and 
saw evidence of serious human rights violations.
477
 The situation in Southern 
Sudan, particularly in refugee camps, was also reported to be of great concern and 
―unimaginable.‖478 Even Kenya - described as the model of development in Africa 
- was characterized by widespread corruption, ineffective government, and 
                                               
473  Appendix I, ―Letter dated 30 December 2008 from the Permanent Representative of South 
Africa to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council,‖ accessed  
September, 23, 2012, http://www.refworld.org/docid/48abd5980.html.   
474 Not many Vietnamese embassies have been established in African countries. 
475 Interview by author in Hanoi, December 30, 2011; March 29, 2013. 
476 Interview by author in Hanoi, December 30, 2011. 
477 Interview by author in Hanoi, January 31, 2012. 
478 Ibid. See also ―Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,‖ the United Nations, March 20, 
2009, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Sudan%20S%20PV%206096.pdf . 
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poverty.
479
 Vietnamese officials came to believe that situations in these countries 
required international intervention in some ways.
480
   
 
Vietnam therefore strongly supported a role for the UN, regional 
organizations and relevant bodies in helping states prevent conflicts, address their 
root causes and fulfil their responsibilities under relevant Council‘s resolutions.481 
In addition, Vietnam tried to act as a responsible member of the Council, taking 
into consideration the interests of states concerned. To Vietnamese officials, 
acting in a responsible manner meant helping to lessen tensions and contribute to 
the resolution of regional issues ―on the basis of principles enshrined in the UN 
Charter and with consideration of the interests of states concerned.‖482 For 
example, as chair of the 1132 Committee, Vietnamese representatives closely 
worked with the Special Court in Sierra Leone leading to the removal of the 
majority of individuals subjected to travel restrictions.
483
  
 
Second, from what Vietnamese officials had witnessed in Sierra Leone, 
Sudan, and Kenya, a reference was made regarding the possible ―responsibility to 
protect situations‖ in Vietnam. In response to the concern occasionally raised in 
Hanoi that outsiders could possibly use RtoP as a pretext to intervene in domestic 
affairs, for example situations relating to ethnic minorities in the Central 
                                               
479 Interview by author in Hanoi, March 27, 2013. 
480 Interview by author in Hanoi, January 31, 2012. 
481 MOFA Department of International Organizations, Cable message no. 545/HT dated December 
27, 2009.  
482  MOFA Department of International Organizations Presentation at the 26th Diplomatic 
Conference (2008) ―Some Initial Thoughts on the Increased Participation in the Process of 
International Cooperation Toward the Implementation of Vietnamese Foreign Policy set out since 
the Xth National Congress of the CPV and One Year as Non-permanent member of the UNSC,‖ 
p.4. 
483  ―Statement by H.E. Ambassador Le Luong Minh, Permanent Representative of Viet Nam, 
Chairman of the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1132 (1997) 
Concerning Sierra Leone at the Meeting of the Security Council on Agenda Item Briefing of 
Security Council subsidiary bodies,‖ Permanent Mission of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam to 
the United Nations, December 14, 2009, http://www.vietnam-un.org/en/vnun.php?id=172&cid=1.  
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Highlands and in the North West,
484
 almost all Vietnamese officials interviewed 
shared an optimistic view that domestic stability would discourage outside 
intervention.
 485
 Specifically, one official argued that ―Vietnam should not be too 
sensitive to RtoP or think that one day it could be punished on RtoP grounds or 
become a victim.‖486 This official believed that what happened in some African 
countries would be less likely to occur in Vietnam given the existence of 
established legal frameworks in the country that would help manage the domestic 
situation in a way that would prevent mass atrocities and repression from 
occurring. Put differently, proper management of internal issues would not create 
opportunities for outsiders to intervene in the internal affairs. The belief that RtoP 
situations in some of African countries would be less likely in Vietnam therefore 
helped remove the fear among Vietnamese officials of the possibility that RtoP 
could be used as pretext by outsiders to intervene in domestic affairs. 
 
In short, the most notable attitudinal change among the group of 
Vietnamese officials in New York was that they became more comfortable with, 
and supportive of, RtoP. This attitudinal change was primarily because of a 
persuasion process through which Vietnamese officials finally came to judge that 
RtoP was less threatening than they had thought before. Of equal importance was 
the effect of learning. Through direct involvement in the Council‘s work, 
Vietnamese officials came to acknowledge the increasing role of the UN and other 
international bodies in assisting states. At the same time, knowledge gained from 
this learning process helped remove the fear of the possibility of RtoP situations 
in Vietnam. Positive attitudinal change toward RtoP was reflected in public 
statements in two ways. First, Vietnam stated that it saw RtoP as necessary and 
urgent in today‘s world. Second, Vietnam offered support for the role of the 
                                               
484 Interview by author in Hanoi, February 10, 2012,  
485 Interview by author in Hanoi, January 31, 2012; March 26, 2013; April 3, 2013. 
486 Interview by author in Hanoi, January 31, 2012. 
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international community in assisting states in the need to fulfil their responsibility 
to protect.  
Social influence as an explanation 
Social influence as an alternative explanation also helps provide insights 
into Vietnam‘s increasingly positive attitude toward RtoP. In joining the UNSC, 
the Vietnamese leadership placed a lot of emphasis on improving its image and 
status. In 2005, a MOFA research project stated that ―Vietnam‘s decision to bid 
for non-permanent membership in 2008-2009 was a major political decision in the 
country‘s process of integrating in the world community and improving its status 
in the international arena, and at the same time showing its determination to 
shoulder the burden with others in the world community.‖487 In other words, 
participation in the UNSC was expected to ―contribute to increasing Vietnam‘s 
credibility through showing the spirit of responsibility toward issue of 
international peace and security and the implementation of obligations of an 
international citizen.‖488 At the 2005 World Summit, Foreign Minister Nguyen Dy 
Nien announced Vietnam‘s decision to run for a non-permanent seat of the UN 
Security Council for the term 2008-2009 in order to ―make greater contribution to 
the work of the UN.‖489 
 
In 2007, Foreign Minister Pham Gia Khiem, in a review of the country‘s 
external relations, described the successful bid for a non-permanent seat in the 
UNSC as a remarkable achievement in the country‘s multilateral diplomacy, 
                                               
487 MOFA Department of International Organizations Research Project ―On the Role of the UNSC 
and Vietnam‘s Future Participation,‖ (2005), Introduction. 
488 Ibid., p. 92. 
489 ―Statement by H.E. Mr. Nguyen Dy Nien, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic 
of Vietnam to the 60th Session of the United Nations General Assembly,‖ the United Nations, 
September 21, 2005, http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/60/statements/viet050921eng.pdf. 
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reflecting Vietnam‘s credibility in the eyes of the world community.490 With that 
achievement, among others, the foreign minister expected that external relations 
in 2008 would further contribute to the country‘s increased role and status through 
the creative and proactive involvement in international institutions. With reference 
to the UNSC, it was recommended that Vietnam work to ―contribute in a 
responsible and effective manner for the Council to fulfil its mandate of 
maintaining international peace and security.‖491 
 
Showing the spirit of responsibility means having a view on every issue 
debated. Indeed, Vietnam‘s officials were sensitive to criticism that they have 
long expressed their positions in general terms.
492
 In particular, Vietnamese 
officials in New York found that they had to speak on peace and security 
concerning particular countries such as those in Africa where Vietnam had 
virtually no interests. They frequently had insufficient background information to 
quickly build a national position.
493
 As internal documents reveal, Vietnamese 
officials were especially sensitive about how others would respond to their 
statements and the way the country would vote on issues before the Council.
494
  
 
With regard to RtoP, Vietnamese officials took a position on all three 
pillars and publicly raised their concerns on some points. This was in marked 
contrast with the case of the ARF a decade before when state representatives were 
instructed to keep silent throughout the PD discussions and told only to speak if 
                                               
490 Phạm Gia Khiêm, "Đối ngoại Việt Nam năm 2007: Góp phần thiết thực cho sự nghiệp xây 
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required. On the contrary, concerns of image forced Vietnamese officials at the 
Security Council to raise their own voice. Speaking on their own helped state 
representatives to be seen as confident and up to the task at this global institution.  
 
In addition, acting in a responsible manner required making a concrete 
contribution to the work of the Council. In relation to RtoP, Vietnamese 
representatives - taking over the presidency of the Council in July 2008 and 
October 2009 - chose the protection of children and women in armed conflicts as 
a topic for discussion. They believed that this was an area where Vietnam could 
make a concrete contribution to the Council‘s debates, given the country‘s 
historical experiences during the wars and achievements recorded in the 
subsequent national reconstruction process.
495
 Further, internal documents show 
that choosing the topic of the protection of women during the month of October 
2009 arguably provided an opportunity to show Vietnam‘s policy towards 
women, achievements recorded and to ―stamp Vietnam‘s imprimatur before the 
end of the terms as a non-permanent member.‖ 496  
 
Addressing issues at the Council also required Vietnamese officials to take 
into consideration - as a guiding principle - the positions and interests of a wider 
group of participants, including powerful states, concerned states, regional states, 
and ASEAN members.
497
 Specifically, officials were instructed to actively 
coordinate their position with China, Russia, ASEAN members and members of 
the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) inside and outside the UNSC.
498
 Officials 
admitted in an interview that regular consultations were held with core NAM 
                                               
495 MOFA Department of International Organizations Memo, ―On Our Second Presidency of the 
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497 Ibid., p.6. 
498 MOFA Department of International Organizations Presentation at the 26th Diplomatic 
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members such as Cuba, India, Algeria, Indonesia, Egypt, South Africa and 
Brazil.
499
 Given the number of NAM members at the Council is always four at 
minimum and eight at maximum,
500
 and that like-minded states including China 
and Russia are always there, Vietnam‘s decisions primarily reflected the shared 
position of these reference groups.  
 
Vietnam‘s position on RtoP was no exception. Deputy permanent 
representative Bui The Giang told the debates on Ban Ki-moon‘s report in 2009 
that Vietnam ―associates itself with the statement made by the distinguished 
representative of Egypt on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.‖501 By this 
time, a majority of NAM members had endorsed RtoP, at least in principle.
502
 The 
strongest opponents in the group included Cuba and Sri Lanka, for instance. 
However, they constituted a distinct minority and individually they did not have 
much influence on Vietnam‘s foreign policy.503 China and the US, though initially 
RtoP opponents, also came to recognize RtoP.
504
  
 
In short, concerns over image and ―not rocking the boat‖ also help explain 
Vietnam‘s positive attitude towards RtoP in general. However, what is notable in 
the case of the UNSC is that there is no single critical moment that caused the 
                                               
499 Interviews by author in Hanoi, December 30, 2011; February 10, 2012.  
500 MOFA Department of International Organizations Research Project ―On Vietnam and the first 
non-permanent membership at the UNSC (2008-2009): Experiences and Lessons,‖ (2012), p. 49. 
501 ―Statement by H.E. Ambassador Bui The Giang, Deputy Permanent Representative of Viet 
Nam, at the General Assembly‘s Plenary Meeting on Responsibility to Protect (R2P),‖ Permanent 
Mission of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam to the United Nations, July 24, 2009, 
http://www.vietnam-un.org/en/vnun.php?id=151&cid=23. 
502 "Statement by H.E. Ambassador Maged A. Abdelaziz Permanent Representative of Egypt on 
Behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement on Report of the Secretary-General," the International 
Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, July 23, 2009, 
http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/NAM_Egypt_ENG(1).pdf. 
503 The most notable development in relation to the XI National Congress of the Communist Party 
of Vietnam held in 2011 was that the group of traditional friends, including Cuba, was removed 
from the final document of the Congress. 
504 On China and RtoP, see Liu Tiewa, ―China and Responsibility to Protect: Maintenance and 
Change of Its Policy for Intervention,‖ The Pacific Review 25, no. 1 (2012): 153-73.  
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sudden attitudinal change from opposing to supporting as happened in the two 
previous chapters.  
Mimicking as an explanation 
Mimicking is the act of copying the behaviour of others in a group. 
Johnston argues that mimicking is an efficient means for a novice to adapt to an 
uncertain environment. Put differently, it is a safe option for a novice in an 
uncertain environment to copy what all other members do, without knowing the 
costs and benefits of doing so. In the framework of international institutions 
where new participants are unfamiliar with the procedures, routines and language 
of interaction, mimicking involves the borrowing these procedures and routines 
and talking about the issues that are central to the institutions.  
 
Johnston also argues that for a state as a new participant in an institution, 
mimicking can lead to lock-in effects in the three following forms: (i) the 
development at the domestic level of specialized organizations to handle policy 
toward such institutions; (ii) the adoption on the part of state representatives of 
certain standard operating procedures such as working procedures, routines or 
modes of operation; and (iii) the acceptance on the part of those state 
representatives of the discursive practices of the institution such as forms of 
argument and articulation.
505
 
 
There is some evidence of mimicking on the part of the Vietnamese 
officials while at the UNSC and especially with regard to RtoP. Being novices in 
the working environment of the Security Council, Vietnamese officials had to 
follow others to participate in the deliberations and resolutions of RtoP situations. 
In particular, they participated in the resolutions of RtoP-related issues and started 
using the language of responsibility to protect without a clear understanding of the 
                                               
505 Johnston, Social States, chapter 2, 45-52. 
178 
 
concept. They also did not have clear preferences about RtoP as they did in the 
case of ASEAN and the ARF. However, what is notable is that through 
participation in these deliberations Vietnamese officials came to accept that 
having a say on issues debated at the Council, even those where Vietnam had 
virtually no interests, was a standard mode of operation. In addition, Vietnamese 
officials eventually dropped the cautious approach to RtoP that they initially 
pursued and adopted a more positive posture which latter paved the way for 
persuasion to occur, leading to the endorsement of RtoP as an emerging  norm.  
 
 Given noviceness is the key individual feature conducive to socialization, 
particularly mimicking, the following section looks at the characteristics of 
Vietnamese officials as genuine novices at the Security Council and how they 
adapted to this new working environment. For Vietnamese officials in New York, 
a lack of familiarity with the procedures, routines, and how to deal with the 
intensity and huge workload at the Security Council were considered significant 
challenges.
506
 Chairing the Council‘s meetings proved to be the most challenging 
task.
507
 The Vietnamese Permanent Representative Le Luong Minh confirmed that 
the most intense period and the most complicated issues that Vietnam had to deal 
with came in July 2008 during its first presidency.
508
 Assuming this position, the 
Vietnamese officials had to hold various consultations and prepare numerous 
documents such as speeches, statements of the President, and resolutions.
509
 
 
                                               
506 MOFA Department of International Organizations Research Project ―On the Role of the UNSC 
and Vietnam‘s Participation in the near Future,‖ (2005), pp. 93-4. 
507 MOFA Department of International Organizations Memo, ―Vietnam assumes the 2nd UN 
Security Council Presidency in October 2009,‖ no. 660-BC/BCSD-TCQT-m, dated September 16, 
2009, p.2. 
508 ―Interview with Ambassador Le Luong Minh by a Vietnam News Agency correspondent on 
Vietnam‘s activities during its Presidency,‖ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 25, 2012, 
http://www.mofahcm.gov.vn/vi/mofa/cs_doingoai/nr070523093001/ns080801135812. 
509 Ibid. In this month, about 40 meetings at the Ambassadorial level, including open and closed 
meetings, were held; six resolutions, three statements by the President and five press releases 
adopted. 
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In addition, the lack of background information and in-depth knowledge 
on the part of the Vietnamese officials of the issues debated at the Council was 
also a great concern.
510
 It was acknowledged in the 2005 MOFA research project 
that Vietnam had not yet built a diplomatic corps with working experience in 
multilateral settings and with specialized knowledge of the Security Council 
agenda items, such as regional issues in Africa, the Middle East, anti-terrorism 
and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
511
 Officials therefore had to 
carefully chart out a roadmap of participation, anticipate issues that could be 
discussed at the Council and prepare positions on each item so as to be able to 
deal with them in an effective manner when taking office.
512
 For example, six 
major issues were expected to be high on the Council‘s agenda in 2008, namely 
Myanmar, the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula, Iran, the Middle East, 
Kosovo and Darfur (Sudan).
513
 Unfortunately, the list did not end there. Reality 
showed that in 2008 Vietnam had to deal with other issues of a complicated nature 
that came unexpectedly such as Kenya, Zimbabwe, the Thai-Cambodia conflict, 
and the conflict in South Ossetia.
514
  
 
Thus in terms of capacity building, the two most important objectives for 
Vietnamese officials as novices were: (i) to master the working procedures and 
routines at the Council and (ii) to improve their knowledge of the agenda items. In 
this respect, Vietnam‘s decision to join the UNSC was described as an effort to 
                                               
510 MOFA Department of International Organizations Research Project ―On Vietnam and the first 
non-permanent membership at the UNSC (2008-2009): Experiences and Lessons,‖ (2012), p. 58. 
Vietnamese officials found the lack of background information and positions of the related parties 
on situations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia the most challenging for them to build a quick 
position. 
511 MOFA Department of International Organizations Research Project ―On the Role of the UNSC 
and Vietnam‘s Participation in the near Future,‖ (2005). Among others, a training programme on 
understanding the UNSC and improving capacity building for MOFA officials and those from 
concerned Ministries was developed and sponsored by the UNDP.  
512 The list included approximately 60 items, grouped into general and regional issues. 
513 MOFA Department of International Organizations Research Project ―On Vietnam and the first 
non-permanent membership at the UNSC (2008-2009): Experiences and Lessons,‖ (2012), p.65.  
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―jump into the high seas‖ to test the waters.515 In the same vein, Vietnam could 
not be aware of the specific benefits it might gain by joining the Council. Rather, 
it could only anticipate some. As mentioned in the previous section, the country‘s 
leadership saw an opportunity to improve Vietnam‘s international standing by 
joining the UNSC, among others.
516
  
 
The 2005 MOFA research provided some success stories that Vietnam 
could emulate. For example, Japan, Germany, Canada and India were identified as 
non-permanent members whose contribution to UN peace-keeping operations had 
helped project their influence. Specifically, their positions and preferences were 
taken into consideration when the Council decided how to use the resources for 
such activities. Similarly, Vietnam believed that if it considered contributing 
personnel to peace-keeping operations, not only would its voice be heard on the 
issue but it would also be in a more advantageous position in the decision-making 
process of the deployment, thus preventing the possible abuse of Vietnamese 
personnel for inappropriate purposes.
 
Another example was Morocco in its 1992-
1993 term. This non-permanent member had successfully projected its influence 
over the issue of Western Sahara at a time when the Polisario Front was unable to 
do so because its main ally Algeria was not a member of the Security Council. As 
a non-permanent member, Vietnam also hoped that it could exert some influence 
on regional issues.
 517
  
 
However, reality showed that Vietnam in 2008-2009 did not have much 
chance to apply these lessons so as to maximize its expected benefits. For 
example, Vietnam has not yet contributed personnel to peace-keeping missions 
                                               
515 Ibid. 
516 It was anticipated that participation in the UNSC would help improve Vietnam‘s credibility; 
advance the national positions; put it in a better bargaining position and strengthen bilateral 
relations with the P5. 
517 MOFA Department of International Organizations Research Project ―On the Role of the UNSC 
and Vietnam‘s Participation in the near Future,‖ (2005).  
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although there have been some positive signs of progress.
518
 Similarly, it was 
difficult to measure Vietnam‘s influence on regional issues. Although officials 
played an active role in the deliberations and resolution of regional issues such as 
Myanmar (its constitutional referendum and debate that followed Cyclone Nargis) 
or Thai-Cambodia clashes over the Preah Vihear Temple, these regional issues 
also put them in a more difficult situation, if not a dilemma, because the states 
concerned were all ASEAN members.  
 
The Vietnamese Permanent Representative Le Luong Minh confirmed in 
an interview that these two regional issues, together with Iran and Zimbabwe, 
were important and of considerable sensitivity during Vietnam‘s presidency in 
July 2008.
519
 In the case of Myanmar, pressure not only came from Western 
countries, but also from China as a traditional like-minded state. The Vietnamese 
saw signs on the part of the Chinese that they wanted to ―kick the ball‖ to 
Indonesia and Vietnam, pushing them to the forefront of the deliberations.
520
 On 
the Thai-Cambodia conflict, pressure came from Cambodia. Rather than 
supporting Cambodia‘s effort to bring the case to the Security Council, Vietnam 
argued that it was a legal issue, thus stressing the role of ASEAN as a mediator. 
As a consequence, the Cambodian delegation felt somewhat unhappy.
521
 In short, 
expected benefits turned out to be more difficult to achieve in reality.  
 
Vietnam‘s decision to go along with RtoP should also be examined against 
this backdrop. As the chronology shows, state representatives did not initially 
anticipate any concrete benefits that Vietnam could enjoy by going along with the 
                                               
518 ―Vietnam Prepare to Join UN Peace keeping Forces,‖ ThanhNien Online, November 17, 2012, 
http://www.thanhnien.com.vn. 
519 ―Interview by Ambassador Le Luong Minh with a Vietnam News Agency Correspondent on 
Vietnam‘s Activities during its Presidency of the Security Council,‖ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
accessed September 25, 2012, 
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520 MOFA Department of International Organizations Report ―On the UNSC‘s activities and 
Vietnam‘s Participation in April, 2008,‖ no. 554/BC-BNG-TCQT, dated May 21, 2008, p. 4. 
521 Interview by author in Hanoi, December 30, 2001. 
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norm. Rather, they saw potential implications for the state‘s sovereignty. 
Vietnamese officials took part in the deliberations and resolutions of RtoP-related 
issues but without a clear understanding of the concept. MOFA officials admitted 
in the interview that no research on RtoP had been done in the foreign ministry.
522
 
As a result, many officials assigned to work at the mission in 2008-2009 did not 
have a clear understanding of RtoP upon their arrival. 
 
However, since RtoP was directly invoked and covered in various items on 
the Council‘s agenda, state representatives could not avoid having a view. First, 
engaging in deliberations and resolutions of RtoP-related issues is an obligation of 
any member at the Security Council. Second, by engaging in these deliberations 
Vietnamese officials wanted to show that they were acting in a responsible 
manner. Third, since Vietnam had expressed a more positive attitude toward RtoP 
at the 2005 World Summit, state officials had to act in a manner consistent with 
that, rather than isolating themselves from the debates. So, in addition to the 
working requirement, Vietnam‘s participation in RtoP deliberations was also 
driven by image concerns. 
 
Therefore, some important points could be drawn from Vietnam‘s 
engagement in RtoP deliberations. First, this was strictly an act of mimicking: by 
taking part in RtoP deliberations - though without a clear understanding of the 
concept and the benefits of doing so - Vietnamese officials were trying to adapt to 
a new working environment and exposing themselves to a new issue. In addition, 
through participation in RtoP deliberations Vietnamese officials wanted to be seen 
by others as competent communicators. In this sense, mimicking on the part of 
Vietnamese officials was driven by image concerns. As such, it is a function of 
social influence.  
                                               
522 Interview by author in Hanoi, January 31, 2012. 
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Second, through their participation in the deliberations and resolutions of 
RtoP-related issues as well as other items on the Council‘s agenda, Vietnamese 
officials came to accept that having a say on issues debated at the Security 
Council was a standard mode of operation. Refraining from speaking, observing 
and hiding behind others as Vietnamese officials did at the ARF in 2001 thus 
became irrelevant at best and costly at worse, since priority was given to building 
a good image of Vietnam as a responsible Council member. This is exactly the 
lock-in effect of mimicking that Johnston points out: the acceptance on the part of 
novices of working procedures, routines or modes of operation of the group. 
 
Finally, engagement in the deliberations on RtoP and related issues 
facilitated a better understanding of the concept on the part of the Vietnamese 
officials. This then led to a shift from a defensive posture to a more active one on 
the issue. It should be noted that, given the lack of a clear understanding of the 
concept and the fear of negative implications, Vietnamese officials initially 
approached and used the language of RtoP with caution. For example, a 
Vietnamese representative - speaking at a Council meeting on protection of 
civilians in armed conflict in November 2007 - emphasized the seemingly 
inviolability of states‘ sovereignty by adding the phase “within its jurisdiction” to 
states‘ primary responsibility for the protection of their own peoples.523 That 
phrase was however dropped from subsequent statements in 2008-2009, as 
Vietnamese officials became more convinced that RtoP was less threatening and 
that states‘ sovereignty was fully protected. The statement delivered at the 
General Assembly Plenary Debate on RtoP in July 2009 was a clear example of 
this shift. The language in the statement was described by outsiders as 
                                               
523 The United Nations, ―Security Council‘s meeting on Protection of Civilians in Armed 
Conflict,‖ 20 November 2007, S/PV.5649 (Resumption 1), p. 21-22. Emphasis added. 
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―unexpectedly constructive.‖524 In this sense, mimicking helped facilitate 
persuasion.  
Conclusion 
This chapter argues that Vietnam changed its position from being opposed 
to becoming more engaged with RtoP, especially in 2008-2009, was because of 
socialization. An alternative explanation which argues that Vietnamese officials 
became more engaged with the RtoP was to gain material incentives offered by 
RtoP advocates or that they found themselves under great pressure or even threat 
if not supporting the norm was not plausible in this case study. Analysis 
throughout the chapter shows no sign of material side-payments that Vietnamese 
officials thought they could gain by adopting RtoP. The 2012 MOFA review of 
Vietnam‘s experiences and lessons after two years participating in the UNSC did 
not mention any material gains that Vietnam had expected for or achieved. 
Instead, it emphasized that Vietnam‘s participation in this global institution was 
another step to implement Vietnamese foreign policy and contributed to the 
consolidation of Vietnam‘s credibility and status in the international arena.525 In 
addition, Vietnamese officials at the Security Council were not under great 
pressure to go along with RtoP as they had been in the PD deliberations and 
negotiations for an ASEAN HRB either.  
 
In this chapter a combination of mimicking, social influence and 
persuasion, help explain the supportive position taken by Vietnamese officials. 
Social influence helps explain Vietnam‘s endorsement of RtoP in principle. And 
together with mimicking, it helps facilitate persuasion which led to an attitudinal 
                                               
524 ―Report on the General Assembly Plenary Debate on the Responsibility to Protect,‖ the 
International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, September 15, 2009, 
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICRtoP%20Report-
General_Assembly_Debate_on_the_Responsibility_to_Protect%20FINAL%209_22_09.pdf. 
525 MOFA Department of International Organizations Research Project on ―Vietnam and Its first 
non-permanent membership at the UNSC (2008-09): Experiences and Lessons,‖ (2012), p 56. 
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change among a small group of Vietnamese officials in a more direct way: having 
a better understanding of RtoP caused this group to see the concept as less 
threatening. They became more comfortable with it and this positive attitudinal 
change was reflected in various public statements.  
 
In terms of theory, the interactions between the three socialization 
processes in leading to Vietnam‘s endorsement of RtoP thus confirm Johnston‘s 
theory, particularly with regard to mimicking. Mimicking in this chapter is both 
condition for and an effect of persuasion and social influence. This is exactly what 
Johnston has argued.
526
 In addition, the empirical findings in this chapter show 
that socialization in the truest sense - internalization of new norms through 
persuasion - can occur and perhaps more notably can even occur in the UNSC 
which was initially chosen as a ‗least-likely‘ case because of its institutional 
features. The findings raise questions about the link between persuasion and 
particular institutional designs asserted in Johnston‘s work. Some institutional 
features supposedly conducive to socialization processes - the size of the group, 
for instance - did not seem to matter much. Contrary to what theory might expect, 
persuasion occurred in the UNSC‘s deliberations even when these involved a 
large group of participants.  
 
How durable is this new positive attitude toward RtoP? This is an 
important question because Johnston argues that persuasion is a micro-process 
that leads to the most durable and self-reinforcing pro-norm behaviour. If the 
frequency of references to RtoP can be considered a measurement of a positive 
attitude, his argument could be challenged. By this measure Vietnam‘s support for 
RtoP in New York might even be seen as a deceptive effort. For example, when 
the use of force on RtoP grounds was endorsed in Libya in 2011, Vietnam did not 
raise its voice. A senior official said in an interview that since Vietnam was no 
                                               
526 Johnston, Social States, 24. 
186 
 
longer a non-permanent member, it would be unwise for Vietnam to publicly 
support or oppose any concerned parties in the conflict.
527
 However, on the 
occasion of the 16
th
 session of the Human Rights Council on February 28, 2011 
Deputy Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh said that Vietnam and some other 
states such as Russia and Cuba did not support the use of force to intervene in 
Libya.
528
 He also stressed that any international action should be based on 
consensus.  
 
As internal documents reveal, Vietnam was concerned about the growing 
trend of major powers using force against weak states: Yugoslavia (1999), Iraq 
(2003), Georgia (2008), and Libya (2011).
529
 In the Vietnamese perspective, the 
use of force in the Libya case - albeit authorized by the UNSC - was an act of 
intervention in a sovereign state in the name of humanitarian intervention to 
support a rebel group and achieve regime change. This could create a dangerous 
precedent for international relations and pose great challenges for other sovereign 
states facing political upheavals that might lead to conflict.
530
 The situation in 
Libya and across North Africa in 2011 was studied through the lens of the 
struggle among powers in which the United States and other Western countries on 
one side increased their intervention activities and China and Russia on the other 
side proposed non-intervention.
531
 A senior Vietnamese diplomat also admitted in 
an interview that internal debates within MOFA on Libya and other African 
                                               
527 Interview by author in Hanoi, March 26, 2013. 
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countries in 2010-2011 focused more on the implications for international 
relations in general, than on RtoP.
532
  
 
  Despite this, Vietnam‘s failure to support the use of force in Libya should 
not be seen as a step back in its support for RtoP. Vietnam has not yet endorsed 
the use of force as one of the collective actions taken by the international 
community on RtoP grounds. Similarly, just because there was less talk about 
RtoP should not be seen as conclusive evidence of deception. As David Capie 
observes, representatives of Southeast Asian governments appear less interested in 
RtoP in Southeast Asia than when they were in New York.
533
 However, 
Vietnam‘s relative silence at the regional level is mainly due to bureaucratic 
factors: those who spoke in New York did not always speak in regional 
institutions such as ASEAN or the ARF.  
 
In addition, the fact remains that even within MOFA there has not been a 
single consistent position on RtoP. For example, there was no reference to RtoP in 
the internal documents prepared by the Department in charge of African Affairs 
on the Libya case when the use of force was authorized on RtoP grounds. Thus 
except for those who have worked in the UN in 2008-2009, there is still a lack of 
understanding on RtoP among officials in Hanoi. In the most recent review of 
Vietnam‘s integration process, the lack of a consistent position on similar issues 
raised at different fora such as democracy, human rights, and religious freedom, 
was seen an weakness which reflected a lack of coordination among MOFA 
departments and that needed to be properly addressed.
534
 Therefore, it would be 
fair to argue that Vietnam‘s positive attitude toward RtoP while at the UNSC was 
wholly situational.  
                                               
532 Interview by author in Hanoi, February 21, 2012. 
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534 MOFA Foreign Policy Department, ―Overview Report on the Ministry-level Research Project 
on International Integration toward the Implementation of the Foreign Policy Orientation adopted 
at the XIth National Congress of the CPV,‖ (2012), p.25.  
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Vietnam‘s positive change in attitude toward RtoP as a result of 
persuasion should therefore not be exaggerated. Attitudinal change was observed 
on a small group of Vietnamese officials who were directly involved in the 
Council‘s work in 2008-2009. There was even a range of views among those 
officials who found RtoP less threatening. A diplomat who once said that he no 
longer saw RtoP as humanitarian intervention admitted in the interview that they 
had to deal with RtoP on a case-by-case basis and RtoP implementation was in 
reality still a political struggle.
535
 Further, while almost all officials interviewed 
acknowledged the moral significance of RtoP, they said they became somewhat 
more conservative after the Libya case and concerned about the trend of ―double 
standards‖ in RtoP implementation.536 And in the most recent review of 
Vietnam‘s participation in the Security Council in 2008-2009, democracy, human 
rights, institutional reforms and RtoP are seen as controversial issues that Vietnam 
should be well-prepared to respond to if there are attempts by Western 
governments to put them high on the Council‘s agenda. This, it was noted, would 
be especially important if Vietnam wants to bid for another term as a non-
permanent member.
537
  
                                               
535 At the UN, as Vietnamese officials observed many developing countries still oppose invoking 
RtoP in particular situations. The struggle between those support and those oppose will therefore 
continue, especially when no consensus was reached at the debate on Ban Ki-moon‘s report on the 
implementation of RtoP held in 2009. 
536 Interview by author in Hanoi, March and April 2013. 
537 MOFA Department of International Organizations Research Project ―On Vietnam and the first 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
This thesis has explored Vietnam‘s involvement in three important 
international institutions, namely the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the 
ASEAN Regional Forum and the United Nations Security Council. It has used 
socialization theory to investigate how participation in these social environments 
has changed Vietnam‘s behaviour and preferences on some key political and 
security issues, including human rights, preventive diplomacy and the 
responsibility to protect. This final chapter provides a brief summary of the main 
empirical findings. It then reflects on the implications for socialization theory and 
for future research.   
Empirical findings 
The main empirical finding in the thesis is that there is evidence of 
socialization occurring across three distinct case-studies, eliciting pro-norm 
behaviour on the part of the Vietnamese officials, though to varying degrees. In 
chapter four, persuasion did not work to elicit Vietnam‘s cooperation on the 
creation of the ASEAN Human Rights Body. On the contrary, social influence 
occurred, providing a more plausible explanation for Vietnam‘s endorsement of 
the initiative: the decision was made primarily because of peer pressure and 
pressure resulting from membership. Vietnamese officials found themselves in the 
minority and image concerns of wanting to appear to be a responsible member of 
ASEAN prevented them from blocking the process toward the creation of such a 
mechanism.  
The climax of the negotiations on the HRB came at the eighth meeting of 
the ASEAN HLTF where the ten participants were divided into two groups: those 
from older ASEAN members supported the immediate creation of the HRB and 
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those from newer members, namely Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam 
were reluctant. Unable to arrive at a consensus, the HLTF participants referred the 
issue to their Foreign Ministers for a decision. The critical moment came at the 
second meeting of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers when Deputy Foreign Minister 
Le Cong Phung finally announced Vietnam‘s decision to go along with the HRB 
initiative, although this was conditioned upon the completion of the TOR and 
ensuring the HRB would only have consultative status. ASEAN Secretary-
General Ong Keng Yong confirmed that Phung‘s announcement had settled the 
controversy and consensus was finally reached on the creation of the HRB.  
The decision to support the HRB was made in a situation where Vietnam 
found itself in an uncomfortable minority. According to a Vietnamese senior 
official, even the like-minded states, Laos and Myanmar, finally came to agree 
with the initiative. Other officials noted that Vietnam did not want to be seen as 
blocking the process and worried that, especially in the context of ASEAN 
Community building, opposing the creation of the HRB might negatively affect 
the country‘s credibility and status in ASEAN. 
The endorsement of the HRB demonstrates a change in Vietnam‘s 
preferences whereby it broke the taboo of avoiding intra-regional discussions on 
human rights issues. Notably, this preference change took place in a context 
where no concrete material side payments or threats of sanctions were present. 
There was no evidence that the activist group of states had offered material 
rewards in exchange for support from the reluctant ones. Their pressure 
throughout the negotiations did not constitute a threat, either. There was also no 
sign of any attempts by Western governments to intervene in the work of the Task 
Force so as to influence the progress on the HRB negotiations, even though 
human rights issues have long been an obstacle in bilateral relationships between 
individual ASEAN members - and the Association as a whole - and the West. 
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In chapter five, persuasion did not work to change Vietnam‘s position 
from opposing to supporting the adoption of the Preventive Diplomacy Papers at 
the 8
th
 ARF in 2001. Rather, social influence occurred and led to the acceptance of 
the PD papers on the part of Vietnamese officials. Choosing China as a behaviour 
exemplar, the Vietnamese participants in the chairmanship of the ARF had no 
choice but to follow their Chinese counterparts when the latter suddenly changed 
its position and supported the adoption of PD Papers as a part of the agenda. In 
this sense, Vietnam‘s decision to adopt the PD papers was an act of mimicking. 
However, such an act of mimicking came about as a result of social influence. As 
such, it is not mimicking in strict sense as Johnston suggests that is to survive in a 
novel environment.  
Vietnam‘s decision was made at the ARF SOM in May 2001 in which the 
agenda for the 8
th
 ARF was considered and there was no evidence that the activist 
group of states had offered material rewards in exchange for support from the 
reluctant ones. Similar to the situation in the negotiations on the HRB, peer 
pressure and pressure resulting from being the Chair of the ARF played the key 
role in eliciting Vietnam's changed behaviour. Prior to this ARF SOM, differences 
remained between the two opposing groups - with Japan, the US, Australia and 
Singapore in the activist group and China, Russia, India, Vietnam and almost all 
ASEAN members in the reluctant one - on whether or not to adopt PD papers. 
Vietnamese participants did not anticipate a consensus between the two groups as 
likely given what they perceived as the hardened attitudes on the part of China, 
Russia and India. They believed the Chinese were still cautious and resolutely 
opposed to moving the ARF onto the PD phase. In that context, Vietnamese 
participants felt somewhat safe to pursue a strategy of slowing down the ARF‘s 
transition from confidence building measures to preventive diplomacy.   
However, as a senior Vietnamese official noted, at the May 2001 SOM the 
Chinese suddenly changed their position from opposing to supporting the 
adoption of these PD documents, thus generating consensus among major powers 
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to settle the debate. Vietnam‘s efforts to delay the adoption of the PD papers 
failed as a result. Since the role of ASEAN was limited to taking an 
accommodation position vis-à-vis the preferences of major powers, Vietnam as 
the ARF Chair had to follow the major powers and adopt the three papers as a part 
of the 8
th
 ARF agenda. However, the decision did not automatically lead to a 
change in preferences and Vietnamese officials in subsequent ARF meetings still 
sought ways to slow down the Forum‘s transition from confidence building to 
preventive diplomacy and prevented its institutionalization. 
Chapter six showed how the three socialization processes interacted to 
generate Vietnam‘s endorsement of RtoP as an emerging norm. Unlike the two 
previous chapters where social influence exerted direct effects on Vietnam‘s 
decisions to go along with the HRB and the adoption of PD papers, social 
influence in this chapter helped explain Vietnam‘s support for RtoP in principle. 
There was no critical moment that forced Vietnamese officials to change their 
position from opposing to supporting RtoP. Rather, image concerns and a desire 
‗not to rock the boat‖ had two indirect influences.  First, having a view on RtoP - 
expressing support or concern - was required to show the spirit of responsibility as 
a non-permanent member of the Security Council, thus avoiding the criticism that 
Vietnam has long expressed positions only in general terms. Second, in the period 
2008-2009 Vietnam found it hard to oppose RtoP because it had been 
acknowledged and endorsed, albeit to varying degrees, by the majority of UN 
members. In addition, after Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Dy Nien had 
expressed a more positive attitude toward the concept at the 2005 World Summit, 
continued support for RtoP was needed to demonstrate that Vietnam was acting 
consistently. 
Chapter six also showed how mimicking sheds light on Vietnam‘s 
engagement in RtoP deliberations as an effort to adapt to the new working 
environment at the UNSC. Vietnamese officials engaged in RtoP deliberations 
and used its language even without having a clear understanding of the concept 
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and despite concerns about possible external intervention in Vietnam on RtoP 
grounds. What is also notable is that mimicking, together with social influence, 
helped facilitate persuasion which led to attitudinal change among a small group 
of Vietnamese officials in a more direct way. Accepting RtoP in principle and 
participating in RtoP deliberations - initially driven by the desire to be seen as a 
responsible member and competent communicator and to enrich knowledge on the 
part of the state representatives so as to be capable in the resolutions of RtoP 
related issues - gradually led to new understanding of RtoP as a less threatening 
concept. In addition, through ―learning by doing‖ - direct involvement in the 
resolution of possible RtoP situations at the UNSC - Vietnamese officials became 
more convinced of RtoP‘s appropriateness. A group of Vietnamese officials in 
New York acknowledged the humanitarian aspect of RtoP and its necessity in 
today‘s world and came to accept that Vietnam could not isolate itself from the 
trends of the times.  
Empirical findings and alternative explanations for Vietnam's behavioural 
change 
While Vietnam's changed attitude toward endorsing RtoP as a new norm at 
the UNSC confirms Johnston's argument of truest socialization through 
persuasion, its changed behaviour to conform to groups' positions in ASEAN on 
the creation of the HRB and in the ARF on the adoption of the PD papers does not 
mean norm internalization on the part of Vietnam. As was shown in chapter four 
and five, Vietnam continued to press for the completion of the TOR before the 
establishment of the HRB and sought ways to slow down PD process in 
subsequent ARF's meetings. As such, one can argue that empirical findings in 
these two chapters support neo-liberal perspective on the role of international 
institutions in facilitating cooperation among states. Neo-liberals argue that states 
have fixed material interests before engaging with others and that international 
institutions are created to facilitate the convergence and pursuit of these material 
interests. Therefore, the two above decisions made by Vietnam can be seen, in the 
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light of neo-liberal arguments, as a reflection of common interests or in the pursuit 
of possible material side-payments.  
There are two problems with neo-liberal explanation regarding Vietnam's 
decisions to support the creation of the HRB and the adoption of PD papers. First, 
Vietnam's conformity with groups' positions in these two case-studies is not an 
evidence of convergence of interests as neo-liberals claim. The creation of an 
ASEAN HRB and the adoption of PD papers were not in Vietnam's interests. That 
was why Vietnam had sought way to slow down the two processes.  
Second, and more importantly the two decisions were made in situations in 
which there was no presence of material side-payments. In chapter four there was 
no evidence that the activist members, individually or collectively, offered 
Vietnam any material reward in exchange for its support for the creation of the 
HRB. The same situation can also be observed in chapter five on PD. There was 
no evidence that the ARF's activist members such as Japan and the US had placed 
progress on political and security area as a conditionality for deepening biliateral 
economic and trade cooperation with Vietnam. Therefore, neo-liberalism cannot 
provide a plausible explanation for Vietnam's changed behaviour, supporting for 
the creation of an ASEAN HRB and the adoption of PD papers in the ARF. 
Empirical findings and Vietnam's foreign policy behaviour 
In terms of foreign policy behaviour, the above empirical findings show 
the slow but increasingly positive and substantive changes in Vietnam‘s foreign 
policy toward cooperation inside international institutions throughout the first 
decade of the 21st century. A foreign policy based on diversifying and 
multilateralizing the country‘s external relations, and reflected in an increased 
involvement in international institutions, has gradually transformed the way 
Vietnam sees itself and others. In the early years of this process, as was shown in 
chapter five on Vietnam‘s participation in the ARF, ideological differences 
embedded in the concepts of friends and foes were the key factor that prevented 
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Vietnam from developing closer political and security cooperation. As a result, 
the 2001 decision to adopt the Preventive Diplomacy documents did not 
necessarily mean a change in preferences whereby Vietnam supported the ARF‘s 
embarkment on its second stage of development. Rather, Vietnam subsequently 
continued to find ways to try to slow down that process.  
However, in 2003 the concepts of friends and foes were replaced with 
partners and objects of struggle. With the adoption of the Resolution of the 8th 
Plenum of the Party Central Committee (the IXth tenure) which entitled Strategic 
Orientations of National Defence in the New Situation. The document reads:  
- Those who respect the independence and sovereignty and desire to 
establish and expand friendly, equally and mutually beneficial relations 
with Vietnam, should all be our partners. 
- Any forces planning or carrying out hostile activities against our 
objectives in the cause of national construction and defence of the 
Fatherland should all be objects of struggle. 
- However, given the rapidly evolving and complicated current situation, it 
is necessary to adopt a dialectical perspective: in each object of struggle 
there are aspects we still need to win support and cooperation; in some 
partners, there could be some aspects that are different from and 
contradictory to our interests.
538
 
 
This new approach provided a greater flexibility and more space for 
expanding and deepening cooperation with those Vietnam had been reluctant to 
engage with in the past. As a senior official said in an interview, the visit by 
Vietnamese Defence Minister Pham Van Tra to the United States in November 
2003 was a demonstration of this new approach and it marked a new turn in US-
Vietnam relations.
539
 In the ASEAN context, Vietnam softened its tone regarding 
the struggle aspect of the relationship. The language that distinguished old and 
                                               
538 Unofficial translation, quoted in Nguyen Nam Duong, ―Vietnamese Foreign Policy since Doi 
Moi: The Dialectic of Power and Identity‖ (PhD thesis, University of New South Wales, Australia, 
2010), 151. 
539 Interview by author in Hanoi, March 25, 2013. On Vietnam-US relations in 2003, see  Nguyen 
Manh Hung, ―Vietnam: Facing the Challenge of Integration,‖ Southeast Asian Affairs (2004): 297-
311.  
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new ASEAN members, stressing ―us-them‖ differences was dropped. Instead, 
Vietnam now repeatedly claims to be a responsible member of ASEAN.
540
 
Indeed, Vietnam has been determined to transform itself from a member with a 
modest role to a ―proactive and responsible member, playing the leading role in 
issue areas where it has core interests and competitive advantages.‖541 
Specifically, the new orientation in Vietnam‘s participation in ASEAN is to 
―proactively participate in the work of institutional building and improving 
decision-making procedures, especially setting up ‗rules of the game‘ within the 
Organization.‖542 This proactive posture is recommended to ―be upheld in even a 
number of sensitive issue areas such as democracy, human rights, religion, 
national defence and security with a view to protecting our core national interests 
and that of ASEAN as a whole.‖543  
 
Shifting from ―being a new ASEAN member‖ to ―being a proactive and 
responsible member of ASEAN‖ is not simply a change in language. Rather, it 
reflects a transformation in the way Vietnam sees itself. Being a new ASEAN 
member implies at least two things: first, it is to state that differences, in political 
system and level of development for instance, have been obstacles in the process 
of deepening ASEAN cooperation; second, in such a position Vietnam could only 
make contributions to the group within its (normally perceived as limited) 
capabilities and in its interests. Although differences still remain,
544
 proclaiming 
itself as ―a proactive and responsible member‖ implies an increased sense of 
belonging and a higher level of identification with ASEAN. In this sense, the 
decision to go along with the ASEAN HRB in 2007, albeit reluctantly, is a 
                                               
540 ―Phát biểu của Thủ tướng Nguyễn Tấn Dũng nhân ngày ASEAN‖ [Speech by Prime Minister 
Nguyen Tan Dzung on the ASEAN Day] Thế giới và Việt Nam, August 7, 2012, 
http://tgvn.com.vn/Item/VN/ChinhTri/2012/8/9A8441E6138B7A5E/. 
541 MOFA ASEAN Department Research ―On the Prospects of ASEAN in the first two decades of 
the 21st century: Impacts and Vietnam‘s Strategy,‖ (2008), p. 96. 
542 Ibid. 
543 Ibid. 
544 MOFA ASEAN Department ―Documents prepared for the 27th Diplomatic Conference,‖ no. 
858, dated December 2, 2011. 
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manifestation of the effort on the part of the Vietnamese officials to act 
consistently with this new image.  
 
The spirit of Vietnam as an active and responsible member of the world 
community can be best seen in 2008-2009 when it was a non-permanent member 
at the UNSC and in 2010 when it held the Chair of ASEAN.
545
 At the UNSC, 
Vietnamese officials showed that they gained a better understanding of the 
salience of specific issues for other member states and took into consideration 
their perceptions and preferences in the decision-making process. As Chair of 
ASEAN in 2010, Vietnam made concrete efforts to contribute to the building of 
ASEAN Community, most notably through its proposal of the Master Plan of 
ASEAN Connectivity adopted at the 17
th
 ASEAN Summit.
546
 
Implications for socialization theory 
In terms of theory, the empirical findings in the thesis confirm the 
plausibility of socialization as a source of cooperative behaviour among state 
agents within social environments. Socialization in the truest sense - 
internalization of new norms through persuasion - is empirically conceivable as in 
the case of the UNSC. However, it should also be noted that socialization is not 
the only most plausible explanation for Vietnam‘s cooperative behaviour in the 
three case-studies. As was shown in the case of the UNSC, along with persuasion, 
learning as an independent variable also played an important part in eliciting 
attitudinal change on the part of the Vietnamese officials toward RtoP. Persuasion 
and learning mutually reinforced one another, leading to a new understanding of 
RtoP among Vietnamese officials. 
                                               
545 Phạm Gia Khiêm, ―Ngoại giao Việt Nam năm 2008 và định hướng năm 2009‖ [Foreign affairs 
of Vietnam in 2008 and orientation in 2009], Tạp chí Cộng sản 796 (2009): 14-19; Phạm Gia 
Khiêm, "Việt Nam và nhiệm kỳ chủ tịch ASEAN 2010: Thành tựu của ASEAN và dấu ấn Việt 
Nam‖ [Vietnam as ASEAN Chair in 2010: Achievements of ASEAN and the Vietnamese imprint], 
Tạp chí Cộng sản  818 (2010): 8-15.  
546 ―Master Plan of ASEAN Connectivity,‖ ASEAN, December 2010, 
http://www.asean.org/archive/documents/MPAC.pdf. 
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Further, given the fact that Vietnamese officials entered the deliberations 
with a pre-existing preference of ―not being in the minority‖ there are both 
rationalist and social elements in Vietnam‘s decisions to support the norms under 
examination. As a working rule, ―not being in the minority‖ helps facilitate the 
effects of social influence. Indeed, as we saw the micro-process of social 
influence worked across all three case-studies. However, the fact that social 
influence happened in all three case-studies may lead to the claim that rationalism, 
rather than socialization, prevails in Vietnam's story. That means Vietnam 
conforms to groups' positions and norms for rational reasons. One can even go 
further arguing that social influence thus undermines the explanatory power of 
socialization theory. 
This argument is not persuasive, however. In fact, rationalism in the case 
of Vietnam totally fits with what Johnston defines as "social thin rationalism"
 
and 
that is in contrast with "material thin rationalism."
547
 The concept of "thin 
rationalism" used by Zurn and Checkel in their studies of socialization in Europe 
refers to "the intentional version of rationalist theory, which argues that agents act 
on the basis of beliefs and preferences."
548
 By adding "social" to "thin 
rationalism," Johnston wants to emphasize the sociality of rationalist calculus 
made by an actor in institutional environments. He argues, "when one speaks of 
'normative pressure' in IR, one is talking about conformity for rational reasons but 
under conditions that are entirely 'social.'" In Johnston‘s view, this sociality comes 
in two forms: (i) the actor‘s desire to maximize social status and (ii) a certain 
degree of its loyalty to the group. "Material thin rationalism" in contrast with 
"social thin materialism" would therefore refer to conformity under conditions 
that are entirely "material." Put differently, an actor would conform to a group's 
                                               
547 Johnston, "Conclusion and Extensions: Toward Mid-Range Theorizing and beyond Europe," 
1030-31. 
548 Michael Zurn and Jeffrey T. Checkel, "Getting Socialized to Build Bridges: Constructivism and 
Rationalism, Europe and the Nation-State," International Organizations 59, no. 4 (2005), 1058. 
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norms in order to maximize material benefits and that this actor could easily shift 
its loyalty from one group to another.  
So what are the social aspects of Vietnam‘s rational decisions? First, 
Vietnam's decisions to support for the creation of the HRB, the adoption of PD 
papers and its endorsement of RtoP can be seen as consequentialist choices: 
Vietnamese officials came to support groups' positions and associated norms 
because they did not want to be in the minority.  However, these choices were 
made to achieve social rather than material goals: to build a good image of 
Vietnam as a responsible member of the groups. More importantly, such a desire 
for social status (public recognition) can only be achieved at multilateral settings 
(rather than in bilateral relationships) in which the larger the membership, the 
wider the public recognition that Vietnam could expect for. 
 Second, by supporting groups' positions and associated norms Vietnam 
was showing its loyalty to the institutions it joined which, as Johnston argues, 
rooted in its increased awareness of its obligations as a member of these 
groups:
549
 As a member of the ASEAN family, Vietnam was aware that it should 
not block the process of establishing a human rights mechanism; as the ARF 
Chair, Vietnam was aware of its responsibility to facilitate and make concrete 
progress for the Forum to embark on a new stage of development; and at the 
UNSC, Vietnam was aware of its obligations as a non-permanent member, 
making concrete contributions to the maintenance of international peace and 
security.  
In short, in the case of Vietnam rationalist and social factors worked 
together to provide more insights into the process that led Vietnam to change its 
behaviour toward more cooperative. In this sense, rationalist and social factors are 
complementary, rather than incompatible. This finding thus contributes to the call 
for building bridges between constructivism and rationalism - rather than focusing 
                                               
549 Johnston, "Conclusion and Extensions," 1031. 
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on the competitive aspects of rationalist-constructivist debate - by making efforts 
on "the search for complementarities."
550
 
Another implication for theory concerns the purported importance of 
institutional design. While Johnston argues that socialization is more likely to 
happen in informal, weakly institutionalized and consensus-based institutions 
such as ASEAN and the ARF, the case of Vietnam shows that socialization also 
works in a strongly institutionalized institution such as the UNSC which was 
initially chosen as a ―least-likely‖ case. Moreover, the findings here suggest some 
institutional features arguably conducive to socialization processes are not as 
important as Johnston suggests. For example, the size of the group did not seem to 
matter much. Contrary to theory, persuasion occurred in the UNSC‘s deliberations 
involving a large group of participants. Meanwhile, social influence happened in 
ASEAN deliberations with a smaller group of participants. Similarly, the effects 
of formal working rules such as deliberation and consensus - arguably conducive 
to persuasion - were also limited. Johnston suggests an institution with a 
deliberative mandate and consensus as its decision-making rule should help create 
a working environment that gives participants some degree of free choice and 
facilitates flexible cognition when assessing counter-arguments. However, as was 
shown in chapters four and five, as long as Vietnamese officials did not trust the 
persuaders, the nature of deliberation or consensus based decision-making did not 
help make their arguments persuasive. 
Empirical findings in the Vietnam case also suggest that an agent‘s 
noviceness as a condition for socialization needs to be further studied. Even 
though the Vietnamese participants were genuine novices in PD and RtoP 
deliberations, noviceness at different points of time and contexts seems to embody 
different attributes and thus can facilitate socialization to different degrees. In 
other words, noviceness is contextual. The main similarity between Vietnamese 
                                               
550 Zurn and Checkel, "Getting Socialized to Build Bridges,"1047. 
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officials as novices at the ARF in 2001 and those at the UNSC in 2008-2009 is 
that they all entered the deliberations with concerns about external intervention: 
preventive diplomacy, human rights and the RtoP all challenged Vietnam‘s long-
upheld norms of sovereignty and non-interference; supporting these norms 
required relaxation of traditional understanding of the two fundamental principles 
guiding state behaviour.  
The main differences between them are on the level of independence in 
relation to their principals and openness to new information or issues. Although it 
seems that Vietnamese officials in New York did not enjoy much autonomy 
because they had to follow the strict reporting and coordinating rules and fixed 
guiding principles of conducting activities at the UNSC, they were actually in a 
more advantageous position in providing policy recommendations because no one 
else had a better understanding of the debates at the UNSC than they did. 
Therefore, almost all decisions on how Vietnam should vote at the Council were 
based on reports and recommendations from the mission in New York. In 
contrast, any steps that Vietnamese officials could take during ARF deliberations 
required instructions from MOFA leaders at home.  
Vietnamese officials in New York were also more open to the new 
environment and issues at the UNSC. On the one hand, openness reflects the pro-
active posture on the part of the Vietnamese officials which is primarily driven by 
image concerns as shown in chapter six. On the other hand, openness is required 
by learning. A lack of understanding about RtoP forced the Vietnamese officials 
in New York to learn more about it as a concept so as to be capable of 
participating in the discussions and resolutions of RtoP-related issues. In addition, 
learning by doing whereby Vietnamese officials were directly involved in the 
resolution of RtoP situations like Sierra Leone provided them with more evidence 
of the necessity of RtoP‘s implementation. As a result, a new understanding of 
RtoP as a less threatening concept was developed and the moral significance 
embodied was recognized.  
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Learning is, therefore, an attribute of noviceness and an independent 
causal mechanism. As a mechanism, learning in the Vietnam case should be 
understood as a process through which the Vietnamese officials used new 
information gaining from deliberations and discussions to update their beliefs and 
to devise actions that were consistent with those new beliefs.
551
 As was shown in 
chapter six, Vietnamese officials entered the RtoP deliberations and discussions 
without a clear understanding of the concept or prior preferences. Rather, 
engaging in deliberations helped state officials build the country‘s position on the 
issue. 
Beyond 2010: The new strategy of international integration  
The XI National Congress of the CPV in 2011 marked a new turn in 
Vietnam‘s integration process: the objectives and guidelines for the country‘s 
integration adopted at the X National Congress in 2006 - “proactively and 
actively engage in international economic integration while expanding 
international cooperation in other fields” - was transformed into “proactively and 
actively engage in international integration.”552 Vietnam is now determined to 
pursue a more comprehensive integration strategy that will not be limited to 
economics and trade, but which will also include security, national defence, social 
and cultural policy.
553
 Internal debates after the XI National Congress of the CPV 
                                               
551 Learning also occurred when Vietnam prepared to join ASEAN in the early 1990s. Through 
interactions Vietnam found many similarities with ASEAN countries that enabled Vietnam-
ASEAN cooperation which eventually led to the decision to join ASEAN. See Nguyen Vu Tung, 
―Vietnam‘s Membership in ASEAN: A Constructivist Interpretation,‖ Contemporary Southeast 
Asia 29, no. 3 (2007): 483-505. 
552 ―Documents of the eleventh Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam,‖ the Communist 
Party of Vietnam, 2011, 
http://chinhphu.vn/portal/page/portal/chinhphu/NuocCHXHCNVietNam/ThongTinTongHop/noid
ungvankiendaihoidang?categoryId=10000716&articleId=10038382. (Emphasis added). 
553 See Phạm Gia Khiêm, "Thực hiện chiến lược ngoại giao toàn diện hướng tới thực hiện thành 
công định hướng đối ngoại của Đại hội XI‖ [Carrying out the Strategy of Comprehensive 
Diplomacy toward the Successful Implementation of Foreign Policy Orientation of the XI 
Congress of the CPV], in Định hướng Chính sách Đối ngoại Việt Nam trong giai đoạn mới 
[Vietnam‘s foreign policy orientation in the new period], ed. Phạm Bình Minh (Hanoi: Nhà Xuất 
bản Chính trị Quốc gia, 2011), 7-59.    
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have focused on reviewing the country‘s integration process over the past decades 
and exploring foundations and substance of integration in security and national 
defence, social and culture up to the year 2020.
554
 The theory and practice of 
international integration, especially in political, security and defence areas, have 
been explored and incorporated into a new Politburo Resolution on international 
integration.
555
  
Against this background, future research on how socialization has 
redefined Vietnam‘s interests and behaviour should continue to focus on high 
politics issues, particularly in the fields of security and defence which have long 
been the most sensitive and closed areas of cooperation. Conducting new 
investigations on how far Vietnam could go as a result of socialization - in 
addition to the adoption and internalization of norms - in security and defence 
cooperation is of great significance and relevance for the following reasons: 
First, and in relation to the protection of national security and defence, 
Documents of the XI National Congress of the CPV for the first time clarify that 
the security aspect in the task of external relations activities is to ―firmly protect 
independence, sovereignty, unification and territorial integrity.‖556 This new 
development reflects the increased concerns and awareness of threats to national 
security among policy-makers in Hanoi prior to and during the preparations for 
                                               
554 MOFA Foreign Policy Department Research Project ―On Exploring Foundations of the 
Vietnamese Diplomacy in the early Decades of the 21st Century,‖ (2011); The Diplomatic 
Academy of Vietnam in May 2012 organized three workshops on international integration. The 
first workshop was on ―Concepts, Substance, Objectives, and Guidelines on Vietnam‘s 
International Integration up to 2020,‖ the second on ―A comprehensive Review of Vietnam‘s 
International Integration over the past years,‖ and the third on ―International Integration: 
Orientations and Tasks on Integration in Security and National Defence, Social and Culture to the 
year 2020.‖  
555 ―The Politburo Resolution no. 22-NQ/TW on International Integration,‖ dated April 10, 2013, 
http://www.mofahcm.gov.vn/mofa/bng_vietnam/nr080212094156/ns130709211917. More than 
one decade ago, on November 27, 2001the Politburo issued the Resolution on International 
Economic Integration, no. 07-NQ/TW. 
556 The main tasks as identified in the previous Documents and restated in the XI Documents 
consist of solid preservation of a peaceful environment  which is conducive to the acceleration of 
national industrialization and modernization; and actively contributing to the common struggle of 
the world people for peace, national independence, democracy and social progress. 
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the XI National Congress. Indeed, since 2007 territorial disputes in the East Sea 
(South China Sea) have become salient in Vietnam‘s external relations. The 2009 
White Paper on National Defence by the Ministry of Defence specified threats to 
Vietnam‘s security and development, including among others the complicated 
developments concerning the disputes over sovereignty, sovereign rights and 
jurisdiction over the territories in the East Sea which have seriously affected the 
maritime economic development of Vietnam.
557
  
The task of defending sovereignty and territorial integrity has therefore 
become more urgent. At the 17
th
 ARF in 2010, Vietnam in the Chairmanship of 
ASEAN showed for the first time a new preference for multilateral solutions in 
addition to the traditional bilateral ones concerning the sovereignty disputes in the 
East Sea.
558
 Vietnam successfully internationalized the disputes in the East Sea by 
getting the US to raise its voice, stressing its national interests in freedom of 
navigation, open access to Asia‘s maritime commons and support for multilateral 
negotiations to settle the territorial disputes.
559
 The CPV‘s leaders at the XI 
National Congress restated the need ―to continue to expand external relations in 
the field of security and national defence,‖ particularly ―to participate in political 
and security mechanisms at bilateral and multilateral level on the basis of respect 
for fundamental principles as provided for in international law and the UN 
Charter…‖560  
                                               
557 "Sách trắng Quốc phòng Việt Nam năm 2009‖ [National Defence White Paper 2009], Ministry 
of National Defence, accessed January 8, 2013, http://mod.gov.vn. 
558 The most recent bilateral agreement between Vietnam and China on the resolution of maritime 
issues was signed during the visit to China by Secretary-General Nguyen Phu Trong in 2011. See, 
―Việt-Trung ký thỏa thuận nguyên tắc giải quyết vấn đề Biển Đông‖ [Agreement on the Guiding 
Principles on the Resolution of Maritime Issues between Vietnam and China], VietnamNet, 
October 11, 2011, http://vietnamnet.vn/vn/chinh-tri/43226/viet-trung-ky-thoa-thuan-nguyen-tac-
giai-quyet-van-de-bien-dong.html. 
559 ―Remarks by Secretary Clinton,‖ US Department of State, July 23, 2010, 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/07/145095.htm. 
560 ―Documents of the XI National Congress of the CPV,‖ the Communist Party of Vietnam, 2011, 
http:// http://chinhphu.vn/portal/page/portal/chinhphu/trangchu. 
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In addition, the Documents of the XI National Congress of the CPV also 
added a new principle in the resolution of the remaining issues concerning 
borders, territory, maritime boundaries and continental shelf that is based on 
―regional norms.‖ With these guidelines, Vietnam attaches greater importance to 
participation in political and security mechanisms, taking seriously regional norms 
and implying possible engagement in more substantive security and defence 
cooperation projects in response to security uncertainties. Most recently, 
integration in security and defence together with integration in other areas is 
defined as a means in order to achieve the two main objectives: (i) creating 
favourable conditions for economic integration; and (ii) taking the advantage of 
international resources and comparative advantages gained from international 
cooperation to effectively fulfil the task of defending the homeland.
561
    
Second, the Documents of the XI National Congress also attach greater 
importance to multilateral diplomacy than in those of the previous Congresses. 
For example, Documents of the IX National Congress in 2001 aimed ―to promote 
multi-directional relationships with developed countries and international 
organizations and to increase participation in multilateral forums.‖562 Documents 
of the X National Congress in 2006 stressed ―the promotion of the comprehensive 
and effective relationships with ASEAN members and countries in Asia-Pacific 
region.‖563 The XI National Congress in 2011 has adopted a new orientation of 
participation in international organizations that put a great deal of emphasis on the 
implementation of Vietnam‘s obligations as a member toward achieving the goals 
of those institutions. The Documents read: 
 
                                               
561 MOFA Foreign Policy Department, ―Overview Report on the Ministry-level Research Project 
on International Integration toward the Implementation of the Foreign Policy Orientation adopted 
at the XIth National Congress of the CPV,‖ (2012), p. 50. 
562 ―Documents of the ninth Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam,‖ the Communist Party 
of Vietnam, 2001, hhtp://chinhphu.vn. 
563 ―Documents of the tenth Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam.‖ 
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―to effectively fulfil obligations at international organizations, particularly 
at the United Nations; to pro-actively work and cooperate with countries, 
regional and international organizations in responding to non-traditional 
security challenges, especially climate change; to stand ready for dialogues 
with concerned countries, regional and international organizations on 
democracy and human rights issues;‖564  
 
The same spirit is also found in the ASEAN cooperation framework, in 
which Vietnam-ASEAN relationship has been taken to a new height: 
…To work with other ASEAN members in a pro-active and responsible 
manner toward building a strong ASEAN Community, strengthening 
relations with partners, maintaining an important role in cooperative 
mechanisms in Asia-Pacific region…565 
 
With this new orientation, participation in ASEAN has now become ―one 
of the pillars in Vietnamese foreign policy‖ and the ―Vietnam-ASEAN 
relationship is now attached equal importance with the traditional, cooperative 
and friendship relationships between Vietnam and neighbouring countries with 
shared borders.‖566 Therefore, it is more likely that from now until 2020, 
Vietnam‘s involvement in international institutions will be pursued in a more 
systemic and substantive manner. 
 
Third, and related, is that the increased awareness of the importance of 
international institutions in Vietnamese foreign policy and the determination to 
actively work for the shared goals of these institutions are clearly signs of identity 
change on the part of the Vietnamese after exposure to institutional environments. 
ASEAN is a case in point. By making more commitments to the building of the 
                                               
564 ―Documents of the eleventh Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam,‖ the Communist 
Party of Vietnam, 2011, http://chinhphu.vn. 
565 ―Documents of the eleventh Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam.‖ 
566 Phạm Bình Minh, "Đường lối, chính sách đối ngoại của Việt Nam trong giai đoạn mới‖ 
[Foreign affairs guidelines and policies of Vietnam in the new stage of development], Tạp chí 
Cộng sản 823 (2011): 35-39.  
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ASEAN Community, Vietnam is showing an increased sense of belonging and a 
greater identification with the group. It now finds itself obliged, together with 
other ASEAN members, to work to achieve the shared goal of building ASEAN 
into a strong community, while at the same time wanting to preserve its important 
role in wider-regional cooperative mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific. Change in 
perception whereby Vietnam takes seriously the implementation of its 
membership obligations toward achieving shared goals in ASEAN has been a 
demonstration of the convergence of national interests with those of the regional 
institution on the one hand. On the other hand, it is a reflection of what 
constructivist scholars describe as change in the purposive content of identity that 
Vietnam is contributing to the construction of a collective identity of ASEAN.
567
 
In short, some important changes can be identified concerning Vietnam‘s 
cooperation in the security and defence areas: (i) Vietnam‘s security interests have 
been redefined whereby they are now very closely aligned with those of the wider 
region; (ii) a new preference has been created as reflected in the sovereignty 
disputes in the East Sea that Vietnam now looks for both bilateral and multilateral 
solutions to the disputes; and (iii) Vietnam has become more identified with 
international institutions in general and political and security institutions in 
particular. These signs of change in identity, interests and behaviour appear to 
support constructivist arguments for change as a result of interactions within 
institutional environments. 
  For these reasons, socialization will be a relevant theoretical framework for 
investigating Vietnam‘s security and defence cooperation in the immediate future.  
It could be asked: has socialization led to changes in Vietnam‘s interests and 
behaviour in security and defence cooperation? If so, what new security norms 
and practices might Vietnam be expected to adopt and engage? Investigations 
along these lines should target defence and military officials because they are still 
                                               
567 Rawi Abdelal, Yoshiko M.  Herrera, Alistair Iain Johnston, and Rose McDermott, "Identity as a 
Variable," Perspectives on Politics 4 (2006): 695-711. 
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the most conservative group in foreign policy making circles and their 
involvement in international institutions are limited. Sites for testing socialization 
effects could begin with existing multilateral security and defence institutions in 
the region such as the ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC); 
ASEAN Defence Ministers Meetings (ADMM) which came into being in 2006 
and ADMM Plus which convened the first meeting in 2010; and the ASEAN 
Regional Forum. The reason is that Vietnam‘s new orientation in security and 
defence cooperation is in line with the development trajectory of these institutions 
that is toward more practical cooperation.
568
 This new orientation is articulated in 
the most recent Politburo Resolution on integration: 
Proactively participating in multilateral institutions on security and 
national defence cooperation that Vietnam belongs to, first and foremost in 
the framework of ASEAN-led institutions; carrying out plans to join other 
multilateral institutions; taking part in cooperative activities in a more 
substantial manner such as participating in UN peacekeeping operations, 
WMD control activities, joint-military exercises and other activities, with 
a view to meeting the demands of the task of defending the homeland and 
making a contribution to deepening, stabilizing and consolidating of 
relationships with partners.
569
  
 
Therefore, it seems likely that Vietnam will go beyond the adoption of norms 
and mere participation in security and defence dialogues to engage in more 
substantive practices and cooperative schemes. Given the salience of security 
challenges brought on by the territorial disputes in the East Sea, it will be 
particularly important to explore what specific security norms and practices and 
cooperative measures Vietnam might adopt and engage in to prevent and resolve 
conflicts in this hotspot. 
                                               
568 ―ASEAN Defence Ministers‘ Meeting Three-Year Work Program 2011-2013,‖ ASEAN, 
accessed January 15, 2013, http://www.asean.org/archive/documents/18471-i.pdf. 
569 ―The Politburo Resolution no. 22-NQ/TW on International Integration,‖, p. 4 
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Conducting new research on Vietnam‘s security and defence cooperation 
within the framework of multilateral security institutions would therefore be of 
great relevance in a context in which Vietnam is pushing ahead with its 
international integration. Furthermore, if the internalization of norms investigated 
in this thesis characterizes the first phase of the country‘s integration process, so a 
new research project on Vietnam‘s cooperation in security and national defence 
along socialization lines would help shed light on how Vietnam might go beyond 
verbal support for norms to implement commitments in practice. This is of great 
significance because as stated in the new Politburo Resolution on international 
integration, ―serious implementation of international commitments that Vietnam 
has made‖ 570 is one among the guiding principles of the country‘s next phase of 
integration.  
                                               
570 Ibid., p.3. 
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